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Summary
How does heterogeneity in individual and firm characteristics explain differences in occupational
choice and organizational performance? This thesis considers variations in human capital profiles
and organizational forms to provide insight into drivers of entrepreneurship entry, persistence, and
income on the one hand, and the ability of social enterprises to motivate employee action on the
other. Using econometric techniques and experimental approaches, the three essays that comprise
this thesis provide novel insights into the determinants of different types of entrepreneurship and
the human resource practices of social enterprises.
The first study examines the importance of family and community background as determinants
of entrepreneurship, beyond a narrow focus on intergenerational associations, by estimating sibling
correlations in unincorporated and incorporated business ownership. Background factors explain
up to 45% of variation in entrepreneurship entry, persistence, and income and are more important
for men and for incorporation – a more growth oriented type of entrepreneurship. Shared genes
account for half of the observed similarities in siblings’ outcomes, while parental self-employment
and incorporation status explain up to 17% of sibling correlations. Parental income also matters,
especially for women and incorporation; in contrast, parental education, immigrant status, fam-
ily structure, and sibling peer effects contribute little to sibling similarities in entrepreneurship.
Neighborhood factors, such as the local industrial structure and the share of entrepreneurs one is
exposed to in adolescence, account for up to 8% of sibling correlations and explain the gap between
brother and sister correlations in unincorporated self-employment.
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6Following this line of inquiry, the second study causally investigates the differential effects
of birth order, family size, and sibling sex composition on unincorporated and incorporated en-
trepreneurship. While later born men are more likely to become unincorporated self-employed, this
is due to their lower education and poorer labor market prospects, pointing to the subsistence na-
ture of this type of entrepreneurship. Evidence of causal family size effects in linear and non-linear
(multiple birth and sibling gender) instrumental variable approaches is limited, although children
with more than four siblings are less likely to become incorporated business owners. There is also
a small negative effect of having a brother on the father-daughter association in unincorporated
entrepreneurship. Finally, jointly accounting for these differences increases previously estimated
sibling correlations by little, confirming the role of families in generating sibling similarities, rather
than differences in occupational choice.
The third essay studies how social enterprises – hybrid organizations combining features of
commercial for-profits and charitable non-profits – can elicit effort from employees that differ in
their social motivation. Social enterprises often exhibit revenue drift, i.e. an excessive focus on
purpose at the expense of profits. Despite the threats this poses for organizational performance,
social entrepreneurs are reluctant to use performance-based pay due to the perceived incongruence
between incentives and social impact, as well as the risk of mission drift (the opposite of revenue
drift) through the attraction of less motivated agents. In an online, real-effort experiment varying
incentive strength and whether individuals can select their preferred contract, monetary rewards
generate a balanced effort allocation by redirecting worker attention to commercial tasks. While
strong incentives lead to a small decrease in workers’ compassion, modest incentives do not affect
social enterprise workforce composition and exhibit little risk of mission drift. Social enterprises
that combine mission and monetary rewards not only attract more workers, but also succeed
in mitigating adverse specialization (i.e. revenue drift) by directing worker attention to both
commercial and social tasks.
Resumé
Hvordan kan forskelle i organisationers ydeevne forklares af heterogenitet blandt karakteristika på
virksomheds- og individniveau? Denne afhandling undersøger variationer af individuelle profiler
med hensyn til menneskelig kapital og organisatoriske former. Formålet er på den ene side at skabe
et indblik i hvad der driver individer til at blive entreprenører samt disse individers vedholdenhed
og indkomst, og på den anden side hvad der driver sociale entreprenørvirksomheders evne til
at motivere sine medarbejdere. Ved brug af økonometriske teknikker og eksperimenter bidrager
afhandlingens tre essays med ny indsigt omkring de afgørende faktorer i forhold til forskellige typer
af entreprenørskab, og omkring tilgange i forhold til menneskelige ressourcer inden for sociale
entreprenørskabsvirksomheder.
Det første studie kigger på vigtigheden af familie- og samfundsmæssig baggrund som afgørende
faktorer for entreprenørskab. Studiet går udover det smalle fokus på generationsmæssige associa-
tioner ved at estimere søskendekorrelationer i forbindelse med ikke-inkorporerede og inkorporerede
entreprenørskab. Baggrundsfaktorer forklarer op mod 45% af variationen i individers sandsyn-
lighed for at blive entreprenører, hvor lang tid de forbliver entreprenører, samt hvad de tjener.
Disse faktorer er mere vigtige for mænd og for den inkorporerede virksomhed – en virksomhed-
stype som er en mere vækstorienteret form for entreprenørskab. Fælles gener står for halvdelen
af den observerede lighed mellem søskendes udfald, imens forældrenes status som selvstændige
og som ejer af inkorporerede virksomheder forklarer op imod 17% af korrelationerne mellem søs-
kende. Forældrenes indkomst har også noget at sige specielt for kvinder og for inkorporerede
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8virksomheder. I kontrast hertil betyder forældrenes uddannelse, immigrantstatus, familiestruktur,
og den såkaldte peer-effekt blandt søskende meget lidt for søskendeligheder, når det kommer til
entreprenørskab. Nabolagsfaktorer såsom lokal industristruktur og andelen af entreprenører, som
individet har været eksponeret for i løbet af ungdommen forklarer op imod 8% af søskendekorre-
lationerne og forklarer gabet mellem bror og søster korrelationer i ikke-inkorporeret selvstændig
virksomhed.
I et lignende spor er det næste studie en kausal undersøgelse af forskellige effekter af rækkefølgen
i søskendeflokken, familiestørrelse, sammensætning af køn i søskendeflokken, samt ikke-inkorporeret
og inkorporeret entreprenørskab. Mænd født senere i søskendeflokken har større sandsynlighed for
at blive ikke-inkorporerede selvstændige. Dette kan forklares af deres lavere uddannelsesniveau
og dårligere arbejdsmarkedsudsigter, hvilket er i tråd med netop denne form for entreprenørskab.
Evidens fra kausale familiestørrelse-effekter i lineære og ikke-lineære (flere fødsler og søskendekøn)
instrumental variable metoder er begrænset, dog har børn med flere end fire søskende mindre
sandsynlighed for at blive ejere af en inkorporeret virksomhed. Der er en svag negativ effekt af
at have en bror i forhold til far-datter relationen i ikke-inkorporeret entreprenørskab. Når disse
forskelligheder betragtes i fællesskab øges tidligere estimerede søskendekorrelationer ikke nævntligt,
hvilket bekræfter familiens rolle i at skabe ligheder blandt søskende frem for forskelligheder i valg
af beskæftigelse.
Det tredje studie undersøger hvor sociale virksomheder – hybridorganisationer der kombinerer
funktioner fra kommercielle profitdrævede virksomheder og velgørenheds non-profit virksomheder
– kan fremkalde indsats blandt medarbejdere som er forskellige i forhold til deres sociale motiva-
tion. Sociale virksomheder har ofte et overdrevet fokus på formål og går dermed på kompromis
med profit. På trods af at dette truer virksomhedens præstations, er sociale entreprenører tøvende
med at bruge præstationsbaseret løn på grund af den opfattede uoverensstemmelse mellem inci-
tamenter med social indvirkning og risikoen for at bevæge sig væk fra missionen (det modsatte
9problem af at bevæge sig væk fra profitten), fordi mindre motiverede individer tiltrækkes ved denne
form for lønstruktur. Gennem et online real-indsats eksperiment med varierende incitamentsyrke
og variation i hvorvidt individer kan vælge deres foretrukne lønkontrakt skaber incitamenter en
balanceret indsatsallokering ved at dirigere medarbejderes opmærksomhed hen mod kommercielle
opgaver. Stærke incitamenter leder til at lille fald i medarbejderes medføleles. Imens har moder-
ate incitamenter ikke nogen effekt på medarbejdersammensætningen hos sociale virksomheder og
giver kun lille risiko for tab af mission. Sociale virksomheder som kombinerer mission og mon-
etærer belønninger tiltrækker ikke bare flere medarbejdere, men har også succes med at mindske
ugunstig specialisering ved at lede medarbejdernes opmærksomhed hen mod både kommercielle og
sociale opgaver.

Rezumat
În ce măsură explică eterogenitatea caracteristicilor individuale s, i ale firmelor diferent,ele în ceea ce
prives,te alegerea ocupat, iei profesionale s, i performant,a organizat, ională? Această teză de doctorat
analizează variat, iile întâlnite în profilurile capitalului uman s, i în formele organizat, ionale pentru a
arăta, pe de o parte, care sunt motoarele începerii unei activităt, i antreprenoriale, ale persistent,ei s, i
veniturilor antrepreneuriale, iar pe de altă parte, abilitatea întreprinderilor sociale de a-s, i motiva
angajat, ii să act, ioneze conform scopurilor întreprinderii. Folosind tehnici econometrice s, i abordări
experimentale, cele trei eseuri care formează prezenta lucrare oferă o perspectivă inedită asupra
factorilor determinant, i ai diferitelor tipuri de antreprenoriat s, i asupra practicilor din domeniul
resurselor umane puse în aplicare în întreprinderile sociale.
Primul studiu analizează important,a familiei s, i a comunităt, ii în calitate de factori determinant, i
ai antreprenoriatului. Dincolo de corelat, ii intergenerat, ionale între ocupat, iile părint, ilor s, i copi-
ilor, acest studiu estimează corelat, ii între rezultatele antreprenoriale – deschiderea unei afaceri,
persistent,a s, i veniturile antreprenoriale, în societăt, i comerciale cu sau fără personalitate juridică
– ale copiilor din aceeas, i familie (corelat, ii intrafamiliale). Mediul familial de provenient,ă explică
până la 45% din variat, iile întâlnite în începerea unei activităt, i antreprenoriale, persistent,ă s, i venit,
fiind mult mai semnificativ pentru bărbat, i s, i pentru societăt, ile cu personalitate juridică – o formă
de antreprenoriat mai orientată spre cres,tere, cu necesităt, i de capital uman s, i financiar ridicate.
Genele comune explică jumătate din asemănările observate în rezultatele antreprenoriale ale frat, ilor
s, i surorilor, în timp ce faptul că părint, ii au o activitate antreprenorială (s, i statutul de societate cu
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personalitate juridică al acestei activităt, i) explică până la 17% din corelat, iile intrafamiliale. Venitul
părint, ilor este de asemenea important, mai ales pentru femei s, i pentru societăt, ile cu personalitate
juridică; în schimb, educat, ia părinţilor, statutul de imigrant, structura familială s, i influent,ele re-
ciproce ale frat, ilor s, i surorilor contribuie într-o mică măsură la asemănările dintre copiii din aceeas, i
familie în domeniul antreprenoriatului. Diferent,ele din compozit, ia industriei locale s, i numărul de
antreprenori la care persoanele studiate au fost expuse în adolescent,ă reprezintă până la 8% din
corelat, iile intrafamiliale s, i explică diferenţa dintre corelat, iile bărbat, ilor s, i surorilor în activitatea
antreprenorială fără personalitate juridică.
Continuând această linie de cercetare, cel de-al doilea studiu examinează efectele pe care le au
ordinea nas,terii, mărimea familiei s, i sexul copiilor asupra antreprenoriatului cu s, i fără personalitate
juridică. Des, i este mai probabil ca bărbat, ii născut, i mai târziu să înceapă o activitate independentă
fără personalitate juridică, acest lucru este cauzat de nivelul mai scăzut de educat, ie s, i de perspec-
tivele mai slabe pe piat,a muncii, ceea ce demonstrează caracterul de subzistent,ă asociat acestui tip
de antreprenoriat. Există dovezi limitate în ceea ce prives,te efectele cauzale ale mărimii familiei în
modele liniare s, i non-liniare de regresie cu variabile instrumentale (folosind nas,teri multiple s, i sexul
copiilor drept instrumente), des, i este put, in probabil ca persoanele cu mai mult de patru fraţi s, i
surori să înfiinţeze o societate cu personalitate juridică, posibil datorită constrângerilor cu privire
la capitalul uman s, i financiar întâlnite în aceste familii. De asemenea, într-o familie în care tatăl
det, ine o afacere, este mai put, in probabil ca fiica să devină antreprenor dacă aceasta are un frate.
În ultimul rând, aceste diferent,e luate împreună duc la o cres,tere us,oară a corelat, iilor intrafamiliale
estimate anterior, confirmând rolul familiilor în generarea unor asemănări, mai degrabă decât a
unor diferent,e între copiii din aceeas, i familie în ceea ce prives,te alegerea unei ocupat, ii profesionale.
Cel de-al treilea eseu analizează întreprinderile sociale (organizat, ii hibride ce îmbină caracter-
isticile întreprinderilor comerciale lucrative s, i cele ale organizat, iilor caritabile non-profit) s, i modul
în care acestea determină angajat, ii cu motivat, ii sociale diferite să act, ioneze în interesele firmei.
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Întreprinderile sociale înregistrează adesea o deviere de la profit, adică o concentrare excesivă
asupra scopurilor caritabile, neglijând profiturile. Des, i acest lucru le periclitează performanţa
organizat, ională s, i supraviet,uirea, antreprenorii sociali ezită să folosească o remunerat, ie în funcţie
de performant,ă din cauza a ceea ce ei consideră a fi o incompatibilitate între stimulente financiare
s, i impact social, precum s, i a riscului de a devia de la misiunea întreprinderii (care se opune riscu-
lui de a devia de la profit), prin atragerea unor angajat, i mai put, in motivat, i. Într-un experiment
ce variază nivelul stimulentelor bănes,ti s, i posibilitatea indivizilor de a-s, i alege tipul de contract,
stimulentele financiare duc la o alocare echilibrată a efortului, redirect, ionând atent, ia angajaţilor
către sarcinile comerciale. În timp ce stimulentele ridicate duc la o us,oară diminuare a compasiunii
angajaţilor, stimulentele moderate nu afectează compozit, ia fort,ei de muncă dintr-o întreprindere
socială s, i prezintă un risc scăzut de deviere de la misiunea acesteia. Întreprinderile sociale care
oferă atât recompense financiare, cât s, i recompense legate de misiunea lor socială nu numai că atrag
mai mult, i angajat, i, dar s, i reus,esc să atenueze specializarea adversă, orientând atent, ia angajat, ilor
către sarcinile comerciale s, i sociale în egală măsură.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Motivation
Individual and firm-level heterogeneity are core concepts in economics and management, helping to
explain differences in labor market outcomes, occupational choice, and organizational performance
(Barney, 1991; Murphy et al., 1991; Becker, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Syverson, 2011; Benabou and
Tirole, 2016). The link between differences at the individual and firm level is particularly strong in
(social) entrepreneurship, where founder ability and motivation are closely tied to organizational
outcomes (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Zahra et al., 2009; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011; Battilana
et al., 2015; Stevens et al., 2015). Entrepreneurship – both commercially and socially oriented –
is the principal factor behind business dynamism (Decker et al., 2014), creating jobs, generating
innovations, and ultimately spurring economic growth and societal welfare (van Praag and Versloot,
2007; Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Battilana and Lee, 2014). Inquiries into the effects of human capital
profiles on (social) entrepreneurship entry and performance are therefore paramount in the quest
to generate not only more, but also better entrepreneurs.
Building on classic studies positing that more able, less risk averse, or richer individuals select
into entrepreneurship (Lucas Jr., 1978; Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987;
Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Bates, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997), the past
17
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decade has acknowledged that entrepreneurs have substantially different backgrounds and that
their start-up activities represent distinct phenomena (Hurst and Pugsley, 2011; Henrekson and
Sanandaji, 2014, 2019). Intuitively, individuals whose human capital and financial resources allow
them to earn more from their new ventures than from paid employment may prefer to become
entrepreneurs; conversely, individuals whose (limited) skills are less valued in the labor market
are more likely to be self-employed. As a consequence, individuals from both tails of the ability
distribution – with ability understood as a complex bundle of human and financial capital – have
a higher likelihood of entrepreneurial entry, thus generating ‘stars and misfits’ or ‘hobos and high-
fliers’ (Åstebro et al., 2011; Åstebro and Thompson, 2011; Andersson-Joona and Wadensjö, 2013;
Ng and Stuart, 2016; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017, 2018).
More pragmatically, recent research has focused on distinguishing entrepreneurial motives and
how these are reflected in organizational choices (Åstebro and Thompson, 2011; Roach and Sauer-
mann, 2015). For example, Hurst and Pugsley (2011, 2015) argue that most business owners
enjoy non-pecuniary benefits, without expressing growth ambitions. Schoar (2010), Henrekson
and Sanandaji (2014, 2019), and Acs et al. (2016) have persuasively argued that self-employment
is a poor proxy for innovative, Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. Instead, firm incorporation may
provide a more accurate proxy for entrepreneurs’ ambitions (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). In-
corporation is a strategic decision that offers founders the benefits of limited liability and tax
advantages, allowing them to pursue riskier, but more rewarding ideas, at the cost of minimum
capital requirements and increased regulatory oversight. As a result, only entrepreneurs who an-
ticipate higher performance are expected to incorporate their business.
Empirically, incorporated enterprises have higher ability founders, larger revenue, and higher
innovation, growth, job creation, and IPO rates relative to unincorporated firms (Guzman and
Stern, 2016; Tåg et al., 2016; Åstebro and Tåg, 2017; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017; van Praag
and Raknerud, 2017). As a result, the success of incorporated entrepreneurs contributes to top
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income inequality (Halvarsson et al., 2018). I therefore consider incorporation a marker of growth
oriented entrepreneurship, compared to small-scale, unincorporated self-employment, a dichotomy
that loosely parallels the often used distinction between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship
(Levine and Rubinstein, 2018; Dencker et al., 2019). Understanding how the determinants of these
types of entrepreneurship differ and whether they create obstacles to entry and growth is therefore
an important task, with implications for both policy and individual human capital decisions.
Beyond innate traits, contexts shape individual preferences for entrepreneurship. Organiza-
tions are often regarded as ‘fonts of entrepreneurship’ (Sørensen and Fassiotto, 2011), spawning
successful, competitive new ventures (Gompers et al., 2005; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Franco and
Filson, 2006; Chatterji, 2009; Campbell et al., 2012).1 Contextual effects are found in academic
environments (Stuart and Ding, 2006; Roach and Sauermann, 2015; Kacperczyk, 2013; Lerner and
Malmendier, 2013); in smaller, more entrepreneurial, less bureaucratic, and less hierarchic organi-
zations (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Sørensen, 2007a; Özcan and Reichstein, 2009; Elfenbein et al.,
2010; Nanda and Sørensen, 2010; Kacperczyk, 2012; Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014; Tåg et al., 2016);
and in regional environments (Sorenson and Audia, 2000; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003; Giannetti
and Simonov, 2009; Dahl and Sorenson, 2012; Guiso et al., 2015).
One particularly salient influence is provided by family and community background (Dunn
and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Aldrich and Cliff, 2003). Although research in this area has emphasized
parental entrepreneurship as the main determinant of entrepreneurship (Blanchflower and Oswald,
1998; Hout and Rosen, 2000; Sørensen, 2007b; Lindquist et al., 2015), parents pass on genetic
endowments, provide financial resources, a home environment, an extended family, and a social
context, including neighborhoods and schools. Therefore, a broader inquiry into the role of families
and communities could prove fruitful in illuminating the early life investments and interactions
that shape entrepreneurship.
1 Individual-firm educational or skill mismatches and disagreements over the value of inventions may also drive
entrepreneurship entry (Gambardella et al., 2015; Stenard and Sauermann, 2016).
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Organizations also exhibit heterogeneity in their mission. Besides primarily commercial or for-
profit firms, entrepreneurs may found charitable, non-profit organizations (Rose-Ackerman, 1996;
Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001) and social enterprises – that is, companies that combine commercial and
social goals, tackling societal challenges with market-based business models (Austin et al., 2006;
Dacin et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2013; Besley and Ghatak, 2017).2 Due to their hybrid nature,
social enterprises operate in a contested field, where commercial and social imperatives prescribe
competing courses of action; these tensions make achieving the ‘double bottom line’ difficult, and
many social enterprises struggle to achieve balance (Pache and Santos, 2010). To effectively serve
their beneficiaries, social enterprises must allocate scarce employee effort to commercial and social
tasks (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Battilana and Lee, 2014; Besharov, 2014). Deviations towards
profit to the detriment of purpose – i.e. mission drift – are often regarded by social entrepreneurs
and potential employees as undesirable and contrary to the essence of social enterprises (Jones,
2007; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2017; Grimes et al., 2018).
In practice, due to their embeddedness in a social logic espousing an emphasis on social im-
pact, a reluctance to employ practices stemming from a commercial logic, and high levels of other-
regarding preferences for both founders and employees (Miller et al., 2012; Santos, 2012; Stevens
et al., 2015; Besley and Ghatak, 2017), social enterprises often pay insufficient attention to revenue
generation. As purpose takes priority over profits, revenue drift hinders social enterprises’ ability
to deliver on their social mission and threatens their survival (Smith et al., 2013; Tracey et al.,
2011; Battilana et al., 2015; Davies and Doherty, 2018; Staessens et al., 2018). Nonetheless, social
entrepreneurs are reluctant to use pay for performance – a tool often used by commercial enter-
prises to motivate effort (Austin et al., 2006; Dees, 2012). Investigating whether social enterprises
can tackle these internal tensions through the use of pay for performance is therefore important
2 Social enterprises are an increasingly important phenomenon across the world, in both developing and developed
economies. Short et al. (2009) notes that 6.6% of workers in the United Kingdom (UK) were involved in social
enterprise activities at the time, with an upward trend. Most countries have an established network of social ventures
(e.g., Social Enterprise UK) and several high-profile organizations – such as Ashoka or the Skoll Foundation – actively
encourage innovative social ventures through contests, prizes, and fellowships.
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for organizational theory, providing insights into the hiring and socialization practices adopted by
hybrid organizations (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013; Boone and Özcan,
2016; Smith and Besharov, 2019), the combination of monetary and mission incentives for workers
who differ in their social motivation (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Burbano, 2016; Cassar, 2019) in
a multitasking framework (Kerr, 1975; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991), and the effects of incen-
tives on attention allocation (Ocasio, 1997; Kaplan and Henderson, 2005; Ethiraj and Levinthal,
2009) relative to employee self-selection (Lazear, 2000; Cadsby et al., 2007). Moreover, such an
investigation carries practical implications, where pay for performance, although seemingly incom-
patible with social impact (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001; Dees, 2012), may ultimately help social
enterprises avoid revenue drift.
Thesis Structure
This thesis consists of three independent chapters, summarized in Table 1.1. Although the core
focus in answering each research question is empirical, I draw on theories of human capital, occu-
pational choice, and multitasking to build theoretical predictions and identify the relevant mech-
anisms behind the findings. Methodologically, I provide both descriptive and causal evidence,
relying on econometric techniques – including variance decompositions, (correlated) random ef-
fects, fixed effects, and (linear and non-linear) instrumental variables, applied to detailed register
data from Sweden – and experimental approaches.
Chapter 2, co-authored with Matthew J. Lindquist (SOFI, Stockholm University), Joeri Sol
(University of Amsterdam), and Mirjam van Praag (CBS and VU Amsterdam), estimates sibling
correlations to quantify the total importance of family and community background for unincor-
porated and incorporated entrepreneurship entry, persistence, and income. We then unpack the
channels through which family and community background exert their influence on sibling similar-
ity, including neighborhoods, parental income, entrepreneurship, and immigration status, family
structure, sibling peer effects, shared genes, and (non)cognitive ability.
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Table 1.1: Thesis Summary
Chapter and Title Research question Heterogeneity Method and Data
2. On the Origins of How much variation Individual: Descriptive
Entrepreneurship: in entrepreneurship between families Variance
Evidence from outcomes do family gender decomposition
Sibling Correlations and community Firm level: (random effects)
background explain? unincorporated Swedish register
and incorporated N ≈ 700, 000
3. Same, but Different? Do families generate Individual: Descriptive/causal
Birth Order, Family sibling similarities within families Fixed effects
Size, and Sibling Sex or differences (by gender Instrumental variables
Composition Effects birth order, family Firm level: (linear/non-linear)
in Entrepreneurship size, and gender) unincorporated Swedish register
in entrepreneurship? and incorporated N ≈ 700, 000
4. Striking a Balance: Can social enterprises Individual: Causal
Revenue Drift, use monetary rewards social motivation Online experiment
Incentives, and to mitigate adverse Firm level: (real effort)
Effort Allocation in specialization and organizational Prolific.ac.uk
Social Enterprises elicit balanced effort? forms N = 708
In Chapter 3, I shift the focus from siblings’ shared background towards within-household
heterogeneity, focusing on the differential effects of birth order, family size, and sibling sex com-
position on unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship entry in a set of causal exercises.
To provide a unifying framework, I then jointly account for these differences in the sibling correla-
tions estimated in the previous chapter, completing the picture on the economic and social family
relationships that shape the next generation of entrepreneurs.
Finally, Chapter 4, joint with Simon C. Parker (Ivey Business School), Randolph Sloof (Uni-
versity of Amsterdam), and Mirjam van Praag (CBS and VU Amsterdam), studies how monetary
incentives affect effort allocation in social enterprises – where socially motivated agents may place
purpose ahead of profits and thereby endanger organizational performance and survival. We use
an online experiment to test our predictions regarding the intensive and extensive margin effects
of monetary rewards on effort balance.
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Chapter 2: On the Origins of Entrepreneurship: Evidence from
Sibling Correlations
The origins of (successful) entrepreneurial behavior are not yet fully understood. Beyond fac-
tors affecting individual predisposition (Parker, 2009), contextual influences – from communities,
universities, or organizations – matter. Despite their strength, these influences stem partly from
individual selection into such environments, based on ability and preferences (Özcan and Reich-
stein, 2009; Elfenbein et al., 2010; Roach and Sauermann, 2015; Tåg et al., 2016). The source of
entrepreneurial behavior should therefore be investigated at an earlier stage in individuals’ lives.
A natural starting point for such an inquiry is provided by family and community background, a
prominent context during individuals’ formative years.
The pervasive and long-lasting impact of childhood environment on economic outcomes is
widely recognized in economics (Becker, 1988; Solon, 1999; Chetty et al., 2016). This environment
is a strong determinant of many entrepreneurial antecedents, such as (non)cognitive ability and ed-
ucation (Grönqvist et al., 2017; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017), job values and preferences (Halaby,
2003; Roach and Sauermann, 2015), and the availability of resources and learning opportunities
(Sørensen, 2007b; Guiso et al., 2015; Lindquist et al., 2015). Regardless of the proximate predis-
positional and contextual pathways, family and community background are inextricably linked to
entrepreneurship (Hout and Rosen, 2000; Aldrich and Cliff, 2003).
Chapter 2 conducts a systematic investigation of the importance of family and community
background in shaping entrepreneurship outcomes. While parental entrepreneurship has been
highlighted as the main intergenerational link (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Dunn and Holtz-
Eakin, 2000; Lindquist et al., 2015), this represents an overly narrow focus, as families affect
individual ability, values, resources, and economic outcomes in multiple ways. To quantify the
importance of family background in entrepreneurship, we apply methods from labor economics to
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population representative Swedish register data. Specifically, we estimate sibling correlations, or
the extent to which siblings have similar entrepreneurship outcomes compared to random individ-
uals from the population (Solon, 1999).3 The study of sibling correlations allows us to highlight
i) the importance of family and community for entrepreneurship, ii) the elements of background
that matter, and iii) how the explanatory power of these factors differs between unincorporated
and incorporated business owners.
In our data, incorporated entrepreneurs have higher cognitive and noncognitive ability, more
balanced skills, higher education and lifetime incomes than unincorporated entrepreneurs, as well as
more successful parents, and enter more capital-intensive industries, validating the entrepreneurial
dichotomy we employ. While Sweden potentially represents a particular context – with a flexible
labor market, generous welfare state, and compressed income distribution (Björklund and Jäntti,
1997) – the distinctions between unincorporated and incorporated businesses are similar to those in
other countries, such as the United States (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017; Halvarsson et al., 2018).
We find that up to 45% of variation in entrepreneurship entry and success is explained by back-
ground, mainly through role models inside and outside the household, family resources, and genes.
Sibling similarity in growth oriented entrepreneurship is explained by having incorporated parents,
growing up in neighborhoods with more incorporated businesses, and having richer parents (espe-
cially for women, who face stronger capital constraints). Genes explain half of sibling correlations,
similarly for brothers and sisters, and similarly for unincorporated and incorporated firms. When
we focus on the traits that may be passed on genetically, leadership skills appear particularly
important for incorporation, where individuals are expected to manage a larger enterprise. By
contrast, we find a minor role for parental education, immigration status, and family structure,
and evidence for sibling peer effects is limited to brothers’ unincorporated self-employment.
3 Sibling correlations represent a variance decomposition technique. Similar methods have been applied in both
economics (Griliches, 1979; Solon et al., 1991) and management (McGahan and Porter, 1997; Mollick, 2012).
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Chapter 3: Same, but Different? Birth Order, Family Size, and
Sibling Sex Composition Effects in Entrepreneurship
While family background creates substantial similarities in siblings’ entrepreneurship outcomes,
families also generate sibling differences, which are not captured by sibling correlations (Conley,
2004; Björklund and Jäntti, 2012). For this reason, Chapter 3 examines variation between children
in the same family with regards to becoming an entrepreneur. Human capital literature suggests
that families may treat siblings differently with regards to birth order, gender composition, or
their interplay with family size (Butcher and Case, 1994; Black et al., 2005). These closely related
factors are economically and statistically important for human capital development and may thus
prove relevant for occupational choice. However, research in this area has only considered a broad
definition of self-employment (Han and Greene, 2016; Black et al., 2018; Mishkin, 2017), failing
to distinguish entrepreneurial heterogeneity. In this chapter, I first causally assess each source of
sibling differences in unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship in Sweden, then jointly
account for them to produce revised estimates of the importance of family background.
First, using family fixed effects models (Black et al., 2005, 2018), I show that causal birth order
effects are limited to a higher entry of later born men into unincorporated self-employment. This
effect is driven by strong negative birth order effects in education, as later born men face poorer
labor market prospects. I find no birth order effects for women and incorporation. Second, once
the endogeneity of parents’ fertility decision is addressed in instrumental variable models based
on multiple births and the gender of the first two children (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Black et al.,
2005; Angrist et al., 2010), I find little evidence of causal family size effects in entrepreneurship:
only children with more than four siblings have a lower rate of incorporation.
Third, pure sibling sex composition effects are absent: a woman growing up with a sister, as
opposed to a brother, is not more likely to become an entrepreneur. This result holds when I get
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closer to a causal interpretation by focusing on first born children, assuming that the next child’s
gender is quasi-exogenous (Cools and Patacchini, 2019; Peter et al., 2018). However, the presence
of a brother reduces the father-daughter association in unincorporated self-employment (although
this relationship is weaker in Sweden than in the United States, Mishkin, 2017), and there are
countervailing effects for incorporation and mothers’ business ownership.
Quantitatively, accounting for within-family differences increases previously estimated sibling
correlations by 1.2-2 percentage points (or 3.2%-6.7%), especially in families with both boys and
girls, where all sources of within-family heterogeneity can be expected. In conclusion, families are
mainly responsible for generating similarities rather than differences and the role of families in
entrepreneurship is only marginally understated.
Chapter 4: Striking a Balance: Revenue Drift, Incentives, and
Effort Allocation in Social Enterprises
As hybrid organizations combining commercial and social logics (Austin et al., 2006; Dacin et al.,
2011), social enterprises must allocate scarce employee effort between commercial and social tasks
in order to deliver on their dual objectives (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Besharov, 2014). However,
many social enterprise employees prioritize purpose over profits (Battilana et al., 2015; Stevens
et al., 2015). This excessive focus on social impact to the detriment of revenue generation – or
‘revenue drift’ (Ebrahim et al., 2014) – may ultimately threaten social enterprises’ financial sus-
tainability and survival (Smith et al., 2013). For example, a social enterprise tackling homelessness
endangered its own survival by focusing excessively on beneficiary needs at the expense of required
operational investments (Tracey and Jarvis, 2006; Tracey et al., 2011); similarly, a fair trade so-
cial enterprise insufficiently heeding customer demands and prioritizing coffee producers instead
suffered from falling sales and operational difficulties for several years, limiting its ability to serve
beneficiaries effectively (Davies and Doherty, 2018).
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While we might expect social enterprises to offer pecuniary rewards to induce employees to
balance their effort between commercial and social tasks, social enterprises rarely employ monetary
incentives (Battilana and Lee, 2014). On the one hand, potential employees may perceive a tight
coupling of pay and commercial performance as incompatible to social enterprise values (Austin
et al., 2006; Tracey et al., 2011; Besharov, 2014). Identity tension is especially likely if employees
associate monetary rewards with the competitive ‘bonus culture’ and profit motive traditionally
characterizing a commercial logic (Dees, 2012; Benabou and Tirole, 2016; Dimitriadis et al., 2017).4
On the other hand, social entrepreneurs may be anxious about the danger of mission drift, where
commercial imperatives overshadow social concerns (Ebrahim et al., 2014), thereby choosing to
eschew monetary incentives (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001).
Chapter 4 questions whether these concerns are well-founded. Drawing on organizational the-
ory and economics (Kaplan and Henderson, 2005), we argue that given the predominance of socially
motivated employees and a mission emphasis in social enterprises (Miller et al., 2012; Smith et al.,
2013; Besley and Ghatak, 2017), an absence of pay for performance leads to an unbalanced effort
allocation, with employees favoring social impact over revenue generation. In a multitasking frame-
work (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991), workers’ high levels of intrinsic motivation induce adverse
specialization (MacDonald and Marx, 2001), endangering social enterprises’ performance. While
modest incentives (i.e. small performance bonuses) can elicit balanced effort between commercial
and social tasks, we expect that strong incentives (i.e. large bonuses) lead to mission drift by
distorting effort too far in the direction of commercial imperatives.
We conduct an incentivized, real-effort, online experiment to test our theoretical predictions
and find that monetary incentives elicit a more balanced effort allocation, regardless of their
steepness, while we find a small, but significant downward shift in employees’ social motivation
when strong incentives are offered. These results suggest that for social enterprises to effectively
4 More than two thirds of commercial firms use pay for performance at the individual level for a large share of
employees (see, e.g., Lazear and Shaw, 2007; Gerhart and Fang, 2014).
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motivate employees, they must use both mission and monetary rewards. Moreover, incentives
work by focusing employee attention on tasks the organization finds valuable, thereby performing
a normative function (Ocasio, 1997; Kaplan and Henderson, 2005; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009).
Contributions
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the effects of individual heterogeneity on the
creation and performance of different types of organizations. Chapter 2 analyzes how differential
exposure to childhood environments creates large between-family differences in entrepreneurship
entry, persistence, and income. Chapter 3 focuses instead on within-family heterogeneity, where
differential parental treatment and sibling interactions lead to distinct human capital profiles.
Both chapters also assess gender heterogeneity, as family background matters in different ways for
men and women. Moreover, the thesis analyzes unincorporated and incorporated business owners as
distinct types of entrepreneurs, roughly equivalent to small scale self-employment and, respectively,
growth oriented entrepreneurship. Chapter 4 considers organizational form heterogeneity, with a
landscape including for profits, nonprofits, and social enterprises as employers. Finally, employees
differ in social motivation, which not only affects their occupational choice (i.e. contract selection),
but also their effort allocation. Below, I summarize the contributions the thesis makes to several
strands of literature.
First, the thesis documents the importance of family and community background as a strong
explanatory factor for entrepreneurship entry and performance, accounting for up to 45% of varia-
tion in entrepreneurship outcomes, split roughly equally between nature and nurture. These sibling
correlations are up to five times larger than what previously estimated intergenerational associa-
tions suggest, implying that early exposure to family and community influences has a broad and
long-lasting impact on individual entrepreneurship. In other words, exposure to different child-
hood environments – i.e. between-family heterogeneity – has large effects on individuals’ long-run
propensity to become business owners. Moreover, these correlations are higher than sibling corre-
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lations in other outcomes, suggesting that occupational choice is a particularly fertile ground for
family influences. In this spirit, it would be interesting for future research to delve further into
the role of background for other labor market outcomes, such as becoming an inventor (Aghion
et al., 2018; Bell et al., 2018) or a manager (Black et al., 2018; Custódio and Siegel, 2018; Camp-
bell et al., 2019). More broadly, the large importance of family background for incorporated
entrepreneurship in Sweden – an egalitarian country with substantial safety nets – may imply a
striking dependency of individual growth-oriented entrepreneurship on parental and community
influences in more unequal economies such as the U.S. (Black and Devereux, 2011; Björklund and
Jäntti, 2011). As inequality in income (and entrepreneurial human capital) is expected to increase
globally, programs providing young individuals with exposure to entrepreneurial role models and
learning opportunities (Huber et al., 2014; Elert et al., 2015; Fairlie et al., 2015; Eesley and Wang,
2017; Lyons and Zhang, 2018) as well as access to finance (Lerner, 2009; Lelarge et al., 2010) may
become even more important in the future.
Second, this thesis contributes to the literature on selection into entrepreneurship from the tails
of the ability distribution (Åstebro et al., 2011; Andersson-Joona and Wadensjö, 2013; Levine and
Rubinstein, 2017, 2018). Incorporated firms are started by individuals with i) higher and more
balanced cognitive and noncognitive ability, ii) higher education and incomes, and iii) exposure to
wealthier and more entrepreneurial parents. The strategic incorporation decision is thus associated
with larger, more capital intensive, growth oriented firms. By contrast, unincorporated firms are
started by individuals with i) lower ability and education, ii) more specialist, technical skills, and
iii) poorer labor market prospects. Individuals in between these extremes are more likely to become
wage employees. Thus, the tails of the ability distribution are associated with entry into different
types of entrepreneurship, and policy makers aiming to foster new ventures should pay attention
to this distinction (Shane, 2009; Acs et al., 2016). The disaggregation of business owners into
unincorporated and incorporated also reveals that parental (and to some extent neighborhood)
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role models are specific to a given type of entrepreneurship. Put simply, to encourage growth
oriented ventures, we must expose individuals to growth oriented ventures (or the within family
and neighborhood factors associated with such firms).
Third, family and community influences are different for men and women. Brother correlations
are always larger than sister correlations, especially for unincorporated self-employment. This
gap is explained by exposure to male-dominated, geographically concentrated professions that are
often pursued through self-employment, as well as older brothers acting as role models for younger
ones; that birth order effects are only visible for men also speaks to the importance of social
mechanisms for boys. Unincorporated fathers may also find it easier or more desirable to pass
on their skills to sons rather than daughters, potentially hindering the transfer of entrepreneurial
human capital. The family’s final resources are more important for women’s decision to become
incorporated, suggesting potential differences in perceived risk or difficulties in accessing finance for
women relative to men. Disentangling these channels is an important avenue for future research,
with important implications for reducing the gender gap in entrepreneurship.
Finally, this thesis speaks to a growing literature on social enterprises’ human resource prac-
tices. Entrepreneurs who choose to pursue a blend of commercial and social goals (Dacin et al.,
2011; Miller et al., 2012) must ensure that employees allocate roughly equal amounts of effort to
commercial and social activities to avoid mission drift and revenue drift (Battilana and Dorado,
2010; Battilana et al., 2015; Tracey et al., 2011). The theoretical contribution of this thesis is
to map this setting onto a multitasking framework with motivated workers (Holmström and Mil-
grom, 1991; MacDonald and Marx, 2001; Jones et al., 2018) and argue that pay for commercial
performance mitigates adverse specialization; in other words, only the combination of mission and
monetary rewards succeeds in making workers balance their effort between competing tasks. The
empirical contribution is to show experimentally that monetary incentives – contrary to the usual
expectation of alienating socially motivated workers and inducing mission drift – focus socially
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motivated employees’ attention on desirable tasks, thus performing a normative function (Oca-
sio, 1997; Kaplan and Henderson, 2005; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009). Insights from multitasking
theory may further be used in social entrepreneurship to understand the adoption of complemen-
tary practices from commercial and social logics (Pache and Santos, 2013), as well as the business
models prone to mission or revenue drift (Ebrahim et al., 2014).
In a broader perspective, the first two studies highlight the large importance of families for
entrepreneurship. Parental influences – stemming from both nature and nurture, and operating
through a variety of mechanisms – tower over community influences; and while differences between
children in the same family are limited, disparities in exposure to entrepreneurial families may
limit individuals’ perception of entrepreneurship as a feasible career or their ability to become
successful business owners. The final study emphasizes that social entrepreneurs could and should
engage with tools characteristic of commercial ventures to address internal tensions in effort alloca-
tion. Whether and how pay for performance complements other hiring and socialization practices,
governance mechanisms, and social impact rewards constitute research avenues that may improve
social enterprise theory and practice in the future.
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34 CHAPTER 2. ON THE ORIGINS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is often hailed as a driver of innovation, job creation, and growth. However,
the origins of (successful) entrepreneurial behavior are not yet fully understood. Individual prefer-
ences, ability, education, and financial resources, all feature as potential dispositional determinants
of entrepreneurship (Parker, 2009). More recently, the contextual influence of universities, organi-
zations, or neighborhoods has also received attention.1 While each of these contextual effects has
been convincingly documented, they stem partly from the selection of individuals into such environ-
ments, based on ability and preferences (Özcan and Reichstein, 2009; Elfenbein et al., 2010; Roach
and Sauermann, 2015; Tåg et al., 2016). This implies that the source of entrepreneurial behavior
should be investigated at an earlier stage in individuals’ lives. We argue that a natural starting
point for such an inquiry is provided by an individual’s family and community background. To this
end, we conduct a systematic assessment of the importance of family and community background
as determinants of entrepreneurship.
Studies of the role of family background for entrepreneurship usually emphasize parental en-
trepreneurship (Lentz and Laband, 1990; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin,
2000; Aldrich and Kim, 2007; Laspita et al., 2012; Hoffmann et al., 2015). While its impact on indi-
vidual entrepreneurship has been convincingly documented, working through role-modeling and/or
the transfer of entrepreneurship-specific human capital (Sørensen, 2007b; Lindquist et al., 2015),
parents’ entrepreneurship is only one of many ways through which they influence their children’s
entrepreneurial choices and outcomes. Parents pass on genetic endowments, provide income, a
home environment, an extended family, and a social context in which children grow up, including
1 Stuart and Ding (2006) and Roach and Sauermann (2015) study the effect of academic environments; Nanda
and Sørensen (2010), Kacperczyk (2013) and Lerner and Malmendier (2013) focus on workplace and university peers;
Dobrev and Barnett (2005), Sørensen (2007a), Özcan and Reichstein (2009), Elfenbein et al. (2010), Kacperczyk
(2012), Sørensen and Sharkey (2014), Tåg et al. (2016) study how organizational bureaucracy, size, and hierarchy
spawn entrepreneurs; Sorenson and Audia (2000), Stuart and Sorenson (2003), Giannetti and Simonov (2009), Dahl
and Sorenson (2012), and Guiso et al. (2015) examine the effects of an entrepreneurial network, local embeddedness,
and youth exposure to regional entrepreneurial density.
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neighborhoods, schools, and churches. These factors combine in different ways to encourage or
discourage an individual’s choice to become an entrepreneur as an adult, beyond the influence of
parental entrepreneurship.
In this paper, we argue that intergenerational correlations in entrepreneurship should be
viewed as narrow and insufficient measures of the overall importance of family background for
entrepreneurship. Instead, our methodological contribution is to estimate sibling correlations in
entrepreneurship. Sibling correlations can be viewed as omnibus measures of the importance of
family background and neighborhood effects in determining a given outcome (Solon, 1999; Björk-
lund and Jäntti, 2011; Black and Devereux, 2011). Intuitively, sibling correlations measure the
similarity in outcomes of siblings relative to the similarity in outcomes of individuals drawn ran-
domly from the population: the larger the correlation, the more important shared background is
for generating sibling similarities. Thus, sibling correlations measure the fraction of variation in
the outcome variable that is due to shared family background and neighborhood effects.2
Our sibling approach allows us to make two contributions to the entrepreneurship literature.
First, we quantify the overall importance of family and community background as determinants
of business ownership, beyond simple intergenerational associations entrepreneurship. What share
of the variation in entrepreneurial outcomes is driven by family background and neighborhood
effects? Our results indicate these influences are substantial and (up to five times) larger than was
assumed based on parent-child transmission studies. Second, we discuss the relative importance
of various determinants discussed in the previous literature within a single, unified framework.
What is it that parents do that makes their children so similar? Which background characteristics
influence entrepreneurial outcomes the most?
2 Although our paper is (to the best of our knowledge) the only one to focus its full attention on sibling
correlations in entrepreneurship, some twin studies calculate twin correlations in order to estimate heritability in
entrepreneurship. Nicolaou et al. (2008) do not report these correlations; Zhang et al. (2009) and Nicolaou and
Shane (2010) do report raw correlations for Swedish and U.S. twins, but do not discuss them at length, as they focus
on measuring heritability. Zunino (2016) studies gene-environment interaction effects using Italian twins in a more
standard regression framework and, hence, does not report sibling correlations comparable to our own.
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To compute sibling correlations in entrepreneurial outcomes, we use data from Sweden’s Multi-
generational Register on nearly 700,000 children born between 1960 and 1970. For the years
1993-2012 we have information from the Swedish tax authority concerning business ownership
for all of these individuals and their parents. We also have data on individual and family socio-
economic variables, including information on education, income, family structure, immigration
status and parish of residence. For most brothers in our sample, we have measures of cognitive
and non-cognitive skills at age 18 taken from their military draft records.
We operationalize entrepreneurship using information on business ownership. We classify in-
dividuals as business owners in any given year if they receive the majority of their taxable labor
earnings from a company they own in full or in part. We then define two different types of
entrepreneurs: those who own and operate unincorporated firms, i.e. the self-employed, are dis-
tinguished from those who own and manage incorporated (non-listed, limited liability) firms.3 We
make this distinction for several reasons. Unincorporated firms are typically small, owner-operated
firms with no employees; by contrast, incorporated firms have, on average, more employees (Hurst
and Pugsley, 2011; Åstebro and Tåg, 2017), a higher likelihood of growth and reaching an IPO
(Guzman and Stern, 2016), and create more income for the business owner (Levine and Rubinstein,
2017; Humphries, 2017; van Praag and Raknerud, 2017). In Sweden, incorporated firms contribute
to top income inequality, whereas unincorporated firms increase inequality at the bottom of the
distribution (Halvarsson et al., 2018). The entrepreneurship literature has therefore questioned
whether self-employment is a good proxy for Schumpeterian entrepreneurship (Schoar, 2010; Hen-
rekson and Sanandaji, 2014, 2019) and has suggested that incorporation is a better marker of
growth orientation (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017).
Most studies show different antecedents and characteristics for incorporated relative to unincor-
porated entrepreneurs: their parents have higher education and incomes, they are more educated,
3 The literature commonly refers to unincorporated business owners as ‘self-employed’ and to incorporated
business owners as ‘entrepreneurs’ (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017, 2018).
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and score higher on aptitude tests (Åstebro and Tåg, 2017; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017; Tåg
et al., 2016). These differences can be substantial, consistent with entrepreneurs being drawn
from the tails of the ability distribution (Åstebro et al., 2011; Levine and Rubinstein, 2018). In
our data, incorporated business owners have higher cognitive and noncognitive ability, education,
and lifetime incomes than unincorporated business owners, have more balanced skill distributions,
and enter different industries, supporting the validity of this dichotomy. To enable comparisons
with previous literature defining entrepreneurship as self-employment and to follow recent develop-
ments, we estimate sibling correlations for both unincorporated and incorporated business owners.
For both categories, we create three different outcome variables: (1) entry, i.e. if a person was a
business owner in at least one year, (2) persistence, i.e. years as business owner, and (3) income,
i.e. income earned as a business owner.
We estimate quite large sibling correlations, suggesting that family background and commu-
nity influences are important determinants of entrepreneurial outcomes, especially for men and for
incorporated business ownership. Background explains between 30% and 45% of the variation in
entry, persistence, and income for men and between 15% and 38% for women. These numbers gen-
erally exceed the estimated sibling correlations for education and earnings (Björklund and Jäntti,
2012), suggesting that family and community are particularly salient factors for entrepreneurial
outcomes. We then explore three questions that arise from these large sibling correlations. First,
which background characteristics contribute most to sibling similarity in entrepreneurial outcomes?
Second, why are sibling correlations in incorporated business ownership larger than their unincor-
porated equivalents? Third, why are brother correlations larger than sister correlations, especially
for unincorporated firms? To answer these questions, we use detailed data on parental and sibling
characteristics (including twin data) to examine the roles played by (i) neighborhood effects, (ii)
parental income, education, business ownership, immigration, and family structure, (iii) sibling
peer effects, and (iv) shared genes. Finally, for the men who underwent the mandatory military
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draft, we explore which shared traits can provide pathways for family influence by analyzing the
role of cognitive and non-cognitive ability.
We begin by estimating neighborhood correlations that include corrections for parental sorting
into neighborhoods (Page and Solon, 2003a), which can be viewed as upper bounds on neighbor-
hood influences experienced at age 15. Neighborhood effects can explain 3% to 8% of variation
in business ownership for men and 3% to 5% for women, suggesting that sibling correlations are
driven mainly by family factors and not by shared community influences. However, neighbor-
hoods do matter. Additional analyses yield two new results. First, the neighborhood correlation
in unincorporated business ownership for men is large enough to explain most of the observed
gender difference in sibling correlations in this outcome. We hypothesize that regional differences
in male-dominated occupations, such as farming and construction, which (in Sweden) are typically
organized as unincorporated firms, account for the majority of the gender difference in sibling cor-
relations in entry and persistence in unincorporated self-employment. Second, there is a somewhat
smaller neighborhood effect related to ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ or role modeling; that is, part of
the neighborhood correlations is explained by the share of business owners in the neighborhood
(Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Guiso et al., 2015).
Comparing the entrepreneurship correlations of different sibling types, we find that shared genes
account for up to 50% of the sibling correlations for men and potentially even more for women. In
their Swedish twin study, Zhang et al. (2009) find a large genetic component for women, but no
genetic component for men, and report a large shared environmental component for men, but no
shared component for women in self-employment. Zunino (2016) finds a large genetic component
for men, but not for women, and argues that the zero finding for women is most likely due to
a female unfriendly entrepreneurial environment in Italy that dampens the expression of their
genetic predisposition. In a sample of U.S. twins, Nicolaou and Shane (2010) find no substantive
differences in heritability for men and women. In line with the latter, our results based on different
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sibling types, and not just twins (Björklund et al., 2005), show equally large genetic and shared
environmental components for both men and women.
Parents, however, do more than just pass on their genes to their children. The most important
parental characteristic for explaining sibling correlations is parental business ownership. Interest-
ingly, parents’ unincorporated business ownership explains a large share of the sibling correlations
in unincorporated, but not incorporated business ownership, and vice versa, parents’ incorporation
only explains sibling correlations in incorporation, hinting towards type-specific entrepreneurial
role-models or the transfer of type-specific human capital. An additional share of sibling corre-
lations in incorporated business ownership, i.e. the most capital-intensive form, is explained by
parental income, especially for sisters. Parental education, family structure, and immigrant status
account for little of sibling correlations in business ownership.
Siblings may also directly influence each other’s choices, i.e. there may exist sibling peer effects
in business ownership entry. To investigate this, we estimate a correlated random effects model
(Altonji et al., 2017), which allows us to put an upper bound on sibling peer effects. For the most
part, we find little evidence of such effects; we do, however, find evidence that an older brother’s
choice of becoming an unincorporated business owner has a positive effect on the probability of
his younger brother making the same choice at a later date. This effect can explain up to 8% of
the brother correlation in unincorporated entry.
In our final exercise, we examine the role played by similarities in brothers’ cognitive and
non-cognitive skills. While these scores explain only a small fraction of the sibling correlations
in their entry decisions (at most 3%), similarities in cognitive and non-cognitive skills explain 8%
of the correlations in their business incomes. This is mainly due to non-cognitive ability: a high
leadership score strongly predicts incorporated business ownership entry and income.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2.2 describes our data and empirical
strategy, including a discussion of the analytical relationship between sibling correlations and inter-
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generational correlations. We report sibling correlations in Section 2.3 and assess the mechanisms
behind sibling similarity in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
2.2 Data and Methods
2.2.1 Data
We use a 70% sample from Sweden’s Multigenerational Register, which includes all persons born
from 1932 onwards who have lived in Sweden at any time since 1961.4 All family ties, both
biological and adoptive, are recorded in this register. We define siblings, and hence families, as those
sharing the same (adoptive) mother.5 The Multigenerational Register also provides information
on month and year of birth. Having month of birth allows us to accurately identify multiple births,
although we do not have information on the zygosity of these children. Other variables taken from
this register include gender, year of immigration or emigration, and year of death, as well as parish,
municipality, and county of residence from 1968 onwards.
Individuals in our sample can be matched to various official data sources using unique personal
identification numbers; we thus have no attrition issues when matching additional variables to
our sample. This does not mean, however, that our data are free from measurement error. For
example, parental business ownership will be miss-measured in some cases, as some parents in our
sample are quite old (or even dead) during the years when our business ownership variables are
available. We address these and other measurement issues below.
Our entrepreneurship variables are taken from the Swedish Tax Register. Consistent with the
Swedish tax authority, we define individuals as business owners when they derive the majority of
their taxable labor income from a business owned in full or in part. We differentiate between two
types of business.6 For the years 1993 to 2012, we know whether a person received the majority
4 This register is held at Statistics Sweden, together with all the other registers we refer to.
5 In rows (4)-(6) of Appendix Table A.1.2 we show that our results are robust to alternative family definitions.
6 Tåg et al. (2016), Åstebro and Tåg (2017), Humphries (2017), and Halvarsson et al. (2018) distinguish between
these types of business owners in Sweden; Berglann et al. (2011), and van Praag and Raknerud (2017) do so for
Norway, while Hvide and Oyer (2018) focus on newly incorporated firms in Norway.
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of their taxable labor income from a partially or fully owned unincorporated or incorporated firm
(and possibly employing personnel).7 In our data, an incorporated business is a privately owned,
non-listed, limited liability stock company, subject to minimum capital requirements.8
Our extensive margin measures of business ownership, Unincorporated and Incorporated, are
dichotomous variables equal to 1 if the individual is ever categorized as the owner of an unincor-
porated and, respectively, incorporated firm, and zero otherwise. In any given year, no individual
is classified as both Unincorporated and Incorporated.9 We use information on business owner-
ship and income between 1993 and 2012 to define our intensive margin outcomes. Specifically, we
count the number of years individuals have been business owners, Years unincorporated and Years
incorporated,10 as well as the income received while a business owner, Income unincorporated and
Income incorporated. Our measure of income represents pre-tax total factor income, including
earnings, taxable benefits (e.g. unemployment insurance, parental insurance, sick pay, etc.), and
net capital gains (e.g. dividends, interest received or paid, etc.). We average business ownership
income across the years individuals were business owners and then take the log of this average.11
Given the years for which business ownership data is available, we restrict our sample to
7 Data on unincorporated business ownership is available from 1985 onwards and is used to calculate parental
unincorporated business ownership. We only use data from 1993 onwards for children in order to make the results
comparable to those for incorporation; results are robust to using all years (see row (2) of Appendix Table A.1.2).
8 Many (male dominated) occupations, such as farmers and craftsmen, are over-represented among unincorpo-
rated firms, especially in rural areas, whereas incorporated firms are spread across industries more evenly. Statistics
Sweden includes farmers in its business owner definition, since farms are run as companies (unincorporated or
incorporated). In our sibling sample (yearly data, 1993-2010), the recorded industry for unincorporated firms is
agriculture in 12.5% of cases; the equivalent number for incorporated firms is 2.4%. Sibling correlations are robust
to excluding families where parents were farmers (see row (12) of Appendix Table A.1.2). Other occupations, such as
lawyers, medical doctors, or accountants are represented across all categories, since they may operate as employees
of other organizations, as well as unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurs.
9 The most likely entry mode is a new ventures, rather than a business take-over (Parker and van Praag, 2012).
Moreover, in our data, 21.2% of unincorporated business owners have also been incorporated, and 32.3% of the
incorporated have also been unincorporated. Of the 18,867 individuals with both types of experience, 78.7% have
first been unincorporated (these spells need not be consecutive and may not capture the same venture). In principle,
this is consistent with a conceptual model where individuals first experiment with entrepreneurship on a smaller
scale, learn about their potential quality as entrepreneurs, and then decide whether to launch a growth oriented,
incorporated firm (Folta et al., 2010; Manso, 2016). While our paper focuses on the differences between types of
businesses, we acknowledge that one type (unincorporated) may also lead to the other (incorporation).
10 Note that these measures do not capture firm survival (considered a poor measure of success, see Arora and
Nandkumar, 2011), but individual persistence, in potentially different spells.
11 Note that current business income may not accurately reflect current entrepreneurial productivity. Some owners
may misreport their incomes to avoid paying taxes, while the incorporated may choose to take out lower wages today
in order to build equity in their business (Hamilton, 2000; Åstebro and Chen, 2014; Hurst et al., 2014).
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siblings born between 1960 and 1970. Thus, we follow the oldest cohort from ages 33 to 52, and
the youngest cohort from ages 23 to 42. Those who died or emigrated from Sweden before 1993
are dropped from the sample. These restrictions imply that siblings are born at most 11 years
apart and that some individuals have siblings who are not included in our sibling sample.12
We have also created a set of family-wide background variables. We define parental unincor-
porated and incorporated business ownership the same way we do for their children. Our parents,
however, are quite old when we observe entrepreneurial outcomes. The median birth year of the
mothers and fathers in our sample is 1939 and 1936, respectively. This implies some degree of mea-
surement error due to censoring in our measures of parental entrepreneurship.13 We address this
measurement error in four distinct ways. First, we have data on unincorporated firm ownership
starting in 1985. So for parents, we use this longer time span (1985-2012) to define unincorpo-
rated business ownership. Second, we focus on the extensive margin measure of parental business
ownership (i.e. appearing at least once in our data as business owners). Third, as a robustness
check, we ‘pool’ mothers and fathers to see if either has ever been a business owner and use this
as an alternative measure of parental entrepreneurship. Fourth, we split the sample into younger
and older parents, to see how this affects our results concerning the associations between parents’
and their adult children’s entrepreneurial outcomes.14
Parental education, taken from the National Education Register and the 1970 Census for some
older parents, is measured in seven different levels spanning the old seven-year compulsory level
12 We impose these restrictions so we can observe siblings’ and parents’ business ownership for the longest period
possible. In Appendix Table A.1.2, row (9) we show similar results for a smaller sample of complete families.
13 All our regressions include a control for children’s birth year, and row (11) of Appendix Table A.1.2 shows
that including parental and children’s birth year dummies does not affect the sibling correlations. In the accounting
exercise, we also include two additional dummy variables for parental death or emigration from Sweden. The first is
an indicator if the parent died or emigrated from Sweden before 1985 (which is when our data for self-employment
in an unincorporated business begins). The second is an indicator for parental death and emigration between 1985
and 1992 (given that our data for incorporated businesses starts in 1993).
14 In addition, we extracted survey data on self-employment from the Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU) for
the years 1968, 1974, 1981, and 1991. We chose a representative sample of men and women born in the same years as
the parents in our sample. We then calculated the share of these men and women who reported being self-employed
in at least one of the four available survey years; 18% of men and 8% of women report being self-employed at least
once. These numbers are somewhat lower than the rates that we report in Panel B of Table 2.1. Thus, we may
actually have a relatively accurate measure of parental self-employment.
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through to graduate school. This indicates the highest degree completed in Sweden, and as such,
it is missing for older immigrants who have not attended school in Sweden.15 We include a dummy
for missing parental education in our empirical analysis. Parental income, taken from the Swedish
Tax Register, is defined as the log of the average of a parent’s pre-tax total factor income for
all available years from 1968 to 2012. This is calculated separately for mothers and fathers, then
summed. Total factor income captures both labor earnings and returns on capital (financial wealth
and/or rental property and/or other rental assets), and is strongly correlated with wealth (Lefgren
et al., 2012). In our empirical specifications, we introduce total factor income as a set of dummy
variables for deciles of the distribution, as well as the top 5 and top 1 percent. These dummies
capture the skewed nature of Sweden’s income and wealth distributions, and are thus likely to be
significant predictors of business ownership (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004).
Our family structure variable is based on information on parents’ actual cohabitation (when
the child is 15) from Sweden’s Total Population Register. It contains six categories: missing, both
parents present, single mother, single father, mother with new husband, father with new wife.16
Finally, we define neighborhoods as the parish siblings live in at age 15.17
For most male Swedish citizens in our sample we have information from their military draft
records concerning height, weight, and body mass index (BMI). We also have stanine (scale 1-9)
test scores for logical, verbal, spatial, and technical ability, as well as a measure of leadership skills
constructed from a structured interview with a psychologist, which was used to help select young
men (around the age of 18) into officer training.18
15 In some cases, their education is still included if it was recorded by the immigration authorities.
16 Other family structure variables, such as i) mother’s age at first birth, ii) the mother’s partner count (number
of children she has conceived children with), iii) father unknown, iv) the presence of both biological and adoptive
children in the household, or v) family size, add little explanatory power.
17 We estimate parish correlations; other neighborhood definitions (schools or statistical metropolitan areas) are
unlikely to induce large changes in these correlations (Raaum et al., 2006; Lindahl, 2011). Moreover, in our data,
correlations estimated for wider definitions (municipalities and counties) are lower than parish correlations.
18 Military draft records were provided by the Swedish Recruitment Agency (Rekryteringsmyndigheten) and the
Swedish War Archives (Krigsarkivet). See Lindqvist and Vestman (2011) and Grönqvist et al. (2017) for a complete
description of the data and discussions on how these data correlate with various labor market outcomes.
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2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of 696,231 individuals (356,847 men and 339,384 women) from 430,935 families,
and Appendix Table A.1.1 shows the number of families with different sibship sizes. In our sample,
nearly 33% of individuals are singletons (i.e. they have no siblings included in the sample – by
contrast, we only have 6% ‘true’ singletons).19
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that 12.8% of the individuals in our
sample have been Unincorporated at least once, while 8.4% have been Incorporated at least once.
The average number of Years unincorporated and Years incorporated are 5.9 and 5.8, respectively.
Income unincorporated and Income incorporated are higher than permanent income (i.e. averaged
over the years 1993-2012), and display larger variability (see Panel A in Table 2.2 for measures of
permanent income). As expected, income from incorporated businesses is, on average, larger than
income from unincorporated businesses.
Descriptive statistics for parents are shown in panel B; 15% of mothers and 24% of fathers
have been unincorporated at least once, while 3.1% of mothers and 6.3% of fathers have been
incorporated. Mothers and fathers have similar education levels; fathers are slightly more likely
to be Swedish natives and have somewhat higher income than mothers. Panel C shows that the
average number of children is 2.8 per family, of which we capture 1.6 children per family on average
in our sample. The majority of families consists of intact families – almost 70%. Single mothers
represent the second most frequent family type (18.7%), followed by mothers with a new husband
(5%), single fathers (3.7%), and fathers with a new wife (1.7%). This variable is missing for 1.3%
of our sample. Panel D shows that our average parish, out of a total of 2,650 parishes, comprises
259 individuals, while the largest includes 5,286 individuals.20
In Panel A of Table 2.2, we examine differences in the observable characteristics of employees
19 We include singletons to increase the precision of the estimate of between-family variation and odds ratios,
although our results are not sensitive to their inclusion or exclusion, see row (1) of Appendix Table A.1.2.
20 These numbers reflect the size of our sample in each parish, not true parish size. A Swedish parish is roughly
similar in size to a U.S. Census tract, with a median parish size of just under 3,000 inhabitants (in 2000).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D. N Min Max
A. Business ownership outcomes
Unincorporated 0.128 (0.334) 696,231 0 xx1
Incorporated 0.084 (0.277) 696,231 0 xx1
Years unincorporated 5.892 (5.238) 89,061 1 20
Years incorporated 5.785 (4.605) 58,410 1 20
Unincorporated log income 13.703 (1.202) 89,061 0 .xx19.7
Incorporated log income 14.088 (0.969) 58,410 .x9.1 .xx19.1
B. Parental characteristics a
Mother unincorporated 0.148 (0.355) 430,935 0 xx1
Father unincorporated 0.243 (0.429) 421,548 0 xx1
Mother incorporated 0.031 (0.174) 430,935 0 xx1
Father incorporated 0.063 (0.244) 421,548 0 xx1
Mother log income 11.603 (0.828) 429,550 0 .xx17.1
Father log income 12.174 (0.670) 418,670 0 .xx17.3
Mother years of schooling 10.023 (2.787) 423,737 7 x19
Father years of schooling 9.985 (3.012) 406,914 7 x19
Mother immigrant 0.103 (0.304) 430,935 0 xx1
Father immigrant 0.086 (0.280) 421,548 0 xx1
C. Demographics
Male 0.513 (0.499) 696,231 0 xx1
Twins 0.021 (0.143) 696,231 0 xx1
Adopted 0.014 (0.119) 696,231 0 xx1
Family size, total a 2.803 (1.306) 430,935 1 x18
Family size, in sample a 1.616 (0.767) 430,935 1 xx8
Family structure at age 15 a
Both parents 69.54% 299,657
Single mother 18.69% 80,548
Single father 3.74% 16,118
Mother with new husband 4.98% 21,454
Father with new wife 1.73% 7,452
Missing 1.32% 7,506
D. Neighborhood characteristics
Parish size 259.365 (475.779) 2,650 1 5,286.x
Ever unincorporated 0.162 (0.369) 2,650 0 xx1
Ever incorporated 0.074 (0.262) 2,650 0 xx1
% Other parents unincorporated 0.307 (0.138) 2,642 0 xx1
% Other parents incorporated 0.043 (0.036) 2,642 0 .xxx0.5
a Variables calculated at the family level to avoid overweighting large families.
(labor market participants who have never been business owners), unincorporated, and incorpo-
rated business owners. On average, the incorporated have higher lifetime incomes and more edu-
cation than the other two groups, while the unincorporated have lower incomes and less education.
46 CHAPTER 2. ON THE ORIGINS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics by Business Ownership Status
Employee Uninc. Inc. (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (3)-(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Individual characteristics
Years of schooling 12.309* 11.945* 12.305* -0.364 -0.004 0.360
(2.184) (2.072) (2.109) *** ***
Log income 11.864* 11.731* 12.222* -0.133 0.357 0.491
(0.635) (0.497) (0.466) *** *** ***
Business income 13.591* 14.070* 0.479
(1.212) (1.003) ***
Logical ability a 4.905 4.752 5.338 -0.152 0.433 0.585
(1.974) (1.893) (1.826) *** *** ***
Verbal ability a 4.797 4.672 5.076 -0.126 0.278 0.404
(1.774) (1.735) (1.633) *** *** ***
Spatial ability a 5.057 5.076 5.461 0.018 0.404 0.385
(1.933) (1.886) (1.817) *** ***
Technical ability a 4.897 4.932 5.356 0.035 0.459 0.424
(1.897) (1.814) (1.767) *** *** ***
Leadership skills a 5.243 5.125 5.635 -0.118 0.392 0.510
(1.502) (1.527) (1.422) *** *** ***
Skill dispersion a 0.260 0.262 0.233 0.002 -0.027 -0.029
(0.135) (0.134) (0.118) *** *** ***
B. Family characteristics
Mother unincorporated 0.137 0.230 0.202 0.093 0.065 -0.028
(0.344) (0.421) (0.402) *** *** ***
Father unincorporated 0.231 0.355 0.319 0.123 0.088 -0.035
(0.422) (0.478) (0.466) *** *** ***
Mother incorporated 0.024 0.032 0.120 0.008 0.095 0.087
(0.154) (0.177) (0.325) *** *** ***
Father incorporated 0.053 0.065 0.195 0.012 0.142 0.131
(0.224) (0.246) (0.396) *** *** ***
Mother log income 11.591* 11.586* 11.736* -0.005 0.145 0.150
(0.819) (0.822) (0.686) *** ***
Father log income 12.166* 12.126* 12.355* -0.040 0.189 0.229
(0.649) (0.722) (0.635) *** *** ***
Mother schooling 9.996 10.141* 10.372* 0.144 0.375 0.231
(2.785) (2.842) (2.859) *** *** ***
Father schooling 9.940 10.039* 10.341* 0.099 0.400 0.301
(3.031) (3.067) (3.120) *** *** ***
Mother immigrant 0.110 0.120 0.087 0.010 -0.023 -0.033
(0.312) (0.325) (0.282) *** *** ***
Father immigrant 0.091 0.101 0.075 0.010 -0.016 -0.026
(0.288) (0.301) (0.263) *** *** ***
Intact family 0.705 0.700 0.772 -0.006 0.066 0.072
(0.456) (0.458) (0.420) *** *** ***
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard deviations in parentheses. Some individuals have been
both unincorporated and incorporated at different times; they are omitted here, but the results are
similar if they are counted as both Unincorporated and Incorporated. a Available for men only.
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For the sample of men for whom military data is available, unincorporated business owners tend
to have lower cognitive and non-cognitive ability than employees, with the exception of technical
ability, often associated with the manual labor performed by the self-employed (Levine and Rubin-
stein, 2017). By contrast, the incorporated have higher ability than the other groups, especially
with regards to leadership skills. The dispersion of these skills – measured by the intra-individual
coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to mean) of cognitive and noncognitive scores
– is also lower for incorporated business owners than for either of the other two groups, which
are highly similar.21 This result is in line with the balanced skills or jack-of-all-trades theory of
entrepreneurship (Lazear, 2004, 2005), in which individuals with a generalist profile are more likely
to become entrepreneurs than specialists due to the broad set of tasks and functions entrepreneurs
must perform. However, our result places an important limit on the generalization of this theory:
only incorporated business owners benefit from balanced skills, and not all owners, as previously
thought (Aldén et al., 2017).
In addition, the incorporated are more likely to enter industries such as the manufacturing
of machinery, metal, electrical and optic tools, retail and wholesale trade, financial services, and
computer and data services, whereas the Unincorporated are found more often in services and
agriculture (see Appendix Figure A.1.1). These differences broadly reflect the different financial
requirements of an industry (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004), with incorporated business owners more
often encountered in capital intensive industries.
Panel B shows that employees and business owners also differ in their background. On average,
the parents of the Incorporated have higher education and income levels than the parents of the
other two groups. The Unincorporated are more likely to have parents who owned an unincor-
porated (but not incorporated) firm than those in the other two groups, whereas incorporated
21 We compute the coefficient of variation using all non-missing observations; results are similar when we only
use individuals with complete ability data. Results are also similar when we measure balance as the intra-individual
standard deviation of skills (Aldén et al., 2017). However, we prefer the coefficient of variation as there are significant
mean differences between groups.
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entrepreneurs are more than three times as likely to have incorporated parents compared with the
other two categories. Clearly, incorporated and unincorporated business owners differ in terms
of their observable characteristics and family backgrounds, including the type of entrepreneurial
experiences they were exposed to as children. These differences are in line with those noted by
Levine and Rubinstein (2017), Åstebro and Tåg (2017), Tåg et al. (2016), and Humphries (2017).
In addition, the differences between employees and the incorporated are larger than those be-
tween employees and the unincorporated, implying that employees and the unincorporated may
be more substitutable than employees and the incorporated, which should translate into larger
sibling correlations in being incorporated than in being unincorporated.
2.2.3 Methods
Entrepreneurship, Eif , for sibling i from family f can be modeled as:
Eif = X ′ifβ + if , (2.1)
where X ′if includes individuals’ birth year and a gender dummy for individual i from family f .
The residual term, if , is an individual-specific component representing a person’s position in the
overall distribution of entrepreneurship, whose population variance is given by σ2 . Following Solon
(1999), the individual variance component, if , is assumed to be comprised of two linearly additive
and independent variance components:
if = af + bif . (2.2)
The first part, af , is a permanent component shared by all siblings in family f . This is what
makes siblings similar. The second component, bif , is the permanent component unique to sibling i
in family f . The variance of if can be expressed as the sum of the stationary population variances
of the permanent family and individual components:
σ2 = σ2a + σ2b . (2.3)
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The share of the variance in an individual’s long-run propensity to choose business ownership over
wage employment that can be attributed to family background effects is:
ρ = σ
2
a
σ2a + σ2b
≡ corr(if , i′f ). (2.4)
This share coincides with the correlation in business ownership of randomly drawn pairs of
siblings, which is why ρ is called a sibling correlation. This sibling correlation can be thought of
as an omnibus measure of the importance of family and community effects. It includes family-
wide influences that are shared by siblings, such as parental entrepreneurship, parental income,
parental aspirations, cultural inheritance, genes, etc. However, it also includes shared influences
that are not directly experienced in the home, such as school, church, and neighborhood effects.
Genetic traits not shared by siblings, differential treatment of siblings, time-dependent changes in
neighborhoods, schools, etc., are captured by the individual component bif . If non-shared factors
are relatively more important than shared factors for determining business ownership, the variance
of family effects will be small relative to the variance of individual effects and the sibling correlation
will be low; in other words, the more important the effects of factors that siblings share are, the
larger the sibling correlation will be.22
An estimate of the sibling correlation in entrepreneurship entry, ρ, can be constructed using
estimates of the between-family variation, σ2a, and the individual (within-family) variation, σ2b .
These can be obtained by estimating the following latent linear response model:
E∗if = X′ifβ + af + bif , (2.5)
22 The existence of non-shared family factors, such as differential treatment by birth order, gender, or their
interaction with family size, implies that sibling correlations should be viewed as lower bounds on the importance of
family background and neighborhood effects. Björklund and Jäntti (2012) discuss this issue and examine the size of
the advantage of first born children over their younger siblings in cognitive and non-cognitive skills, height, schooling,
and earnings; they find only minor effects. Nonetheless, birth order effects could be important for self-employment
(Black et al., 2018). Mishkin (2017) finds that in the U.S. the father-daughter association in self-employment is 80%
lower if a brother is present. The next chapter in this thesis (working paper circulated as Vladasel, 2018) studies
birth order, family size, and sibling sex composition effects in entrepreneurship in Sweden and concludes that they
are quantitatively unimportant. In particular, I show that the mechanism described by Mishkin (2017) only applies
to paternal unincorporated business ownership, and is much weaker in Sweden. Overall, sibling differences have only
a minor effect on our estimates.
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where we only observe Eif = I(E∗if > 0) (i.e. the dependent variable is dichotomous). We
estimate equation (5) using Stata’s xtlogit command under the assumption that the random effect
af is a realization from a normal distribution with mean zero and constant variance, while the
individual variance component, bif , is drawn from the logistic distribution with mean zero and
variance pi2/3. Stata’s xtlogit command reports ρ (along with a 95% confidence interval) as part
of its standard output. For the continuous intensive margin outcomes, we estimate a similar
model using Stata’s mixed command under the assumption that the two random components are
independent realizations from a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and constant
variance. The variance components are estimated using restricted maximum likelihood. These
models are estimated only conditional on entry into self-employment.
2.2.4 The Relationship between Sibling and Intergenerational Correlations
Solon’s (1999) derivation of the sibling correlation nicely demonstrates the analytical relationship
between the intergenerational (e.g. parent-offspring) correlation, which we will call γ, and the
sibling correlation, ρ. Let the permanent family component, af , be defined as the sum of parental
business ownership (times γ), γf , and a set of other parental factors orthogonal to f , zf . We
then obtain the following relationship:
af = γf + zf . (2.6)
Taking the variance of both sides of equation (2.6) and dividing through by σ2if gives us:
σ2af
σ2if
= ρ =
γ2σ2f
σ2if
+
σ2zf
σ2if
. (2.7)
If σ2f u σ
2
if
, then we obtain the following relationship:
ρ = γ2 +
σ2zf
σ2if
. (2.8)
The sibling correlation equals the intergenerational correlation in business ownership squared
plus all parental factors uncorrelated with parental business ownership. In Section 2.4.2 we show
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that the total effect of the latter dwarfs the importance of parental entrepreneurship when ac-
counting for sibling correlations. Thus, focusing attention solely on intergenerational correlations
results in a narrow measure of the overall importance of family for entrepreneurship.
2.3 Sibling Correlations in Entrepreneurial Outcomes
We report sibling correlations in entrepreneurial outcomes in Table 2.3. Column (1) shows sibling
correlations for Unincorporated, our extensive margin measure for ever being an unincorporated
business owner. The overall sibling correlation is 0.21: in other words, 21% of the total variation
in Unincorporated is determined by family background and community influences. For brothers,
the sibling correlation in Unincorporated is 0.29, whereas for sisters it is 0.21.23 In column (2), the
overall sibling correlation for ever being an incorporated business owner, Incorporated, is 0.34. For
brothers the correlation is 0.40 and for sisters it is 0.35. These numbers suggest that family and
community background are even more important for the decision to become Incorporated than for
becoming Unincorporated. For men, 40% of the variation in this outcome is determined by the
families and environments they are raised in.
Sibling correlations for our intensive margin outcomes, Years unincorporated and Years incor-
porated, are reported in columns (3) and (4). The overall correlations are 0.21 and 0.39, and similar
to our extensive margin results. For brothers, background is responsible for 31% and 45% of the
variation in persistence in unincorporated or incorporated firm ownership. For sisters, the equiv-
alent numbers are 17% and 38%. In columns (5) and (6), we report sibling correlations in total
factor income earned from business ownership, Income unincorporated and Income incorporated.
Brother correlations are 0.30 and 0.42 for unincorporated and incorporated businesses ownership
income, respectively, and sister correlations are 0.16 and 0.36.24
23 The overall sibling correlations also include mixed gender sibships, which generally have the lowest sibling
correlations. For brevity, we do not report mixed sibship results, except in Table 2.6 and Appendix Table A.1.3.
24 While the extensive and intensive margin results are similar, one can argue that the latter are conditional on
selection into entrepreneurship and may not capture much beyond selection. In an earlier working paper version of
this chapter (Lindquist et al., 2017), we used a stricter definition of entrepreneurship, where only individuals who
had spent at least the median number of years (4 for unincorporated, 5 for incorporated) as entrepreneurs are defined
as such. The results for these outcomes are even stronger. The brother correlation in Incorporated ≥ 5y is 0.48,
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Table 2.3: Sibling Correlations in Business Ownership
Entry Years Income
Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. All children
ρ 0.212 0.341 0.214 0.386 0.209 0.346
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Individuals 696,231 696,231 89,061 58,410 89,061 58,410
Families 430,935 430,935 80,551 53,157 80,551 53,157
B. Brothers
ρ 0.292 0.404 0.310 0.447 0.296 0.416
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Individuals 356,847 356,847 55,606 42,650 55,606 42,650
Families 278,107 278,107 51,731 39,592 51,731 39,592
C. Sisters
ρ 0.213 0.351 0.169 0.381 0.158 0.360
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033)
Individuals 339,384 339,384 33,455 15,760 33,455 15,760
Families 267,894 267,894 31,155 15,274 32,155 15,274
Standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) estimate maximum likelihood random effects
logistic regressions with entry into entrepreneurship as the outcome variable; columns (3)-(6) estimate
restricted maximum likelihood random effects linear regressions with years of and income from busi-
ness ownership as the outcome variable, conditional on becoming an unincorporated or incorporated
business owner.
To get a more complete picture of the importance of background for the number of years
spent as a business owner, we create a set of dummies for individuals being unincorporated or
incorporated for more than x years, where x = 1, 2, ..., 10. Figure 2.1 plots sibling correlations
in these outcomes: as before, correlations in being Incorporated are higher than those in being
Unincorporated, and brother correlations are higher than sister correlations. However, confidence
intervals for brother and sister correlations in incorporated business ownership largely overlap,
and gender differences are most noticeable for unincorporated self-employment. In addition, there
is a positive relationship between years of business ownership and the influence of family and
community background. At the median number of years as an unincorporated entrepreneur (4
larger than the 0.40 we obtain in Panel B of Table 2.3 (see also Figure 2.1 below, plotting correlations in being an
entrepreneur for a given number of years). This suggests that our intensive margin outcomes do capture more than
selection, and that family background further explains performance in entrepreneurship.
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Figure 2.1: Sibling correlations in being a business owner for at least x years, separately by
gender and type of business, with 95% confidence intervals.
years), correlations are 0.36 for brothers and 0.26 for sisters; at the median number of years as
an incorporated entrepreneur (5 years), correlations are 0.48 for brothers and 0.46 for sisters.
Correlations further increase for being a business owner for up to 10 years, where incorporated
correlations reach 0.72.
Overall, the sibling correlations in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1 suggest that family background
and community influences are important determinants of entrepreneurial outcomes, especially for
men and for incorporated business ownership. Background explains between 30% and 45% of the
variation in entry, persistence, and income for men and between 16% and 38% for women. These
numbers generally exceed the estimated sibling correlations for education and earnings (Björk-
lund and Jäntti, 2012), as well as cognitive and non-cognitive ability for men (see Section 2.4.5),
suggesting that family and community are particularly salient determinants of business ownership
outcomes at both the extensive and intensive margin.
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In Appendix Table A.1.2, we show that our sibling correlation estimates are robust to a set
of different subsamples and outcome definitions. In particular, they are robust to (1) excluding
singletons, (2) using data from 1985 onwards for unincorporated outcomes, (3) using data only on
individual careers between ages 25 and 40, (4) defining the family through the father, (5) excluding
families with an adoptive father, (6) excluding families with an adoptive mother, (7) restricting
the sample to non-twin pairs, (8) restricting the sample to closely spaced non-twin pairs (born 12
to 24 months apart), (9) restricting the sample to families captured in their entirety, (10) families
for which data on parental characteristics is complete, (11) including individual and parental birth
year dummies, (12) excluding families with parents older than 65 in 1993, (13) excluding families
with parents older than 65 or who left the sample before 1993, (14) excluding families where
parents were farmers, and (15) a placebo test whereby we replicate the original cluster structure of
our data and randomly assign individuals to these clusters (to show that sibling correlations pick
up more than simple statistical noise).25
We also calculate sibling correlations for the different constellations of siblings, namely families
with male children only, with female children only, and with mixed gender children. To perform
this robustness check, we restrict the sample to sibships captured in their entirety, which row (9) of
Appendix Table A.1.2 shows does not affect our main sibling correlations. Appendix Table A.1.3
shows similar patterns: correlations for male-only sibships are larger than in female-only sibships
across all outcomes. Correlations in mixed gender sibships are slightly lower, in line with the
broader differences between men and women’s business ownership.
With these robust sibling correlations in hand, the remainder of the paper focuses on answering
the following questions:
25 These mixed-effects models do not have closed-form solutions and rely on numerical optimization techniques.
In additional sensitivity analyses, we experimented with estimation commands using slightly different optimization
procedures. For example, we estimated the extensive margin models using the user-written command gllamm (Rabe-
Hesketh et al., 2005) and found very similar results.
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1. What is it that parents give their children that make them so similar in terms of their business
ownership outcomes?
2. Why are sibling correlations for incorporated business ownership larger than sibling correla-
tions for unincorporated businesses ownership?
3. Why are brother correlations in unincorporated business ownership larger than the equivalent
sister correlations?
To answer these questions, we focus on the extensive margin outcomes throughout the rest of
the paper and show results for the intensive margin outcomes in the Appendix. When differences
between the extensive and intensive margin results do arise, we highlight them in the main text.
2.4 Accounting for Sibling Similarities
What is it that makes the entrepreneurial outcomes of siblings so similar? In this section, we inves-
tigate the extent to which our sibling correlations can be accounted for by (i) neighborhoods, (ii)
observable parental characteristics (including parental business ownership), (iii) sibling peer effects,
and (iv) shared genes. We also examine one of the potential pathways (children’s traits) through
which parents may transmit entrepreneurship-relevant human capital: their levels of cognitive and
non-cognitive abilities.
2.4.1 Neighborhoods
In his review of the determinants of entrepreneurship, Parker (2009) notes that “[a]ll major
economies exhibit regional differences in rates of entrepreneurship” (p. 147). Indeed, Giannetti
and Simonov (2009) show that between-municipality variance in Sweden is almost ten times the
within-municipality variance in entrepreneurship, and that a standard deviation increase in the
proportion of entrepreneurs in the local labor market is associated with 25% more entry into en-
trepreneurship. In Italy, Guiso et al. (2015) find a positive effect of local firm density in individuals’
province of residence at age 18 on entrepreneurial entry. They also show that this density leads
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to higher income in entrepreneurship and the adoption of better management practices, which
suggests exposure to entrepreneurship when young aids learning.26
Our sibling correlations include such neighborhood and community effects. In this section we
assess the share of the sibling correlation that can be accounted for by influences experienced
outside of the home, but shared by siblings. To do so, we estimate neighborhood correlations in
entrepreneurship, using data on the parish individuals resided in at age 15 (the smallest geograph-
ical unit we observe). These correlations place an upper bound on the impact of community-wide
factors influencing business ownership choices. An estimate of the neighborhood correlation, ρn,
can be constructed by using estimates of the between-neighborhood variation, σ2n, and the individ-
ual (within-neighborhood) variation, σ2b , which can be obtained by estimating the following latent
linear response model for our extensive margin outcomes:
E∗in = X′inβ + cn + bin, (2.9)
where cn is a permanent community factor and we only observe Ein = I(E∗in > 0). An equiva-
lent model can be estimated for our continuous intensive margin outcomes. The main difference
from previously estimated sibling correlations is that we also include a set of parental character-
istics in X′in to correct for parental sorting into neighborhoods (Solon et al., 2000; Raaum et al.,
2006). Correcting for sorting provides a tighter upper bound on neighborhood effects on business
ownership outcomes. With these new variance components, the neighborhood correlation is:
ρn =
σ2c
σ2c + σ2b
. (2.10)
26 Contemporaneous learning from local entrepreneurs, however, does not seem to play a role (Michelacci and Silva,
2007; Guiso et al., 2015). For example, Giannetti and Simonov (2009) argue that their contemporaneous effect reflects
non-pecuniary benefits generated by social status concerns rather than learning, while Dahl and Sorenson (2012)
show that entrepreneurs tend to locate close to ‘home’, exploiting regionally embedded social capital. Moreover,
entrepreneurs display less geographical mobility than employees, and this effect is not produced mechanically by
involvement in the family firm; these local entrepreneurs exploit advantages in access to finance to build larger,
more capital intensive businesses (Michelacci and Silva, 2007). Additionally, Bell et al. (2018) show that exposure
to inventors in the community where they grew up is a strong determinant of individuals becoming inventors, with
role-modeling (rather than genetic transmission) as the main channel of influence.
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Table 2.4: Neighborhood Correlations in Business Ownership
Unincorporated Incorporated
Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. No controls
0.038 0.018 0.020 0.022
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
13.11% 8.40% 5.06% 6.24%
N 352,145 335,173 352,145 335,147
B. Parental controls (excl. entrepreneurship)
0.036 0.015 0.016 0.013
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
12.46% 7.04% 3.98% 3.75%
N 352,145 335,173 352,145 335,147
C. Parental controls (incl. entrepreneurship)
0.023 0.011 0.011 0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
7.99% 5.21% 2.60% 2.75%
N 352,145 335,173 352,145 335,147
D. All controls (incl. share of entrepreneurs in neighborhood)
0.018 0.008 0.006 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
6.10% 3.81% 1.58% 1.62%
N 347,702 330,799 347,702 330,799
Odds ratios:
% Other parents uninc. 3.581*** 2.023*** 1.315*** 1.389***
% Other parents inc. 1.953*** 10.508**** 52.689**** 50.824****
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Percentages indicate the
contribution of the neighborhood correlation to the corresponding sibling correlations in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 2.3. Panel D displays the odds ratios of the share of parents of individuals in the same
parish who have been unincorporated or incorporated (leaving out the focal individual’s parents).
Neighborhood correlations for Unincorporated and Incorporated, are reported in Table 2.4, sep-
arately for brothers and sisters. In panel A, we do not correct for selection into neighborhoods, i.e.
we do not control for parental characteristics. The neighborhood correlation in being Unincorpo-
rated is 0.038 for brothers. This implies that neighborhood effects can account for at most 13%
of the brother correlation in Unincorporated reported in Table 2.3. The neighborhood correlation
in being Unincorporated is 0.018 for sisters, so neighborhood effects can account for at most 8.5%
of the sister correlation in Unincorporated. Neighborhood correlations in Incorporated, which are
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0.02 for both brothers and sisters. These correlations can account for at most 5-6% of the sibling
correlations in Incorporated from Table 2.3. Thus, while neighborhoods do help explain business
ownership, family influences are an order of magnitude larger.
In panel B, we address parental sorting into neighborhoods by controlling for a large set of
parental characteristics such as income and education, but not parental business ownership. As
these measures capture both direct and indirect neighborhood effects, we view them as our pre-
ferred baseline neighborhood correlations: they are somewhat smaller than those in panel A,
especially for Incorporated, as parental incomes may explain both neighborhood sorting and chil-
dren’s incorporation outcomes. In panel C, we add parental business ownership. Parents clearly
select into and/or are shaped by the local community environment, these control variables lower
our estimated neighborhood correlations substantially. We interpret the remaining neighborhood
correlations as tight upper bounds on causal neighborhood effects. Such effects account for between
5% and 8% of the Unincorporated sibling correlation and around 2.7% of the Incorporated sibling
correlation. The takeaway of this exercise, so far, is that neighborhood influences do matter, but
are a limited source of sibling similarity in business ownership.
We find similar results for our intensive margin outcomes (Appendix Table A.1.4), with one
exception. The neighborhood correlation for men in Years unincorporated can account for over
18% of the brother correlation in Years unincorporated and is large enough to explain most of
the observed gender difference in sibling correlations among unincorporated businesses owners.
Our hypothesis is that regional differences in male-dominated occupations, such as farming and
construction, typically organized as unincorporated firms (in Sweden), account for the lion’s share
of the gender differences in sibling correlations in unincorporated outcomes.27 Indeed, Appendix
27 Our argument mirrors that of Page and Solon (2003a,b), who argue that much of the neighborhood correlation
in earnings seen in the U.S. is due to the persistence with which urban born boys (and their brothers) tend to live
and work in urban areas as adults. This geographical persistence means that urban boys tend to live in areas with
similar economic structures, price levels, and wage levels as adults (see also Løken et al., 2013). Thus, part of the
brother correlation, and much of the neighborhood correlation, is generated by this geographical persistence. A
related argument is provided by Chetty et al. (2016), who suggest that neighborhoods matter more for boys in the
U.S. especially because of regional patterns of poverty and incarceration.
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Figure A.1.2 shows that relative to women, unincorporated men are visibly more likely to be found
in agriculture, forestry, and construction.
In panel D, we show that the share of business owners in one’s parish (other than one’s own
parents) explains a large share of the residual neighborhood effect. The importance of growing up in
a high entrepreneurship density neighborhood is reflected in the odds ratios reported in Table 2.4.28
Remarkably, the share of adults in the neighborhood who have ever been incorporated business
owners matters strongly for both brothers’ and sisters’ incorporation choices.
We draw three main conclusions from these exercises concerning the role of community wide
influences in shaping business ownership. First, it is the family and not the neighborhood that
determines the large sibling similarities in entrepreneurial outcomes that we observe in our data.
Second, a large share of the gender difference in sibling correlations among unincorporated business
owner is likely due to regional differences in the prevalence of male-dominated occupations. Third,
a part of the neighborhood effect is related to the mechanisms typically discussed in the literature,
such as the existence of a local entrepreneurial spirit and/or role modeling (see, e.g., Giannetti
and Simonov, 2009; Guiso et al., 2015). While this effect does not explain much of our sibling
similarities, the large odds ratios at the bottom of Table 2.4 indicate that this effect may be quite
important for explaining the individual-level idiosyncratic part of the choice to become a business
owner, particularly for incorporation.
2.4.2 Parental Characteristics
Which parental characteristics are mainly responsible for generating sibling similarities in business
ownership? We study this question by including a set of family-wide variables suggested by the
literature, either one at a time or simultaneously, as control variables in our logistic regressions.
For example, consider the inclusion of mothers’ and fathers’ entrepreneurship in X′if . These two
additional variables should reduce the residual variation in the outcome variable and produce
28 For example, girls in a parish where all observed adults (other than their parents) have been incorporated are
50.8 times more likely to become incorporated than girls in a parish where no other parent has been incorporated.
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a lower estimate of the between-family variation, σ2∗a , than the estimate produced without the
added controls. We can interpret the difference between these two estimates, σ2a−σ2∗a , as an upper
bound on the amount of the variance in the family component that can be explained by parental
entrepreneurship. It is viewed as an upper bound since it includes other factors affecting children’s
entrepreneurship that are correlated with parental entrepreneurship (for instance, education, oc-
cupation, or residence). This exercise also produces a new sibling correlation, ρ∗. From what we
know about the relationship between parents’ and children’s entrepreneurship (Lindquist et al.,
2015), we expect this new sibling correlation to be substantially lower.
The degree to which any particular control variable lowers the sibling correlation after being
included provides a metric for judging its importance in explaining sibling similarities (Mazumder,
2008; Björklund et al., 2010) and the upper bound on its explanatory power, but does not allow for
a strictly causal interpretation.29 Specifically, we explore the potential roles played by parental (i)
education, (ii) income, (iii) business ownership, and (iv) immigration status and family structure.
We also report the odds ratios and coefficients associated with each of these control variables.30
Our accounting exercise allows us to set an upper bound on different elements of family and
community background above and beyond parental business ownership. We can thus gauge the
relative importance of background characteristics, separately by gender, type of business, and
along the extensive and intensive margins.
Previous research has suggested an important role of parental human capital and financial re-
sources (Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987; Lentz and Laband, 1990; Aldrich et al., 1998; Blanchflower
and Oswald, 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Aldrich and Kim, 2007; Fairlie and Robb, 2007a;
29 In addition, one could be concerned with a mechanical decrease in the sibling correlation as controls are added,
similar to the mechanical increase in R2. To ensure this is not the case, we generated a set of (20 or 100) noisy random
variables at both the individual level and the family level, and included them as controls. Appendix Table A.1.5
shows that the change is not mechanical: these random variables increase (decrease) the sibling correlations by at
most 1.59% (0.72%), and often explain nothing at all.
30 Table 2.5 reports the results for Unincorporated and Incorporated business ownership, together with odds ratios.
In Appendix Table A.1.6 we report the explanatory power of these variables for both the extensive and intensive
margin outcomes, as well as their joint contribution to the sibling correlation (panel D).
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Hvide and Oyer, 2018) for entrepreneurship entry and success.31 Parental education often serves
as a proxy for the transfer of general human capital, while a large role for parental income and
wealth would be consistent with the existence of capital constraints (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a,b;
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). While these human and financial capital transfers matter, it is
unclear what their magnitude is in explaining entrepreneurial outcomes, as well as with regards to
gender and firm type (unincorporated or incorporated).
Substantial attention has been devoted to parental entrepreneurship as the most likely influ-
ence on individuals’ occupational choices. The mechanisms underlying the influence of parental
entrepreneurship include shared genes, role-modeling, and the acquisition of general or specific
business human or social capital (Lentz and Laband, 1990; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Fairlie
and Robb, 2007b; Sørensen, 2007b; Colombier and Masclet, 2008; Laspita et al., 2012; Hoffmann
et al., 2015; Lindquist et al., 2015), business inheritance, or occupational following.32
Ethnicity and parental immigration are likely to play a role in entrepreneurship decisions, in
terms of the location of new immigrants and their subsequent choice of business (Dunn and Holtz-
Eakin, 2000; Edin et al., 2003; Andersson and Hammarstedt, 2010, 2011; Kerr and Mandorff, 2015).
Finally, although family structure is potentially associated with personality developments affecting
entrepreneurial decisions, it has been understudied as a determinant of entrepreneurship, mainly
given a lack of reliable data. Previous studies reveal a limited association of family structure with
entrepreneurship or entrepreneurial values (De Wit and Van Winden, 1989; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin,
31 Edelman et al. (2016) highlight the importance of parental social capital; unfortunately, we do not have data
on social capital, although our neighborhood variable will capture such influences to a certain extent.
32 Business inheritance is unlikely to play a large role. Using similar data to ours, Lindquist et al. (2015) find
that only 2.2% of entrepreneurs in Sweden enter for the first time in the same industry and the same year as their
parent exits entrepreneurship. Once they include offspring that become an entrepreneur one year before or after
their parents’ exit, the number rises to 4.4%. Sørensen (2007b) finds that almost 8% of children’s entries into self-
employment in Denmark occur at the same time and in the same industry as their parents’ industry, while Dahl
and Sorenson (2012) note that less than 5% of entrepreneurs (with at least 1 employee) enter an industry where
their parents have experience. Other studies also show that a low share of children actually take over their parents’
company, usually between 5.5 and 14% for U.S. and Canada (Lentz and Laband, 1990; Aldrich et al., 1998; Fairlie
and Robb, 2007a). Note also that succession is less straightforward in the multiple-child families at the core of our
analysis, since not all children inherit the family firm. In our data, siblings are observed as incorporated business
owners at the same time and in the same industry in at most 3% of years, suggesting that co-ownership by siblings
is limited, as is the contribution of business inheritance to sibling correlations.
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Table 2.5: Accounting Exercise: Parental Characteristics
Unincorporated Incorporated
Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Parental education
Mother’s education level:
9 years 1.074*** 1.190*** 1.344*** 1.278***
11 years 1.077*** 1.098*** 1.241*** 1.118***
12 years 1.195*** 1.410*** 1.591*** 1.507***
14 years 1.545*** 1.283*** 1.536*** 1.349***
15.5 years 1.205*** 1.423*** 1.555*** 1.409***
19 years 1.579*** 1.548*** 1.658*** 1.404***
Father’s education level:
9 years 1.087*** 1.176*** 1.203*** 1.374***
11 years 1.050*** 1.115*** 1.044*** 1.127***
12 years 0.865*** 1.200*** 1.284*** 1.429***
14 years 0.842*** 1.186*** 1.121*** 1.417***
15.5 years 0.838*** 1.390*** 1.143*** 1.483***
19 years 0.834*** 1.490*** 1.133*** 1.606***
ρ∗ 0.289 0.205 0.399 0.341
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
0.86% 3.66% 1.13% 2.98%
B. Parental income
Pct. 10-20 0.890*** 0.996*** 1.180*** 1.190***
Pct. 20-30 0.752*** 0.928*** 1.322*** 1.191***
Pct. 30-40 0.700*** 0.929*** 1.389*** 1.399***
Pct. 40-50 0.635*** 0.930*** 1.488*** 1.340***
Pct. 50-60 0.643*** 0.895*** 1.637*** 1.441***
Pct. 60-70 0.632*** 0.915*** 1.809*** 1.548***
Pct. 70-80 0.647*** 1.024*** 2.182*** 1.880***
Pct. 80-90 0.660*** 1.180*** 2.718*** 2.388***
Pct. 90-95 0.662*** 1.409*** 3.219*** 3.022***
Pct. 95-99 0.689*** 1.663*** 4.049*** 4.232***
Pct. 99-100 0.770*** 2.128*** 6.354*** 7.219***
ρ∗ 0.288 0.206 0.382 0.321
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
1.47% 3.14% 5.41% 8.67%
continued
2000; Hout and Rosen, 2000; Halaby, 2003; Hundley, 2006; Tervo, 2006), although the incorporated
in Levine and Rubinstein (2017) are more likely to come from a two-parent family. Controlling
for these observables one by one and then jointly, we can assess both their relative and their total
contribution to variance in business ownership.
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Table 5 (cont’d): Accounting Exercise: Parental Characteristics
Unincorporated Incorporated
Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C. Parental business ownership
Mother unincorporated 1.643*** 1.589*** 1.286*** 1.282***
Father unincorporated 1.963*** 1.356*** 1.342*** 1.196***
Mother incorporated 0.911*** 1.294*** 2.837*** 3.507***
Father incorporated 0.933*** 1.231*** 3.854*** 2.032***
ρ∗ 0.267 0.199 0.348 0.309
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
8.66% 6.37% 13.75% 12.15%
D. Other family characteristics
Mother immigrant 1.088*** 1.010*** 0.845*** 0.913***
Father immigrant 1.153*** 1.044*** 0.970*** 0.945***
Family structure:
Single mother 1.046*** 0.990*** 0.746*** 0.763***
Single father 1.136*** 1.102*** 0.919*** 0.882***
Mother, new husband 1.052*** 1.044*** 0.784*** 0.866***
Father, new wife 1.127*** 1.031*** 0.587*** 0.672***
ρ∗ 0.290 0.213 0.399 0.348
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
0.56% 0.05% 1.18% 1.06%
E. All family characteristics
ρ∗ 0.257 0.190 0.334 0.287
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
11.63% 10.75% 17.23% 18.20%
Individuals 356,847 339,384 356,847 339,384
Families 278,107 267,894 278,107 267,894
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Percentages indicate the
contribution of parental characteristics to the corresponding sibling correlations in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 2.3. For parental education, the reference category is 7 years; for parental income,
the reference category is the bottom decile of parental income distribution; for family structure, the
reference category is the intact family. The models include dummies for missing parental education,
income, business ownership, immigrant status, and family structure, when assessing the explanatory
effect of that particular family variable. In Panel C, we also include dummy variables for the mother
and father leaving the sample before 1985 (when data on unincorporated business ownership becomes
available) and before 1993 (when data on incorporated business ownership becomes available).
In panel A of Table 2.5, parents’ education explains a limited share of variance in business own-
ership. Odds ratios range from 0.83 to 1.66, and parental education lowers brother correlations
in Unincorporated and Incorporated by (at most) 1.1%, and sister correlations by 3%. Despite
strong intergenerational correlations in education in Sweden (Holmlund et al., 2011), the transfer
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of general human capital from parents to sons does not explain why siblings are so similar in terms
of their entrepreneurial outcomes; for daughters, higher education may allow them to overcome
potential entry barriers, making parental education a more important determinant of business
ownership. At the intensive margin, Panel A of Appendix Table A.1.6 shows that parental educa-
tion explains between 3.6% and 9.2% of correlations in business income. This is consistent with
an intergenerational correlation in ability, which allows children of more educated (higher ability)
parents to perform better as business owners.
We control for parental income (the sum of mother’s and father’s total factor income) through
a set of dummies for deciles of the income distribution, as well as the top 5 and 1 percent, in Panel
B. High parental income lowers the odds of being Unincorporated for men but raises the odds for
women, explaining 1.5% (3.1%) of the brother (sister) correlation. Parental income consistently
raises the odds of being Incorporated for both brothers and sisters. This relationship is more
pronounced at the top of the distribution (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004), with parental incomes in the
top 1 percent increasing the odds of becoming Incorporated 6.4 times for brothers and 7.2 times
for sisters. Our measure of parental financial resources accounts for 5.4% (8.7%) of the brother
(sister) correlation in Incorporated, respectively. Thus, parental resources do matter, especially
with regards to incorporation and sisters, as suggested by liquidity constraints models (Evans
and Leighton, 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Levine and
Rubinstein, 2018). In Panel B of Appendix Table A.1.6, we find that while parental financial
resources explain a small share of correlations in Years Unincorporated and Years incorporated,
they do have a strong explanatory power (12%-15.9%) for Income unincorporated. Parental income
also matters for Income incorporated, although the magnitude is smaller (around 5%), possibly
because family resources are used mainly as collateral when the entry decision is made.33
33 We also calculated parental income for the years 1968-1980, when most individuals in our sample are in
their teens. While this variable is strongly correlated with parental lifetime income (ρ = 0.61), its contribution to
explaining incorporated entrepreneurship is much smaller (i.e. 1.57% and 4.29%, relative to 5.14% and 8.67% in
Panel B of Table 2.5 for men, and respectively, women). Parental income appears at least as important for potential
investment in children’s firms as in their human capital, in line with a capital constraints interpretation.
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Following the large literature on intergenerational associations in entrepreneurship, we expect
parental business ownership to be a strong predictor of individual business ownership and to
explain a large share of sibling correlations. Indeed, Panel C of Table 2.5 suggests that having
entrepreneurial parents raises the likelihood of individual business ownership. Moreover, same-
sex associations are stronger, as are those for becoming Incorporated (consistent with Lindquist
et al., 2015). This pattern is reflected in the contribution to sibling correlations: parental firm
ownership explains 6.4%-8.7% of Unincorporated and around 13% of Incorporated. On the one
hand, parental business ownership appears to be the strongest driver of sibling correlation, given
that its explanatory power is larger than that of other family (and neighborhood) background
factors; on the other hand, focusing attention solely on parental business ownership leads to an
overly narrow approach, which leaves out a wide array of family background factors that impact
entrepreneurship. Parental business ownership is less important when we look at the intensive
margin outcomes in Panel C of Appendix Table A.1.6, and for income, it is no longer the most
important parental variable to explain sibling correlations.34
Parental immigration and family structure have little bearing on the extensive margin sibling
correlations, as shown in Panel D of Table 2.5, jointly explaining at most 1%. Inspection of the odds
ratios suggests a concentration of immigrant entrepreneurship in unincorporated self-employment
and that parental cohabitation reduces the odds of being Unincorporated while it increases those
of being Incorporated (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017).
34 To address potential measurement error in parental entrepreneurship, we perform two robustness checks.
First, we split families into those with mothers born before and after 1939 (the median maternal birth year), with
measurement error less problematic for the latter. Sibling correlations vary little between these groups, but parental
entrepreneurship has a stronger explanatory power for incorporation. For instance, compared to an explained 13.75%
of the brother correlation in Incorporated in Panel C of Table 2.5, in families with older and younger mothers the
equivalent numbers are 11.13% and 16.09%. Our original estimates may thus understate the contribution of parental
business ownership to sibling correlations in incorporation in older families; this effect is weaker for unincorporated
outcomes, as we observe parental unincorporated firm ownership at an earlier date (i.e. since 1985). We obtain
similar results if we split families by the father’s birth year. Second, we replicate the exercise in Panel C of Table 2.5
by ‘pooling’ maternal and paternal business ownership. In this case, the explanatory power of parental business
ownership is always lower, in particular for the intensive margin outcomes; indeed, combining unincorporated and
incorporated firms results in even less explanatory power. The disaggregation of parental entrepreneurship by parent
and type of firm appears particularly important for understanding the intergenerational transmission of occupational
choice (outweighing the reduction in measurement error). These results are available upon request.
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Finally, in panel E of Table 2.5 (and Appendix Table A.1.6), we estimate brother and sister
correlations controlling for all the variables above. Their joint contribution to sibling correlations
is 11% for Unincorporated and 18% for Incorporated, slightly smaller for Years (un)incorporated,
and slightly larger for Income (un)incorporated.35 As we noted earlier, parental characteristics
(such as income and education) may be correlated, such that their individual explanatory power is
an upper bound. This is confirmed by the joint explanatory power of all parental characteristics,
which is slightly lower than the sum of individual contributions, especially for incorporation.
To sum up: parental education, family structure, and immigrant status account for minor shares
of sibling correlations in business ownership; unincorporated parents explain a large share of sibling
correlations in unincorporated business ownership (but not incorporation); parental incorporation
explains a large share of sibling correlations in incorporation (but not in unincorporated firm
ownership); parental business ownership matters most for entry and persistence rather than income;
and finally, parental financial resources explain a larger share of correlations in incorporation,
especially for sisters, and are most important in explaining business income.
2.4.3 Sibling Peer Effects
Sibling correlations also capture inter-sibling interactions; while these could be treated as a nuisance
in estimating the impact of family background, we consider such sibling peer effects to be an integral
part of shared environments. The entrepreneurship literature has convincingly identified peer
effects within the workplace (Nanda and Sørensen, 2010) and universities (Lerner and Malmendier,
2013; Kacperczyk, 2013), based on the quasi-random assignment of employees to workplaces or
35 The intergenerational association in business ownership may partly reflect occupational or industry following
(Aina and Nicoletti, 2018; Hvide and Oyer, 2018); for instance, farmers are typically self-employed, and children who
choose to become farmers will likely also be self-employed (especially for men). To address this, in the absence of
detailed occupation data, we include the modal maternal and paternal industries in our accounting exercise (though
these variables may also exhibit substantial measurement error). We find that they explain between 2.6% and 10.8%,
with higher numbers for brothers and unincorporated business ownership. This is consistent with our argument
regarding neighborhood effects and the regional concentration of male-dominated occupations often associated with
self-employment. When we include parental industry in Panel E of Table 2.5, observable parental characteristics
account for 12%-13% (18.5%-20.4%) of brother and sister correlations in becoming Unincorporated (Incorporated).
It appears, therefore, that parental industry experience matters for sibling similarity in business ownership, both by
itself and through its association with firm type.
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students to classes. In addition, role-modeling may underpin intergenerational associations in
entrepreneurship (Sørensen, 2007b; Lindquist et al., 2015; Hoffmann et al., 2015).
Here, we assess the potential role of sibling peer effects in generating sibling correlations. We
first examine sibling correlations at different birth spacings based on month of birth data, from
twins (zero spacing), through siblings born at least 12 months apart in rolling intervals of 12
months, and to sibling spacings of 108 months.36 There are two competing expectations about
sibling peer effects based on the relationship between spacing and sibling correlations (Eriksson
et al., 2016). On the one hand, siblings born closer together interact more intensively and may
share a more similar family environment while growing up, which should lead to higher sibling
correlations at low birth spacings. On the other hand, much older siblings may act as stronger
role models. Thus, depending on the relative strength and non-linearities of each effect, sibling
correlations may increase or decrease with sibling spacing, may be non-linear, or even zero.
Results for unincorporated and incorporated outcomes in Figure 2.2 suggest that while twin
correlations are higher than non-twin correlations, beyond twins there is no an evident relationship
with birth spacing. This pattern is common across outcomes and gender, as Appendix Figure A.1.3
shows. This result is notable, given that in the bulk of the sibling correlation literature, the
outcomes of closely spaced siblings are typically much more similar than those of widely spaced
siblings (see, e.g., Eriksson et al., 2016). Before drawing any conclusion, we turn to a more
systematic peer effects exercise.
While we lack a formal randomization process, we gain information on spillovers by exploiting
differences in the timing of business ownership for sibling pairs. A method for exploring causal
peer effects has been proposed by Altonji et al. (2017), who study illegal substance abuse, and
has also been applied by Eriksson et al. (2016) to criminal activity. The method relies on the
36 We omit spacings between 1 and 11 months, and larger than 108 months as these are quite rare. Labels in
Figure 2.2 imply 12-month rolling intervals, i.e. the label 12 months covers spacings between 12 and 24 months. In
addition, we restrict the non-twins to full siblings in families with 2 children in our sample. Sibling correlations for
this sample, reported in row (7) of Appendix Table A.1.2 are the same as the baseline sibling correlations.
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Figure 2.2: Twin and sibling correlations in business ownership by sibling spacing
and type of entrepreneurship, with 95% confidence intervals.
relatively strong assumptions that only older siblings can influence younger siblings and that
parental influences are not a mediating channel. While their method is intuitively applicable to
situations where peer effects are likely to dominate other causes and where individuals are actively
involved (in the outcome under study) when young, business ownership decisions are usually made
after the individual has left the household. In addition, it is not clear that older siblings necessarily
engage in business ownership earlier than younger siblings.37
37 However, older siblings enter the labor market earlier, and are statistically more likely to become business
owners before the younger siblings, especially at large birth spacings.
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Table 2.6: Upper Bounds on Peer Effects Contribution to Sibling Correlations
Effect on younger sibling Effect on older sibling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Unincorporated
All sibling types 5.11 5.05 -2.07 -3.71
Males **7.24** **7.82** -1.19 -1.97
Females 10.29* 9.78 4.04 -0.55
Mixed (younger brother) -9.99 -8.36 -2.68 -3.70
Mixed (younger sister) 0.72 -1.84 -12.02* -14.52*
B. Incorporated
All sibling types -2.78 -1.37 2.12 *2.85*
Males -0.61 0.86 0.20 1.45
Females *-8.93* -7.12 1.61 1.92
Mixed (younger brother) -5.86 -4.70 7.51 7.73
Mixed (younger sister) -6.15 -4.36 7.76 7.33
Contemporaneous effect No Yes No Yes
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All numbers are in percentages, representing the share of the
sibling correlation explained by the lagged entrepreneurship status of the older sibling, columns (1)
and (2), and the younger sibling, columns (3) and (4), once controls are added and correlated random
effects are accounted for. For the full set of results, see Appendix Tables A.2.1-A.2.5; the results in
this table are based on columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) in those tables. Note that applying a Bonferroni
correction for testing multiple hypotheses (i.e. given that we estimate 40 different models, requiring
a p-value below 0.00125 = 0.05/40) would render all estimates insignificant.
Our exercise focuses on explaining the variance of business ownership outcomes due to the
influence of sibling peers rather than on identifying causal effects. We thus take an agnostic
approach to applying the Altonji et al. (2017) model. Focusing on the subsample of sibling pairs,
we estimate both the effect of the older sibling on the younger one, and of the younger sibling
on the older one, subsequently converting the results into correlations to assess the potential
contribution of peer effects to the sibling correlation (Bonett, 2007). A more detailed description
of our empirical strategy is provided in Appendix A.2, together with a full set of results.
Table 2.6 summarizes the results, with panel A referring to being unincorporated and panel
B to being incorporated. Column (1) shows how much the impact of the older sibling’s business
ownership at time t − 1 on the younger sibling’s business ownership at time t contributes (at
most) to the sibling correlation, and column (2) does so while controlling for contemporaneous
effects. Columns (3) and (4) do the same for the impact of the younger sibling on the older sibling.
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The lagged effect of the older sibling’s unincorporated status on the younger sibling represents at
most 5% of the sibling correlation. Conversely, the effect of the younger sibling on the older one
appears largely negative, implying that peer effects may generate sibling dissimilarities. However,
only brother peer effects are significant, explaining 8% of the sibling correlation. For other sibling
types and incorporation, most peer effects are not significant, further explaining why the brother
correlations for unincorporated outcomes are larger than sister outcomes.
The results from our sibling peer effects analyses paint the following picture. The absence of a
negative relationship between sibling spacing and sibling correlations suggests that i) time-varying,
family-wide factors do not appear to be important, and ii) close (day-to-day) interactions between
siblings may not be important. The largely non-significant peer effects estimated in our formal
exercise imply that the lack of a negative relationship between spacing and sibling correlation
may substantiate the claim of limited sibling peer effects we made based on the first exercise,
rather than the alternative explanation of two potentially opposing effects. A notable exception
are brothers, who experience sibling peer effects in unincorporated business ownership.
2.4.4 Shared Genes
Several studies have shown that entrepreneurship is influenced by genes (Nicolaou et al., 2008;
Zhang et al., 2009; Nicolaou and Shane, 2010; Lindquist et al., 2015; Zunino, 2016; Nicolaou
et al., 2017). Since most siblings share part of their genetic endowment, shared genes may be
an important contributor to sibling correlations. In this section, we assess how much of sibling
correlations in business ownership can be attributed to genes shared by siblings. We begin by
positing an additive model of genetic and environmental influences (see, e.g., Björklund et al.,
2005). Business ownership, E, is due to a genetic factor, G, a shared environmental influence, S,
and an unshared, idiosyncratic environmental influence, U:
E = gG+ sS + uU, (2.11)
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where g, s, and u are model parameters representing the relative influence of each of these three
factors. Given this model, our sibling correlation, ρ = corr(E,E′) is equal to g2 + s2, i.e. the
share of the total variation in our entrepreneurial outcomes that can be attributed to shared
environmental and genetic factors.
In our data, we have information on four different sibling types with different degrees of genetic
relatedness: twins, full siblings, half siblings, and adopted siblings. Assuming that twins share on
average 75% of their genes – since we pool monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins –, the
twin correlation, ρtwin, equals 0.75 ∗ g2 + s2. We assume that the correct models for full, half and
adopted siblings are ρfull = 0.5 ∗ g2+ s2, ρhalf = 0.25 ∗ g2+ s2, and ρadopted = s2, respectively. We
also assume that the correlation in shared environmental factors, corr(S, S′), is equal to one for
all sibling types.
We use a method of moments estimator to produce estimates of gˆ2 and sˆ2. This estimator
chooses parameter estimates in order to match the four different sibling correlations observed in
our data as best as possible (Björklund et al., 2005). We use weights to increase the precision of
our estimates, where the weights are simply the sample size, N, that each sibling correlation is
based on. This means that our estimator will work much harder to fit the model to the observed
sibling correlation for full siblings than it will for the other three types of siblings.38
Table 2.7 reports the results. The estimated sibling correlations from our data, ρˆ, the standard
errors of these estimated correlation, and the sample size, N, are shown in the first two columns.
The key estimated parameters gˆ2 and sˆ2 (and their standard errors) are reported in the top rows
of each panel. The model based predictions for g2 and s2 are shown in columns (4) and (5),
respectively. The model based prediction of the sibling correlation, ρ, for each sibling type is
38 Conceptually, this approach is not very different from trying to fit a line through the different sibling correla-
tions, ordered from pairs that share the least genetic material (adoptees, 0%) to pairs that share the most genetic
material (MZ and DZ twins, 75% on average). This (weighted) least squares approach provides an estimate of the
increase in sibling correlations due to a 1% increase in shared genes, which we can use to assess the importance of
genetic effects for sibling correlations. We performed this exercise in our earlier working paper (Lindquist et al.,
2017), with very similar results to the ones we present here.
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Table 2.7: Shared Genes and Sibling Correlations at the Extensive Margin
Model Average
N ρˆ ρ g2 s2 g2/ρ g2/ρ
Sibling type (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Brothers, unincorporated 0.293 0.153 47%
(0.134) (0.073)
MZ+DZ twins 4,416 0.363 0.373 0.220 0.153 59%
(0.043)
Full siblings 37,772 0.306 0.300 0.147 0.153 49%
(0.014)
Half siblings 5,036 0.157 0.227 0.073 0.153 32%
(0.041)
Adopted siblings 1,010 0.304 0.153 0.000 0.153 0%
(0.087)
B. Sisters, unincorporated 0.340 0.058 72%
(0.147) (0.069)
MZ+DZ twins 4,438 0.399 0.312 0.255 0.058 82%
(0.048)
Full siblings 33,288 0.206 0.227 0.170 0.058 75%
(0.020)
Half siblings 4,746 0.201 0.143 0.085 0.058 60%
(0.056)
Adopted siblings 1,126 0.105 0.058 0.000 0.058 0%
(0.118)
C. Brothers, incorporated 0.391 0.196 48%
(0.064) (0.030)
MZ+DZ twins 4,416 0.528 0.490 0.294 0.196 60%
(0.039)
Full siblings 37,772 0.384 0.392 0.196 0.196 50%
(0.015)
Half siblings 5,036 0.317 0.294 0.098 0.196 33%
(0.049)
Adopted siblings 1,010 0.223 0.196 0.000 0.196 0%
(0.107)
D. Sisters, incorporated 0.413 0.137 58%
(0.195) (0.107)
MZ+DZ twins 4,438 0.429 0.447 0.309 0.137 69%
(0.072)
Full siblings 33,288 0.355 0.344 0.206 0.137 60%
(0.026)
Half siblings 4,746 0.130 0.240 0.103 0.137 43%
(0.122)
Adopted siblings 1,126 0.335 0.137 0.000 0.137 0%
(0.142)
Standard errors in parentheses. GMM estimation of genetic effects using different types of siblings
(Björklund et al., 2005). The last column shows the weighted average contribution of shared genes.
2.4. ACCOUNTING FOR SIBLING SIMILARITIES 73
reported in column (3). In general, the model estimates are much more precise for brothers than
for sisters. The model for incorporated brothers (in Panel C), for example, fits the data surprisingly
well, despite being based on a number of strong, simplifying assumptions.39
In column (6), we report the percentage of the model sibling correlation ρ due to shared genes,
g2. In Panel A, for example, this ranges from 0% for adopted brothers (by construction) to
59% for twin brothers. In column (7) of each panel we report the weighted average percent of the
sibling correlation attributable to shared genes across all possible sibling pairs. For unincorporated
brothers the share is 47%; for incorporated brothers the share is 48%. Thus, up to half of the
brother correlation in business ownership along the extensive margin can be attributed to shared
genes. For sisters, the share due to common genes is somewhat larger (up to 72% and 58% for
unincorporated and incorporated business ownership, respectively), since sister correlations are
smaller and our estimates of g2 are roughly similar for men and women (though slightly noisier
for the latter). Our results showing substantial genetic effects for both men and women are thus
in line with those obtained by Nicolaou and Shane (2010) for U.S. twins.
2.4.5 Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Abilities
In the previous subsection, we argued that children inherit traits from their parents that are
important for explaining entrepreneurial outcomes, but we were silent on what specific traits
might matter. Here, we address the potential role of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, shown to
be determined both by genes and by social and environmental factors (Polderman et al., 2015;
Grönqvist et al., 2017). These heritable skills are important for labor market outcomes in general
(Lindqvist and Vestman, 2011) and entrepreneurship in particular (Hartog et al., 2010; Levine
and Rubinstein, 2017).40 We thus turn to pathways (i.e. children’s traits) for the influence of
39 This exercise follows Björklund et al. (2005) as closely as possible. They, however, have data on nine different
sibling types including some reared apart (i.e. whose environments are not perfectly correlated). This allows them to
loosen and test some of the strict assumptions we make in our additive model, producing lower estimates of genetic
effects. Thus, our results place an upper bound on the contribution of shared genes to sibling correlations. We are
unable to run similar genetic exercises on our intensive margin outcomes, since the sample sizes for the different
sibling types become too small to be informative after conditioning on being a business owner.
40 Extroversion and neuroticism partially mediate genetic influences in entrepreneurship (Zhang et al., 2009).
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family and community background, asking: To what extent can sibling similarities in cognitive
and non-cognitive skills help explain sibling similarities in business ownership?
For most male Swedish citizens in our sample we have formal tests of cognitive and non-
cognitive skills taken from their military draft records. Specifically, we have tests of logical, verbal,
spatial, and technical ability, leadership skills, as well as height, weight, and BMI, for which we
report correlations in Panel A of Table 2.8. Brother correlations in height, weight, and BMI at
age 18 are 53%, 43%, and 40%, respectively, while those in cognitive test scores range from 25%
for technical ability to 32% for leadership skills.41 In addition, in columns (9)-(14) of Panel B, we
reestimate the brother correlations in business ownership for this sample. These correlations range
from 25% to 43%, only slightly lower than their counterparts in Table 2.3.
We add these controls to our models in Panel C. Although these test scores are significant pre-
dictors of business ownership entry in columns (9) and (10), they are not quantitatively important:
they explain 3.9% and 1.8% of the correlations in becoming Unincorporated and Incorporated. The
odds ratios are all quite close to 1, and both types of business owners have slightly lower verbal and
logical scores and slightly higher spatial and technical abilities. These results do not change if we
control instead for the nine levels of these test scores as dummies. In columns (11)-(14), cognitive
ability is associated with lower persistence, but higher business income, especially for logical and
verbal ability (and technical ability for unincorporated firms).
The odds ratios and coefficients on leadership skills provide a more nuanced story. Scoring well
on this test is not correlated with becoming Unincorporated. In stark contrast, leadership skills
are strong predictors of becoming Incorporated: scores above the median raise the propensity to
become Incorporated by a factor of 3 to 5. These skills are also highly correlated across brothers
(32%), which implies that they depend in part on a shared family origin and help us to understand
why the sibling correlation in Incorporated is greater than the sibling correlation in Unincorporated.
41 These correlations are similar to the ones estimated by Björklund and Jäntti (2012) for Sweden.
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Table 2.8: Accounting for Cognitive and Noncognitive Characteristics
Height Weight BMI Logical Verbal Spatial Technical Leadership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Sibling correlations in given outcomes
ρ 0.533 0.428 0.400 0.290 0.298 0.261 0.248 0.315
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Entry Years Income
Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc.
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
B. Sibling correlations in business ownership, no controls
ρ 0.246 0.347 0.301 0.428 0.277 0.416
(0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.021) (0.029) (0.023)
C. Sibling correlations in business ownership, with controls
ρ∗ 0.242 0.337 0.287 0.415 0.256 0.383
(0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.022) (0.029) (0.024)
1.55% 2.72% 4.41% 2.94% 7.57% 7.97%
Odds ratios: Coefficients:
Height 0.997** 1.044** 0.006** 0.020** 0.003** 0.008**
Weight 1.005** 1.000** 0.002** 0.011** -0.002** -0.004**
Logical 0.919** 0.995** -0.145** -0.084** 0.061** 0.053**
Verbal 0.942** 0.905** -0.235** -0.189** 0.039** 0.065**
Spatial 1.027** 1.006** -0.020** -0.001** -0.003** -0.004**
Technical 1.031** 1.045** 0.038** 0.021** 0.015** 0.003**
Leadership score: 2 1.263** 1.494** 0.257** -0.108** 0.126** 0.099**
3 1.111** 1.700** 0.755** 0.657** 0.098** 0.023**
4 1.040** 2.138** 1.244** 1.092** 0.117** -0.037**
5 1.024** 2.805** 1.212** 1.212** 0.194** 0.057**
6 1.023** 3.213** 0.613** 0.725** 0.357** 0.181**
7 1.025** 4.152** 0.413** 0.453** 0.459** 0.300**
8 1.092** 4.412** -0.108** 0.247** 0.653** 0.410**
9 1.313** 5.818** -0.530** 0.183** 0.761** 0.430**
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 (*** p < 0.01 not reported for brevity). Standard errors in parentheses and
p-values for the joint significance of the leadership scores in brackets. The percentages in Panel C
indicate the contribution of cognitive and noncognitive skills to the corresponding sibling correlations
in entrepreneurship in Panel B. BMI is not included in the models in Panel C, as it is highly cor-
related with weight (ρ ≈ 0.87). Leadership dummies are jointly significant, with p<0.001. At the
extensive margin, the sample comprises 164,390 men in 144,306 families, given data availability on
all non-cognitive characteristics. At the intensive margin, there are 25,370 men in 24,518 families for
unincorporated outcomes, and 22,601 men in 21,709 families for incorporated outcomes.
Furthermore, above median leadership skills are positively associated with business income (Hartog
et al., 2010). Together, cognitive and non-cognitive ability explain 8% of sibling correlations in
income from business ownership.
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2.5 Conclusion
We quantify the importance of family background and neighborhood effects as determinants of
entrepreneurship by estimating sibling correlations in unincorporated and incorporated business
ownership entry, persistence and income. For men, background factors determine 30% to 45% of
the total variation in their business ownership outcomes; for women, background determines 15%
to 38% of their outcomes. Many of our estimated sibling correlations in entrepreneurship exceed
those estimated for education and earnings (Björklund and Jäntti, 2012), suggesting that family
background is a particularly salient factor for determining entrepreneurial outcomes. Our results
indicate that such influences are up to five times larger than what parent-offspring correlations in
entrepreneurship suggest. In other words, while parental entrepreneurship matters, other elements
of family background also have substantial explanatory power.
We then study the relative importance of potential mechanisms highlighted by previous studies.
What is it that parents give children that makes them so similar in their business ownership
outcomes? Shared genes account for up to 50% of the sibling correlations for men and slightly more
for women. For brothers, we also examine the role of similarities in cognitive and non-cognitive
skills: while these scores explain little of our sibling correlations, above median leadership skills
are a strong predictor of income from incorporated business ownership.
The most important parental characteristic for explaining sibling correlations is parental busi-
ness ownership. Interestingly, parents’ unincorporated business ownership explains a large share
of the sibling correlations in unincorporated, but not incorporated business ownership, and vice
versa, parents’ incorporation mostly explains sibling correlations in incorporation, hinting towards
type-specific entrepreneurial human capital and role-models. An additional share of sibling corre-
lations in incorporation, i.e. the more capital-intensive form of business ownership, is explained
by parental income, especially for sisters, suggesting potential financial constraints for this type of
entrepreneurship (Levine and Rubinstein, 2018).
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Neighborhood effects explain at most 8% and 5% of variation in business ownership for men and
women, respectively. While sibling correlations appear to be largely driven by family background
effects and not by shared community influences, this does not mean that neighborhoods do not
matter. The neighborhood correlation in unincorporated business ownership for men is large
enough to explain most of the observed gender difference in sibling correlations in unincorporated
business ownership. We hypothesize that regional differences in male-dominated occupations, such
as farming and construction, which (in Sweden) are typically organized as unincorporated firms,
account for the lion’s share of the gender difference in sibling correlations in entry and persistence
in unincorporated self-employment. We also observe evidence in favor of a somewhat smaller
neighborhood effect related to ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ or role modeling, as part of the neighborhood
correlations is explained by the share of business owners in the parish during formative years
(Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Guiso et al., 2015).
We find little evidence in favor of sibling peer effects, although an older brother’s choice of
becoming an unincorporated business owner may raise the probability that his younger brother
becomes an unincorporated business owner at a later date. This effect explains up to 8% of the
brother correlation in unincorporated entry and further narrows the gap between brother and
sister correlations in this outcome. Furthermore, parental education, immigration status, and
family structure contribute little to sibling similarities in business ownership outcomes.
The exercises presented in this paper are not without limitations. First and foremost, when
‘explaining’ the determinants of sibling similarities, we cannot claim that we have presented a set of
precise causal estimates. Instead, we view our results as part of an exploratory accounting exercise
that can point us towards those factors which can potentially explain the largest share of sibling
similarities, including but not limited to parental entrepreneurship. Second, since we measure the
degree to which siblings are similar, we cannot exclude the possibility that single-child families
operate in a different manner and that lone children are influenced in different ways by family and
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community-wide factors.42 Third, our results pertain to a highly developed economy, with specific
cultural and economic traits, and notably egalitarian policies. Our results may likely hold in the
other Nordic countries, where we observe similar sibling correlations in other outcomes such as
income and education (Solon, 1999; Björklund and Jäntti, 2011; Black and Devereux, 2011), but
they may not apply in other countries. Tracking changes over time (Björklund et al., 2009) and
across countries (Schnitzlein, 2014) in sibling correlations in entrepreneurship would help us to
decide whether the sibling correlations that we have documented should be considered relatively
large or relatively small, and whether these numbers are constant across time and space.
There may, of course, be factors other than those we address here that contribute to sibling
similarities. These may include parents’ managerial ability, risk and time preferences, or family
values. Capturing such variation would be an interesting avenue for future research, although parts
of these effects are arguably captured by the observable parental characteristics we account for (e.g.
parental risk preferences may determine parental business ownership) and may have a genetic
component as well. In addition, a future reconciliation of heritability and sibling correlations
could shed more light on the importance of (shared) genes in generating sibling similarity.
More generally, future research could attempt to undercover the particular pathways of in-
fluence: how much do similarities in cognitive and non-cognitive ability (which we touch upon),
educational achievement, choice of organizational hierarchies, obtaining a patent, etc., explain
sibling correlations in entrepreneurship? This would offer a more nuanced understanding of the
sources of similarity between siblings, as well as provide a way of synthesizing the literature on
contextual antecedents of entrepreneurship in a unified framework. Future research could also
assess the importance of background for other career outcomes, such as becoming a CEO or an
inventor (Aghion et al., 2018; Bell et al., 2018; Black et al., 2018; Mérida, 2019).
42 In unreported models, the intergenerational association between parents and children in unincorporated and in-
corporated entrepreneurship in single- and multiple- child families was similar (i.e. 0.068 vs. 0.072 in unincorporated
self-employment, and 0.132 and 0.102 in incorporation, with similar explanatory power). Parental entrepreneurship
is thus at least as important for children in single child families as in multiple child families.
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We view our findings optimistically. The existence of substantial predetermined family-wide
factors does not mean that policy is doomed to fail. The majority of variation in the business
ownership outcomes we study remains individual-specific. Furthermore, several of our findings
are consistent with the recent literature supporting the idea that adolescents appear to ‘learn’
about entrepreneurship through their family and community environment, which implies it should
be possible to ‘teach’ entrepreneurship to young people (Huber et al., 2014; Elert et al., 2015;
Guiso et al., 2015). In particular, our results suggests that entrepreneurship education could be
more effective by exposing young individuals to relevant role-models and potentially by empha-
sizing leadership skills, especially for individuals without access to opportunities to learn about
entrepreneurship (Eesley and Wang, 2017; Lyons and Zhang, 2018). These also represent areas
that would-be entrepreneurs should especially seek to develop as they build their human capital
profile. Finally, policies designed to equip would be entrepreneurs with relevant skills may even
generate a social multiplier effect if the behavior of a successfully treated person also affects the
behavior of other family members, especially for future generations.
At the same time, one can not ignore the large role of family background in determining
entrepreneurial outcomes. It is not clear that all young people with similar entrepreneurial skills
have the same opportunities to actually develop into entrepreneurs. As such, there may be a pool
of entrepreneurial talent that society could dip into and develop; and in doing so increase both
equality of opportunity and economic efficiency.
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Figure A.1.1: Individual modal industries (1993-2010), by type of business.
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Figure A.1.2: Individual modal industries (1993-2010), by type of business and gender (upper
panel – men; lower panel – women).
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Figure A.1.3: Twin and sibling correlations in business ownership by sibling spacing and gender
(left panel – men; right panel – women), with 95% confidence intervals.
Table A.1.1: Number of Families with N Children
N Children No. of Families % No. of Individuals %
1 227,860 52.88 227,860 32.73
2 152,050 35.28 304,100 43.68
3 41.818 9.70 125,454 18.02
4 7,592 1.76 30,368 4.36
5 1,312 0.30 6,560 0.94
6 243 0.06 1,458 0.21
7 49 0.01 343 0.05
8 11 0.00 88 0.01
Total 430,935 100.00 696,231 100.00
All children of the same mother are defined as belonging to the same family.
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Table A.1.2: Sensitivity Analyses
Entry Years
Unincorporated Incorporated Unincorporated Incorporated
All siblings (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Excl. singletons 0.212 0.342 0.215 0.387
(0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
(2) Incl. 1985-1992 0.232 0.214
(0.004) (0.008)
(3) Outcomes, ages 25-40 0.222 0.369 0.222 0.403
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014)
(4) Father 0.204 0.331 0.214 0.386
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
(5) Excl. adoptive fathers 0.206 0.331 0.216 0.387
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
(6) Excl. adoptive mothers 0.212 0.342 0.215 0.387
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
(7) Non-twin pairs 0.214 0.336 0.210 0.408
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012)
(8) Non-twins, 12-24 months 0.208 0.298 0.230 0.430
(0.012) (0.015) (0.028) (0.027)
(9) Complete families 0.200 0.341 0.216 0.382
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012)
(10) Complete parental data 0.208 0.341 0.213 0.394
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
(11) Birth year dummies 0.211 0.340 0.214 0.388
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
(12) Parents ≤ 65yo in 1993 0.210 0.341 0.202 0.379
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
(13) Parents in data in 1993 0.212 0.341 0.201 0.392
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
(14) Excl. farmer parents 0.207 0.340 0.182 0.378
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
(15) Placebo families 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Standard errors in parentheses. Row (1) excludes singletons; row (2) includes data on unincorporated
business ownership, 1985-1992; row (3) measures the outcomes only between ages 25 and 40; row (4)
defines the family through the father; row (5) omits families with an adoptive father; row (6) omits
families with an adoptive mother; row (7) restricts the analysis to families with two children; row (8)
restricts it further to closely spaced non-twin pairs (born 12 to 24 months apart); row (9) restricts the
analysis to families completely captured in our sample; row (10) restricts the analysis to observations
for which all parental characteristics are observed; row (11) includes individual and parental birth
year dummies; row (12) retains families with parents below age 65 in 1993; row (13) retails families
with parents who have not left the data set and are below age 65 in 1993; row (14) drops families where
one of the parents is a farmer; finally, row (15) is a placebo test, where the family cluster structure
is replicated and individuals randomly allocated to families, with 100 bootstrap replications.
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Table A.1.4: Neighborhood Correlations in Business Ownership
Entry Years Income
(1) Uninc. (2) Inc. (3) Uninc. (4) Inc. (5) Uninc. (6) Inc.
A. No controls
All 0.028 0.020 0.038 0.027 0.021 0.027
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
13.03% 5.89% 17.90% 7.03% 9.94% 7.67%
Brothers 0.38 0.20 0.73 0.036 0.037 0.031
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
13.11% 5.06% 23.67% 7.96% 12.59% 7.36%
Sisters 0.018 0.022 0.002 0.013 0.007 0.020
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
8.40% 6.24% 1.16% 3.30% 4.14% 5.55%
B. Parental controls (excl. business ownership)
All 0.027 0.015 0.028 0.021 0.011 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
12.76% 4.53% 13.27% 5.48% 5.13% 3.32%
Brothers 0.036 0.016 0.056 0.027 0.021 0.013
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
12.46% 3.98% 18.18% 5.96% 7.21% 3.07%
Sisters 0.015 0.013 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.008
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
7.04% 3.75% 1.07% 2.98% 1.58% 2.16%
C. Parental controls (incl. business ownership)
All 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.016 0.007 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
8.10% 2.99% 7.81% 4.18% 3.58% 2.48%
Brothers 0.023 0.011 0.034 0.020 0.014 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
7.99% 2.60% 10.96% 4.52% 4.79% 2.22%
Sisters 0.011 0.010 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
5.21% 2.75% 1.05% 2.76% 1.54% 1.98%
D. All controls (incl. share of business owners in neighborhood)
All 0.013 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.006 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
6.10% 1.84% 5.44% 3.69% 2.99% 1.88%
Brothers 0.018 0.006 0.022 0.018 0.011 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
6.10% 1.58% 7.20% 3.93% 3.70% 1.59%
Sisters 0.018 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
3.81% 1.62% 0.97% 2.42% 1.34% 1.55%
Standard errors in parentheses. The percentages indicate the contribution of the neighborhood cor-
relation to the corresponding sibling correlations in Table 2.3.
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Table A.1.5: Accounting Exercise: Effect of Noisy Random Variables
Entry Years Income
(1) Uninc. (2) Inc. (3) Uninc. (4) Inc. (5) Uninc. (6) Inc.
A. Individual level: 20 random variables in (0,1)
Brothers 0.292 0.404 0.309 0.448 0.297 0.416
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
0.01% 0.02% 0.05% -0.21% -0.11 -0.11%
Sisters 0.213 0.352 0.170 0.380 0.158 0.360
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.033)
0.03% -0.06% -0.55% 0.30% -0.46% 0.04%
B. Individual level: 100 random variables in (0,1)
Brothers 0.292 0.404 0.309 0.446 0.298 0.416
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
0.05% -0.11% 0.04% 0.11% -0.48% -0.02%
Sisters 0.213 0.352 0.169 0.385 0.160 0.362
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.034)
-0.12% -0.08% -0.16% -1.16% -1.59% -0.53%
C. Family level: 20 random variables in (0,1)
Brothers 0.292 0.403 0.309 0.447 0.296 0.416
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
0.06% 0.04% 0.09% 0.00% 0.03% -0.01%
Sisters 0.213 0.351 0.168 0.381 0.157 0.361
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033)
0.09% 0.07% 0.17% -0.06% 0.63% -0.07%
D. Family level: 100 random variables in (0,1)
Brothers 0.291 0.403 0.309 0.446 0.296 0.415
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
0.24% 0.09% 0.14% 0.09% 0.17% 0.10%
Sisters 0.212 0.350 0.170 0.378 0.157 0.361
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.033)
0.53% 0.38% -0.58% 0.72% 0.11% -0.08%
Standard errors in parentheses. The percentages indicate the change in the sibling correlations in
Table 3 once the noisy random variables are controlled for (a negative percentage change indicates
an increase in the sibling correlation, while a positive sign indicates a decrease). In panels A and
B, the noisy random variables are generated at the individual level, and the largest change in the
sibling correlation is a 1.59% increase. In panels C and D, the noisy random variables are generated
at the family level, such that they are the same for siblings, and should have a higher explanatory
power than those generated at the individual level. Even so, they explain at most 0.72% of the sibling
correlation. While the number of variables appears inconsequential when variables are generated at
the individual level, when they are generated at the family level the decrease is slightly larger when
100 variables are added instead of 20. Our models in Table 2.5 include far less than 100 variables,
suggesting little cause for concern that the explanatory power is generated by random noise.
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Table A.1.6: Accounting Exercise, Extensive and Intensive Margin Outcomes
Entry Years Income
(1) Uninc. (2) Inc. (3) Uninc. (4) Inc. (5) Uninc. (6) Inc.
A. Parental All 0.210 0.335 0.208 0.379 0.190 0.321
education (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
1.07% 1.84% 3.06% 1.91% 9.18% 7.17%
Brothers 0.289 0.399 0.300 0.437 0.273 0.390
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
0.86% 1.13% 3.14% 2.07% 7.88% 6.12%
Sisters 0.205 0.341 0.167 0.379 0.149 0.347
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.034)
3.66% 2.98% 0.99% 0.47% 5.62% 3.67%
B. Parental All 0.209 0.315 0.204 0.386 0.169 0.325
income (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
1.46% 7.58% 4.80% 0.21% 19.00% 5.96%
Brothers 0.288 0.382 0.294 0.446 0.249 0.397
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
1.47% 5.41% 4.99% 0.20% 15.87% 4.50%
Sisters 0.206 0.321 0.168 0.378 0.139 0.340
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.034)
3.14% 8.67% 0.51% 0.75% 12.01% 5.49%
C. Parental All 0.189 0.282 0.196 0.352 0.197 0.332
business (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
ownership 10.67% 17.26% 8.38% 8.81% 5.62% 4.10%
Brothers 0.267 0.348 0.284 0.413 0.279 0.399
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
8.66% 13.75% 8.12% 7.47% 5.80% 4.03%
Sisters 0.199 0.309 0.164 0.350 0.154 0.354
(0.010) (0.014) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.033)
6.37% 12.15% 2.79% 8.07% 2.46% 1.65%
D. Other All 0.211 0.337 0.209 0.381 0.203 0.345
family (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
traits 0.39% 1.34% 2.28% 1.46% 2.68% 0.23%
Brothers 0.290 0.399 0.304 0.440 0.291 0.415
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
0.56% 1.18% 1.81% 1.38% 1.86% 0.23%
Sisters 0.213 0.348 0.168 0.379 0.153 0.360
(0.010) (0.013) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.033)
0.05% 1.06% 0.49% 0.63% 3.02% 0.09%
E. All All 0.183 0.266 0.184 0.344 0.158 0.228
family (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
controls 13.48% 22.05% 13.90% 11.08% 24.34% 16.62%
Brothers 0.258 0.334 0.268 0.403 0.234 0.359
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
11.63% 17.23% 13.27% 9.83% 20.93% 13.66%
Sisters 0.190 0.287 0.163 0.349 0.133 0.319
(0.010) (0.014) (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.036)
10.75% 18.20% 3.40% 8.42% 15.64% 11.36%
Standard errors in parentheses. The percentages indicate the contribution of parental characteristics
to the corresponding sibling correlations in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.3.
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A.2 Peer Effects Model and Results
We provide a formal exposition of the correlated random effects model suggested by Altonji
et al. (2017) that we adopt for the purpose of estimating sibling peer effects in entrepreneurship.
We begin by estimating the raw association between sibling i’s unincorporated or incorporated
business ownership at time t, Si′t , and sibling i′’s business ownership at time t− 1, Si
′
t−1:
Sit = β0 + β1Si
′
t−1 + u2t , (A.2.1)
where the family subscript f is suppressed. We then add the set of controls used in the accounting
exercise, Xf , and age dummies ageit for the focal sibling i:
Sit = β0 + β1Si
′
t−1 +Xf + ageit + 2t . (A.2.2)
We estimate equations (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) (corresponding to columns (1), (2), (6) and (7) in
Tables A.2.1 to A.2.5) by using the panel structure of our data, limiting the sample to families with
two children.1 We later split the sample into pairs of males, females, and mixed gender pairs, where
the younger sibling is male or female. We use logistic regressions in order to maintain consistency
with previous estimation techniques, and we report both odds ratios and (approximated) sibling
correlations, as explained in the notes to Table A.2.1.
Part of the effect of sibling i′’s business ownership on sibling i’s business ownership estimated
in equation (A.2.2), however, may be due to correlated random family effects, rather than direct
peer effects. Altonji et al. (2017) suggest the use of a correlated random effects regression to isolate
the direct sibling effect, achieving causal inference by assuming one-directional causation (whereas
our study does not attempt to directly target causality); they control for the sum of sibling i′’s
business ownership at time t− 1 and t+1 to net out the unobservable family component. We can
then write:
Sit = β0 + β1(Si
′
t−1 + Si
′
t+1) + λ0Si
′
t−1 +Xf + ageit + agei
′
t + 2t , (A.2.3)
where the direct (lagged) sibling effect is captured by λ0.2 Similarly, we can also include a direct
contemporaneous sibling influence by including sibling i′’s business ownership at time t, Si′t , in
conjunction with an expanded control for correlated random effects:
Sit = β0 + β1(Si
′
t−1 + Si
′
t + Si
′
t+1) + λ0Si
′
t−1 + λ1Si
′
t +Xf + ageit + agei
′
t + 2t , (A.2.4)
where λ1 is the estimate of the ‘contemporaneous’ effect. This estimate should not be interpreted
as a true contemporaneous effect, but rather as a transitory and common shock to both siblings
in the same family. Hence, we do not sum the lagged and contemporaneous sibling effect when
analyzing the contribution of peers to the sibling correlation (in contrast to Eriksson et al., 2016,
for instance). Results for equations (A.2.3) and (A.2.4) are given in columns (3), (4), (8) and
(9) of Tables A.2.1-A.2.5 below, while columns (5) and (10) present results from a variation of
equation (A.2.1), where the lagged sibling effect is replaced by the contemporaneous one (this
equation being necessary for calibration purposes).
As an example of how these tables should be interpreted, Table A.2.1 shows the results of
our sibling peer effects exercise on the sub-sample of sibling pairs, with panel A referring to
unincorporated business ownership and panel B to incorporation; in columns (1) to (5) sibling i
1 Sibling correlations for this sample are reported in row (7) of Appendix Table A.1.2 and closely match those
reported in Table 2.3; see also footnote 33.
2 A detailed description of the assumptions and mechanics of this model is provided in Altonji et al. (2017).
Importantly, they assume that only older siblings can influence the younger ones (and not the other way around),
and that parental treatment of younger siblings does not change upon observing the behavior of older siblings.
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is the younger one, whereas in columns (6)-(10), sibling i is the older one. The results suggest a
positive and significant (at 10 percent) impact of the younger sibling’s incorporation status at time
t− 1 on the older sibling’s incorporation status at time t, as shown in column (9) of Table A.2.1.
This translates into a sibling correlation ρ = 0.009 as given by the lagged sibling effect, representing
2.85 percent of the baseline sibling correlation, as shown in column (4) of Table 2.6 in the main
text. Tables A.2.2-A.2.5 then perform the same exercise separately for male pairs, female pairs,
and mixed gender pairs with a younger male and younger female, respectively. For unincorporated
brothers, peer effects account for 8% of the sibling correlations; for other outcomes and sibling
types, peer effects are small and usually not statistically significant.
While we argue that contemporaneous effects should not be included in the contribution of peer
effects to the sibling correlation (due to common environmental influences), they do provide useful
information. First, they are rarely significant for unincorporated self-employment, suggesting a
limited role for common transitory shocks for this type of business. Second, they are always
significant and positive for incorporation, and explain around 20% of the sibling correlation for all
sibling types together (around 25% for brothers, 12.5% for sisters, and between 13% and 23% for
mixed gender siblings).
In theory, this contemporaneous effect is consistent both with large common transitory shocks
and with the possibility that siblings co-found businesses or take over the family firm. However, it
suggests a rather loose upper bound on the importance of inheritance for our sibling correlations in
the region of 25% for brothers, and smaller for other types of siblings. In our sample, siblings are
observed as incorporated business owners at the same time and in the same industry in at most 3%
of years, suggesting that co-ownership by siblings is a limited phenomenon and that common tran-
sitory shocks account for the majority of the contemporaneous effects in incorporation.3 We also
speculate that these results may also contribute to the distinction between unincorporated business
ownership – usually a small scale, individual endeavor – and incorporated business ownership, a
more complex organizational form likely to require a larger founding team.
3 Note also that sibling entrepreneurs perform rather poorly, at least compared to spousal entrepreneurs (see,
e.g., Bird and Zellweger, 2018).
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3.1 Introduction
Family background matters for occupational choice and children with entrepreneurial parents are
more likely to become entrepreneurs themselves.1 This intergenerational association stems from
the transmission of genes (Nicolaou et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2015), exposure to role models
(Sørensen, 2007b; Hoffmann et al., 2015), and the transfer of general and business specific hu-
man and financial capital (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Hout
and Rosen, 2000). More broadly, families provide children with a home environment, resources,
networks, and social context, especially in early life when preferences for entrepreneurship are
formed (Sørensen, 2007b; Huber et al., 2014; Elert et al., 2015; Guiso et al., 2015). These aspects
are shared by children in the same family, and studies of siblings show that family background
may explain up to half the variation in entrepreneurship outcomes, with the remaining variation
attributed to influences specific to each sibling, as shown in the previous chapter.2
Prime candidates for such idiosyncratic influences are the differences between siblings that fam-
ilies themselves generate. In a popular example, first born children are regarded as more conform-
ing, disciplined, and responsible, making them more likely to inherit the family firm (Bennedsen
et al., 2007; Calabrò et al., 2018) or become entrepreneurs; by contrast, last born children are
often perceived as risk taking, creative, or disruptive, traits typically associated with successful
entrepreneurs (Sulloway, 1996; Han and Greene, 2016; Black et al., 2018). This may be particularly
true in larger families, where the scope for individual differentiation is greater and family resources
– both human and financial capital – are more thinly spread across children. Beyond influencing
birth order, family size may thus hinder entrepreneurship due to resource constraints.3 Moreover,
boys and girls differ in the relationships they establish with parents and the way they experience
1 I refer to entrepreneurship as a measure of business ownership, disaggregated between unincorporated and
incorporated businesses. This term is often used interchangeably with self-employment; for clarity, I only refer to
self-employment when the papers I discuss do so (and do not provide more granular measures).
2 Chapter 2 is an update of Lindquist et al. (2018); for brevity, I refer to the latter throughout this chapter.
3 For popular coverage of birth order and family size and entrepreneurship, see also the Kauffman Foundation
‘Anatomy of an Entrepreneur’ report (Wadhwa et al., 2009) and Tech Crunch (2012).
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mothers and fathers as entrepreneurial role models (Hoffmann et al., 2015; Lindquist et al., 2015;
Mishkin, 2017). Such distinctions are important if individuals are systematically hindered in their
acquisition of entrepreneurial human capital by factors related to their family and deserve further
investigation (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006).
To understand how differences generated inside the household affect siblings’ occupational
choices, I assess the differential effects of i) birth order, ii) family size, and iii) sibling sex com-
position on entrepreneurship entry. These three closely related factors have been highlighted in
human capital research and may prove particularly relevant for entrepreneurship. In addition, I
embrace heterogeneity with regards to gender, as well as unincorporated and incorporated busi-
ness ownership, which represent types of entrepreneurship with strikingly different income, growth,
innovation, and job creation outcomes (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). My approach is to first ana-
lyze the causal effects of each factor separately, then analyze their joint impact on estimates of the
total importance of family and community background in a variance decomposition framework,
drawing on the method outlined by Björklund and Jäntti (2012).
Prior research suggests that later born children are more likely to be self-employed, which Han
and Greene (2016) and Black et al. (2018) interpret as evidence for the hypothesis that later borns
are more creative and innovative (Sulloway, 1996). However, this result requires closer attention,
given that later born children actually fare worse in cognitive and non-cognitive ability, and ed-
ucational attainment (Black et al., 2005, 2018; Lehmann et al., 2018). While later borns could
be expected to be more entrepreneurial, they may be poor entrepreneurs, driven by necessity,
rather than the pursuit of opportunity. Birth order effects may vary with the number of siblings,
but evidence of family size effects in entrepreneurship is notably absent. Family size is expected
to hinder successful entry, since larger families impede human capital accumulation in financially
constrained households (Black et al., 2005; Åslund and Grönqvist, 2010; Lafortune and Lee, 2014)
and limit children’s ability to use parental resources in starting up. The allocation of parental
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resources may also vary with child gender, and Mishkin (2017) finds that women whose father is
self-employed are less likely to become self-employed when a brother is present. However, she does
not analyze the independent effect of opposite gender siblings, which other studies suggest may
influence education and earnings (Butcher and Case, 1994; Hauser and Kuo, 1998), reinforcing
traditional gender roles and affecting women’s educational choices (Cools and Patacchini, 2019;
Peter et al., 2018). Thus, there appears to be substantial scope for within-household sibling dif-
ferences in entrepreneurship, with important implications for both understanding family dynamics
and increasing women’s entrepreneurship.
To analyze these differences, I use administrative data from Sweden. My dataset covers 700,000
individuals born between 1960 and 1970 in 430,000 families, with detailed information on the fam-
ily’s socio-economic status and men’s cognitive and non-cognitive ability. I follow the Swedish
tax authority to classify individuals as entrepreneurs if they draw the majority of their taxable
labor income from an unincorporated or incorporated business they own in part or in full. Un-
incorporated and (non-listed, limited liability) incorporated firms are not just legally different,
but also represent different phenomena. Incorporation serves as a proxy for growth oriented en-
trepreneurship (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014, 2019; Tåg et al., 2016), with positively selected
founders (Lindquist et al., 2018; Humphries, 2017), higher presence in capital intensive industries
(Lindquist et al., 2018), and better outcomes in terms of revenue (Berglann et al., 2011; Levine and
Rubinstein, 2017; van Praag and Raknerud, 2017; Halvarsson et al., 2018), job creation (Åstebro
and Tåg, 2017), patenting (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017), and exit (Guzman and Stern, 2016).
This distinction allows me to refine theoretical expectations and to provide much-needed nuance
to the analysis relative to previous studies.
Using a fixed effects approach to address the confounding effects of family size, I find posi-
tive birth order effects, i.e. later born children are more likely to become entrepreneurs, without
distinguishing by type (Han and Greene, 2016; Black et al., 2018). These effects are driven by
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men’s unincorporated entrepreneurship and I find no birth order effects for women or incorpora-
tion. Moreover, men’s positive birth order effects are mediated by education, pointing towards
selection into unincorporated firms from the lower tail of the ability distribution (Åstebro et al.,
2011; Andersson-Joona and Wadensjö, 2013; Levine and Rubinstein, 2018). The empirical distinc-
tion between unincorporated and incorporated firms thus reinforces the conceptualized dichotomy
between subsistence and transformational entrepreneurship (Schoar, 2010).
Turning to family size, to overcome the endogeneity of parental fertility decisions, I use mul-
tiple births and sibling sex composition as instruments for family size in linear and non-linear
instrumental variable (IV) models (Black et al., 2005; Angrist et al., 2010; Mogstad and Wiswall,
2016). Intuitively, the arrival of twins or triplets and the presence of children of different genders
may push families above their desired fertility in a manner exogenous to entrepreneurship. While
OLS regressions show evidence of the hypothesized positive (negative) family size effects for un-
incorporated (incorporated) entrepreneurship, IV estimates are mostly insignificant. Family size
only acts a barrier to incorporation in sibships with more than five children, where human capital
and financial constraints are likely to become binding.
When I analyze sibling sex composition effects in the sample of complete families, the presence
of a brother or sister does not affect entrepreneurship. However, this analysis may be confounded by
parental preferences over children’s gender. In a more causal approach, I examine the outcomes of
first born children as a function of the next child’s gender, assuming its quasi-exogeneity conditional
on the family’s fertility decision (Cools and Patacchini, 2019; Peter et al., 2018). Sibling sex
composition effects are again absent. In a recent paper, Mishkin (2017) argues that daughters of
self-employed fathers are less likely to become self-employed in the presence of a brother, a result
I replicate for unincorporated fathers and daughters, but is weaker in Sweden than in the United
States. However, incorporated fathers (and entrepreneur mothers) may increase the likelihood of
daughters’ entrepreneurship when a brother is present, with countervailing effects.
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What is the quantitative implication of these findings? By calculating sibling correlations,
Lindquist et al. (2018) show that up to half the variation in incorporation in Sweden is due
to shared family and community background. However, this measure does not include sibling
differences and may be understated (Conley, 2004). I therefore produce revised measures of the
importance of family, accounting for birth order, family size, and sibling sex composition effects
(Björklund and Jäntti, 2012). The revised estimates are at most 1.2-2 percentage points (3.2%-
6.7%) larger than the original sibling correlations, suggesting that within-family sibling differences
are not as important as one might expect them to be.
I make several contributions to the entrepreneurship literature in this paper. First, I sys-
tematically assess a set of determinants of entrepreneurship that have received limited attention:
birth order, family size, and sibling sex composition have small, but theoretically consistent causal
effects for entrepreneurship. Most notably, if later born children are more entrepreneurial, it is
not necessarily because they are creative or disruptive, but because they have lower ability and
education. Second, by focusing on within-household differences, I complement research on the im-
portance of shared family traits for entrepreneurship, and show in a unified framework that sibling
correlations do not understate the importance of family background by much. Third, I offer evi-
dence on the long-run occupational choice effects of factors known to affect education and earnings.
On average, these factors do not impede Swedish individuals’ ability to become growth oriented,
incorporated entrepreneurs, but may push them into unincorporated self-employment if they fare
worse in the labor market. Finally, I add to the evidence that unincorporated self-employment is
broadly equivalent to subsistence entrepreneurship, and unlikely to be the driver of employment
and growth that policy aims to foster.
The paper proceeds as follows. I describe the data in Section 3.2. The next sections describe
how each of the three mechanisms may generate sibling differences, lay out the theoretical ex-
pectations and empirical approach, and present results. I analyze the differential effects of birth
3.2. DATA 103
order in Section 3.3, family size in Section 3.4, and sibling gender in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6
I discuss the implications of within-family differences in entrepreneurship for sibling correlations.
Section 3.7 discusses the results and concludes.
3.2 Data
To analyze the role of sibling differences, I use Swedish administrative data. The Swedish Multi-
generational Register includes all individuals born after 1932 who lived in Sweden at any time
after 1961, and contains unique personal identification numbers that allow me to identify parents
and siblings. I begin with a 25% random sample of individuals, then match on all their siblings,
as well as information on their parents. Families are defined as all children belonging to the same
mother, regardless of whether they are adopted or not. As data on unincorporated (incorporated)
entrepreneurship is only available after 1985 (1993), I restrict the sample to individuals born be-
tween 1960 and 1970 in order to balance coverage of family composition and labor market histories.
This approach yields a 70% coverage of cohorts born in this period and more than 700,000 indi-
viduals. However, the largest spacing between siblings in my sample is 10 years, and siblings born
outside the interval I cover are not included in the sample.
Despite some sibships not being ‘complete’, Family size and Birth order are recorded correctly,
counting all the children in the family, regardless of birth year. One potential issue is the presence
of multiple births (twins, triplets, quadruplets, quintuplets), which are given consecutive birth
orders that may not correspond to the real birth order. For instance, twins with birth orders 1
and 2 may not have been born in the same order; more correctly, they should both be recorded
with birth order 1, but this creates ambiguity regarding the birth order of subsequent children.
I therefore drop families that include multiple births from the analysis of birth order effects; I
also restrict the sample for this analysis to families with two to five children, as singletons cannot
contribute information in a fixed effects approach, and there are few families with more than 5
children, offering limited statistical power.
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Whereas the section on family size effects includes all children, the analysis of sibling gender
effects requires an accurate record of the presence of brothers and sisters. Hence, I focus on the
sample of complete families with at least two children, with more than 230,000 individuals (split
roughly equally between men and women), larger than most other studies of sibling gender effects.4
I create a set of indicator variables to capture sibling sex composition: Sister, Brother, Younger
sister, Older sister, Younger brother, and Older brother code the presence of any such sibling as
1. I also create variables for Number of brothers and Number of sisters, as well as Percent sisters,
the latter counting the share of women in the sibship.
Following the Swedish tax authority, I define entrepreneurs as individuals who derive the major-
ity of their taxable labor income from a partly or fully owned business, and consider unincorporated
and incorporated firm ownership separately. The legal distinction between firm types is that the
latter represents a privately owned, non-listed, limited liability stock company, allowing founders
to pursue riskier investments. In practice, incorporated enterprises have higher ability founders
and better outcomes (Berglann et al., 2011; Andersson-Joona and Wadensjö, 2013; Guzman and
Stern, 2016; Åstebro and Tåg, 2017; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017; Humphries, 2017; van Praag and
Raknerud, 2017; Halvarsson et al., 2018). As a result, incorporation is considered a proxy for growth
orientation (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014, 2019; Tåg et al., 2016; Lindquist et al., 2018; Levine
and Rubinstein, 2018). With this distinction in mind, I focus on individuals’ long run propensity
to become entrepreneurs, and define them as Unincorporated or Incorporated entrepreneurs if they
are recorded as such at any point in the years when the data is available (1985/1993-2012). For
comparisons with Black et al. (2018), I define an individual as an Entrepreneur if they have ever
been unincorporated or incorporated.5
4 The results hold when I restrict the sample to complete families. In addition, sibling correlations for this
sample are the same as those in the larger sample (Lindquist et al., 2018).
5 Results (available upon request) are similar if I i) measure entrepreneurship between ages 25 and 40 for
consistency across cohorts, ii) measure entrepreneurship from 1993 onwards for both unincorporated and incorporated
business ownership, or iii) use a stricter definition, focusing on those who are entrepreneurs for more than the median
number of years, potentially in different spells – unfortunately, I do not have access to firm-level data.
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To understand the channels that generate birth order effects, I assess the mediating role of
education, cognitive, and noncognitive skills. The data record the number of years of completed
schooling (seven levels, from the old minimum of 7 years, to 12 years for high school, and a
maximum of 19 years for a PhD). Cognitive and noncognitive ability data come from military
draft records: at age 18, Swedish male citizens serve a mandatory military stage. At entry, they
are administered a battery of tests, and their logical, verbal, spatial, and technical skills are scored
on a 1 to 9 scale. In addition, a psychologist conducts a structured interview with each individual,
scoring their leadership skills on a 1 to 9 scale. These scores are consequential, as they are used
to sort young men into officer training programs (Lindqvist and Vestman, 2011) and have been
shown to affect entrepreneurship (Aldén et al., 2017; Humphries, 2017).
Throughout the analyses, in addition to dummies for individual and parents’ year of birth, I
control for i) mother’s age at first birth, ii) parental immigration status, iii) parental entrepreneur-
ship, iv) parental education, and v) parental income, the log of the sum of mother’s and father’s
average pre-tax total factor income for all available years between 1968 and 2012. This measure
captures labor earnings and returns on capital, is strongly associated with wealth (Lefgren et al.,
2012), and is introduced as a set of dummies for distribution deciles, the top five and top one
percent. These controls are mainly used for improving precision, as results are similar with and
without them. Since the sample for each causal analysis is slightly different, I present descriptive
statistics for each sample in the relevant section. Overall, around 14.5% of individuals are Unin-
corporated, and around 8.5% Incorporated. Men are always more entrepreneurial than women, and
the same is true for parents.
3.3 Birth Order and Entrepreneurship
Differences between siblings may emerge through birth order, which affects parental preferences
and strategies, children’s bid for parents’ attention, and sibling interactions. On the one hand,
parents invest more temporal and financial resources in the first born, but allow more freedom to
106 CHAPTER 3. SIBLING DIFFERENCES IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP
later borns (Price, 2008; Pavan, 2016; Mechoulan and Wolff, 2015; Hotz and Pantano, 2015). On
the other hand, siblings engage in an individuation process, adopting different roles. A popular
hypothesis in psychology contends that first borns are more conforming, while later borns are more
creative and disruptive (Sulloway, 1996), though Rohrer et al. (2015) find no birth order effects
with regards to personality traits. Empirically, birth order effects in education and cognitive ability
are negative, with potential consequences for earnings (Black et al., 2005; Lehmann et al., 2018).
Due mainly to socialization factors (as opposed to innate traits), later born children have lower
noncognitive ability; consequently, they are less likely to attain managerial positions and do not
necessarily pursue occupations requiring more creativity (Black et al., 2018).
What does this imply for entrepreneurship? Several competing perspectives exist. If new
ventures require higher ability, then earlier born individuals could be more likely to enter, but if
entrepreneurship represents only a necessary response to lack of labor market opportunities en-
gendered by low ability (Åstebro et al., 2011; Andersson-Joona and Wadensjö, 2013; Levine and
Rubinstein, 2017), then later born children could have higher odds of becoming entrepreneurs. The
latter may also be more entrepreneurial if creativity is required (Sulloway, 1996).6 To disentangle
these competing mechanisms, I analyze unincorporated and incorporated business ownership sepa-
rately. Broadly speaking, incorporated firms operate at larger scale and are more growth oriented
than unincorporated firms, thus requiring a higher ability entrepreneur in order to be successful.
Clearer predictions then emerge:
Hypothesis 1. a) Later born children are more likely to become unincorporated than earlier born
children, i.e. there are positive birth order effects in unincorporated entrepreneurship. By contrast,
b) later born children are less likely to become incorporated than earlier born children, i.e. there
are negative birth order effects in incorporated entrepreneurship.
6 Under primogeniture preference, business inheritance may favor first borns (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007).
Without firm-level data, I cannot address this possibility; however, children in Scandinavia become entrepreneurs in
the same industry and around the same time as their parents exit in at most 8% of cases (Sørensen, 2007b; Lindquist
et al., 2015). Birth order and gender are the least important factors in family firm succession in Canada (Chrisman
et al., 1998), but they matter in Italy (Calabrò et al., 2018).
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Figure 3.1: Unincorporated (left) and incorporated (right) entrepreneurship, by birth order and
family size, with 95% confidence intervals.
Estimates of birth order effects in entrepreneurship are scant. An early study finds no such
effects in a small sample of innovative business founders (Robinson and Hunt, 1992). Recently,
Han and Greene (2016) use data from the British 1970 cohort study and fixed effects estimations to
show that later born children are more likely to be self-employed, which they interpret as evidence
for the ‘born to rebel’ hypothesis (Sulloway, 1996).7 In Sweden, Black et al. (2018) find evidence of
relatively weak positive birth order effects in self-employment; their definition, however, conflates
unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship, and does not assess sources of heterogeneity
or mediating factors. I therefore extend their analysis, adding a novel focus on gender and firm
type. I first show the effects visually, then estimate OLS regressions, and finally use a fixed effects
approach to account for the confounding effects of family size.
Figure 3.1 plots the raw levels of unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship by birth
order and family size, separately by gender. While the gender gap in entrepreneurship is striking,
these profiles are flat with regards to birth order; yet, later born children are younger and display
slightly lower entrepreneurship rates (Appendix Figure B.1.1). While a formal investigation is
therefore necessary, the fact that a relationship is not immediately evident – compared with the
results for education in Appendix Figure B.1.2 – hints towards a limited role of birth order effects.
7 Note that around three quarters of the self-employed in this cohort study have no employees.
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The sample consists of families with two to five children, excluding families with multiple
births due to the birth order ambiguity they create.8 Appendix Table B.1.1 presents summary
statistics, separately by birth order: earlier (later) born children are more likely to be incorpo-
rated (unincorporated) entrepreneurs. OLS models controlling for birth year, gender, and family
size, are shown in Appendix Table B.1.2. Second and third born children are more likely to be
entrepreneurs, but fourth and fifth born children are less likely, driven by positive effects in un-
incorporated entrepreneurship and negative effects in incorporation for men. When I control for
parental characteristics, birth order effects become positive.
As higher birth orders are only present in larger families, the previous specifications control
for family size, as well as own and mother’s birth year. However, conditioning on these factors
generates imbalances in parental characteristics (Black et al., 2018). I then estimate family fixed
effects models, allowing me to compare children within families, i.e. keeping parental traits and
family size constant. Table 3.1 presents the results, displaying the likelihood of entry for children
at the second to fifth birth orders relative to a first born. The positive birth order effects overall
are driven mainly by unincorporated entrepreneurship, with a higher entry likelihood for later born
men in particular. For instance, fifth born men are 4.26 percentage points more likely than first
born men to become unincorporated, relative to a male average of 17.82%. Later born women
display a higher, but insignificant, likelihood of becoming unincorporated entrepreneurs.9
Heterogeneity and robustness To examine how parental characteristics may affect birth order
effects, I split the sample by parental entrepreneurship and income in Appendix Table B.1.4. I
find strong birth order effects for unincorporated (and weaker for incorporated) entrepreneurship
when parents are not entrepreneurs. Having an entrepreneurial role model may thus dominate the
role of birth order in generating sibling differences, and essentially equalize the playing field (Han
8 Results are robust to their inclusion, as well as the exclusion of families with adopted children.
9 Appendix Table B.1.3, Panel A, shows that birth order effects are only found outside of female-only families.
The results in Table 3.1 are robust to controlling for mother’s age at the birth of each individual, potentially
correlated with biological factors (Black et al., 2018).
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and Greene, 2016). Alternatively, both earlier and later born children of unincorporated, necessity
entrepreneurs may wish to avoid this outcome, and therefore refrain from entrepreneurship. The
weak birth order effects in incorporation in families with entrepreneur parents also suggest that
firm inheritance by the first born is not a large concern in my analysis. Regarding parents’ financial
resources, birth order effects are stronger for wealthier parents, and become positive and weakly
significant for incorporation, hinting that later born children may become entrepreneurs if they
have sufficient resources at their disposal.
Two key results emerge from this analysis.10 First, broadly in line with Hypothesis 1a, birth
order effects in unincorporated entrepreneurship are positive and significant for men and positive,
but not significant for women. This parallels the findings in Black et al. (2018), although their
results for self-employment seem to be driven mainly by unincorporated business ownership. Sec-
ond, contrary to Hypothesis 1b, birth order effects in incorporated entrepreneurship are largely
absent, speaking to the different nature of this type of entrepreneurship.
Mechanisms What could drive birth order effects in entrepreneurship? The majority of birth
order studies have focused on outcomes more proximate to childhood or stable traits such as
education, cognitive and noncognitive ability, or psychological traits, which may lie on the causal
pathway from birth order to entrepreneurship. I now turn to an examination of these mechanisms,
focusing on cognitive and noncognitive ability, as well as education.
10 In additional analyses, I also find positive birth order effects in unincorporated entrepreneurship in non-
immigrant families (available upon request). Splitting the sample by number of children produces some evidence
that higher birth order children are more likely to become unincorporated entrepreneurs, but this effect becomes
negative and weakly significant in large families, pointing towards a non-linear effect of birth order, moderated by
family size (Appendix Table B.1.4). The results also hold for linear birth order effects (Appendix Table B.1.5).
Birth order has a positive effect on unincorporated entrepreneurship, dampened by family size and entrepreneurial
parents, but boosted by wealthier parents. For incorporation, linear birth order is not generally significant in fixed
effects specifications, although the parental entrepreneurship and income mechanisms remain significant. I also
follow Black et al. (2018) in estimating birth order effects within same gender siblings; for this exercise I restrict the
sample to complete families in order to retain the correct within-gender order (Appendix Table B.1.6). The results
show that order within the entire family, rather than within siblings of the same gender, drives birth order effects,
and also suggests a limited role of sibling sex composition, which I later return to. Finally, subject to the caveat of
smaller samples and noisier estimates, I find virtually no birth order effects for proxies of performance, i.e. years in
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial income (available upon request).
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In columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.2 I focus on the mediating role of education and ability, controlling
for them in family fixed effects models. Individual education explains a large share of birth order
effects in unincorporated entrepreneurship: later born children are more likely to become unin-
corporated entrepreneurs as a result of their poorer educational outcomes (Appendix Figure B.1.2
and Table B.1.7). Unincorporated entrepreneurship thus corresponds to a lack of labor market
opportunities for lower ability individuals (Åstebro et al., 2011; Andersson-Joona and Wadensjö,
2013; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017).11 For incorporation, education does not alter the general pic-
ture of insignificant birth order effects. Results are similar when I perform this exercise separately
by gender in Panel B of Appendix Table B.1.3.
To investigate the role of cognitive and noncognitive ability, I use data on men’s logical, verbal,
spatial, technical, and leadership skills (measured on a 1-9, stanine scale). Black et al. (2018) show
positive birth order effects in noncognitive skills, which positively affect incorporation (Lindquist
et al., 2018). Indeed, I find very strong negative birth order effects in these outcomes in Appendix
Table B.1.7. For this mediation exercise, I introduce test scores as a set of dummies in columns (5)-
(10) of Table 3.2. For incorporation, cognitive and noncognitive skills are positive determinants, but
reveal little with regards to birth order. For unincorporated entrepreneurship, however, controlling
for ability boosts the effects of birth order, driven mainly by a positive effect of spatial ability and a
negative effect of technical ability and leadership skills. Overall, education has the largest impact,
though controlling for cognitive and noncognitive ability may reveal slightly stronger birth order
effects for fifth born men.
I conclude that positive birth order effects exist only for unincorporated entrepreneurship, and
are small, limited to males, and partly mediated by educational achievement. A later born child
is around 4.3% more likely to become unincorporated, on a baseline of 17.8%: while this effect is
sizable, it is much smaller for most birth orders, and since fifth born children are a small fraction
11 Reassuringly, later born children are less likely to report November employment and more likely to have zero
earnings or earnings less than 25% and 50% of the median earnings of paid employees in a given year between the
ages of 25 and 40, reflecting low labor market attachment (results available upon request).
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of the population, it can be considered negligible. Finally, compared to more proximate outcomes
that display strong negative patterns, birth order effects in entrepreneurship are remarkably weak,
both economically and statistically.
3.4 Family Size and Entrepreneurship
While entrepreneurship displays a rather stable pattern regarding birth order, family size may
differentially affect male and female entrepreneurship (Figure 3.1), requiring a formal investigation.
The prediction that family size affects child ability as parents spread resources across more children
has received mixed empirical support. Some studies find no effects on cognitive and non-cognitive
ability and educational attainment (Kessler, 1991; Black et al., 2005; Conley and Glauber, 2006;
Angrist et al., 2010), and others find negative effects (Cáceres-Delpiano, 2006; Black et al., 2010;
Mogstad and Wiswall, 2016; Bagger et al., 2018; Fletcher and Kim, 2018), especially in constrained
families (Åslund and Grönqvist, 2010; Lafortune and Lee, 2014). Consequently, larger families
may impede individual human capital accumulation, preventing opportunity entrepreneurship, but
promoting necessity entrepreneurship. Moreover, in starting a more capital intensive, incorporated
firm, children in large families are less able to rely on parental financial resources, which are strong
determinants of entry (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000), especially
for women (Lindquist et al., 2018).12 Theoretically, we expect:
Hypothesis 2. a) Children in larger families are more likely to become unincorporated entre-
preneurs than children in smaller families. By contrast, b) children in larger families are less
likely to become incorporated entrepreneurs than children in smaller families.
While no studies have specifically examined the role of family size for entrepreneurship, many
control for it in occupational choice equations. The effects of family size are absent in the U.S.
National Longitudinal Survey (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Hundley, 2006), but negative in the
12 While one could argue that increased sibling interaction in larger families may foster social skills or leadership,
this hypothesis is not supported by previous research (Fletcher and Kim, 2018).
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Figure 3.2: Unincorporated (left) and incorporated (right) entrepreneurship, by family size, with
95% confidence intervals.
General Social Survey (Hout and Rosen, 2000; Hundley, 2006) and for children of the self-employed
in Finland (Niittykangas and Tervo, 2005; Tervo, 2006); in Sweden, Lindquist et al. (2018) find pos-
itive (negative) non-causal effects on unincorporated (incorporated) entrepreneurship. Appendix
Table B.1.8 presents the descriptives for the sample, disaggregated by family size. Unincorporated
entrepreneurship increases with family size, while incorporation first increases, then decreases with
family size, as visible in Figure 3.2. However, parental characteristics also vary with family size,
raising concerns about confounders.
Empirically, I first estimate OLS models, then address the endogeneity of family size in instru-
mental variable approaches (Black et al., 2005). Appendix Tables B.1.9 to B.1.12 estimate the role
of family size for entrepreneurship in OLS models, with i) quadratic functions and dummies, ii)
different sets of control variables, including birth order, iii) by gender, and iv) by parental income
and entrepreneurship. Together, they suggest largely positive effects of family size on unincorpo-
rated entrepreneurship and negative effects for incorporation, though the estimates are sensitive
to the inclusion of different controls and relatively noisy.
Parents’ fertility decision, nonetheless, is likely endogenous. For instance, lower ability parents
may have lower ability, potentially less entrepreneurial children, but may also have more children:
family size effects are then confounded by unobservables (Kessler, 1991; Black et al., 2005; Angrist
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Table 3.3: Family Size, Instrumental Variable Approach
Family size Unincorporated Incorporated
(1) 1st Stage (2) OLS (3) IV (4) OLS (5) IV
A. Instrument: multiple second birth; sample: 1st born, 2+ children
Family size 0.0058*** -0.0034 -0.0038*** 0.0035
(0.0008) (0.0122) (0.0006) (0.0100)
Multiple birth 0.7281***
(0.0183)
F -statistic 1,584.99
N 224,345
B. Instrument: multiple third birth; sample: 1st-2nd born, 3+ children
Family size 0.0054*** 0.0118 -0.0046*** 0.0151
(0.0010) (0.0130) (0.0007) (0.0107)
2nd born 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0029** 0.0002
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0019)
Multiple birth 0.8538***
(0.0294)
F -statistic 845.38
N 213,838
C. Instrument: multiple fourth birth; sample: 1st-3rd born, 4+ children
Family size 0.0039*** 0.0128 -0.0045*** -0.0298**
(0.0014) (0.0188) (0.0009) (0.0118)
2nd born -0.0069** -0.0077** -0.0017 0.0006
(0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0024)
3rd born -0.0116*** -0.0135*** -0.0039 0.0017
(0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0025) (0.0035)
Multiple birth 0.9179***
(0.0622)
F -statistic 217.80
N 105,958
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. In Panel A, standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust; in Panels B and C, standard errors are clustered at the family level, and
I report the Kleibergen-Paap F -statistics, adjusting for clustering. All models control for own and
mother’s birth year, gender, and birth order. Other controls include father’s birth year, and mother’s
and father’s education level. Multiple births include twins, triplets, quadruplets, and quintuplets.
et al., 2010). The search for exogenous variation in family size has resulted in the use of multiple
births as instruments: the birth of twins, triplets, etc. may push parents beyond their desired
fertility, allowing family size to be exogenous for previously born children (Black et al., 2005; Bagger
et al., 2018). I create instruments based on a multiple birth taking place at order t to analyze
the outcomes of children born at orders 1, 2, ..., t − 1.13 This approach only exploits exogenous
13 Twins with birth orders 3 and 4 a multiple birth at both 3rd and 4th birth orders, such that i) the first stage
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family size variations, and leads to large and positive first stage estimates, with Kleibergen-Paap
F -statistics above 200.14
The two-stage least squares IV estimates for these samples are shown in Table 3.3.15 While
OLS estimates suggest a positive effect of family size on unincorporated business ownership, IV
estimates are not significantly different from zero. For incorporation, OLS estimates are negative,
whereas most IV estimates are insignificant, with the exception of families with at least 4 children.
As the latter represent less than 2.5% of families, family size is unlikely to constitute an obstacle
to the pursuit of entrepreneurship for a large fraction of the population. In addition, I repeat
the exercise separately for men and women, where differential effects may exist if parents allocate
resources unequally as a function of gender. As Table 3.4 shows, results are very similar, although
the negative effect of large families is only present for men.
Robustness checks Alternatively, I use the first two siblings’ gender as an instrument for family
size, as parents with a preference for gender diversity will have more children (Angrist and Evans,
1998). Indeed, this is characteristic of the Swedish context (Andersson et al., 2006). To ensure
correctly computed instruments, I restrict the sample to complete families and focus on children
with birth orders 1 and 2.16 The first stages are strong, with F > 125: same gender pairs lead to
larger families, irrespective of gender. The OLS and IV results in Panels A and B of Appendix
Table B.1.13 display no evidence of causal family size effects. While this instrument analyzes a
different complier population (Angrist et al., 2010), exogeneity may be violated if child gender
effect on family size is understated, and ii) the instrumented effects of family size may be affected by twin interactions
or other effects. I therefore only define a multiple birth as taking place at birth order t if no multiple birth has
occurred at orders 1, 2, ..., t−1. In principle, a family could comprise several multiple births; I only use the first one
for any given mother to avoid ambiguities. Bhalotra and Clarke (2018) show that twin births may be correlated with
maternal characteristics. To alleviate this concern, I control for mother’s age, education, and income as correlates
of maternal health and later on report results using a different set of instruments.
14 I report Kleibergen-Paap F -statistics, adjusting for the family clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Olea and
Pflueger (2013) effective F -statistics, correcting for potential heteroskedasticity, are very similar.
15 Results from instrumental variable models for binary dependent variables (Newey, 1987, 1990) are qualitatively
similar, but their magnitude is more difficult to interpret (available upon request).
16 IV results are similar when i) parents live together, ii) parental income is below/above median, iii) the parents
are entrepreneurs or not, and iv) I restrict the sample to complete families (available upon request).
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mix affects entrepreneurship through other channels than family size; these results should thus be
taken with caution (Black et al., 2005).17
In order to gain more precise estimates, I also use the method proposed by Angrist et al.
(2010) for combining multiple birth and sex composition instruments (Panels C-E of Appendix
Table B.1.13). This approach produces weak evidence for family size effects, a reassuring result
given the generally smaller standard errors it produces. Nonetheless, the linear family size effects
assumption may be too strong: for instance, family size shifts the likelihood of primogeniture in
family firm successions (Calabrò et al., 2018). To estimate the effects of family size at different
birth orders, I estimate non-linear instrumental variable models (Mogstad and Wiswall, 2016), as
described in Appendix B.2. I find no significant marginal family size effects for unincorporated
entrepreneurship, and negative marginal family size effects for incorporated entrepreneurship in
families with more than five children (Appendix Table B.2.1). While very large families effectively
deny incorporation to children (large decreases relative to the mean), given the small fraction of
such families where human capital and financial constraints become binding, these effects need not
yield substantial explanatory power.
Overall, the weight of the evidence pushes against large causal family size effects in en-
trepreneurship, contrary to Hypotheses 2a and 2b. In this setting, IV estimation – using several
different instruments, as well as non-linear approaches – does point towards substantial endogene-
ity and a bias in OLS estimates.18 Nonetheless, large families do hinder entrepreneurship, and I
later attempt to assess the contribution of family size effects to sibling correlations. I now turn to
the final causal exercise, where I relate sibling gender to entrepreneurship outcomes.
17 Booth and Kee (2009) propose breaking the mechanical relationship with family size (ρ ≈ 0.69) by using a
birth order index, calculated as the ratio between an individual’s absolute birth order and the average birth order
in their family (ρ ≈ 0.12). This approach yields some significant effects, but with an extremely small magnitude,
and effectively negligible (Appendix Table B.1.14). Note that this alternative estimation fails to account for the
endogeneity of family size, so the estimates in Table 3.3 remain the preferred ones.
18 The main IV approach relies on multiple births as an exogenous source of variation in family size; however,
multiple births may also change the way in which parents allocate attention to children and invest in their human
capital. As a result, the IV estimates may only apply to a particular subsample of the population and may capture a
wide array of changes induced by higher family size; to alleviate these concerns, I used a set of different instruments
and approaches, whose results are internally consistent despite relying on different assumptions.
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3.5 Sibling Sex Composition and Entrepreneurship
The last within-household difference I consider refers to sibling sex composition: I assess whether
growing up with a brother or sister affects men’s and women’s entrepreneurship. Sibling gender
may affect both intra-household resource allocation and the nature and quality of sibling interac-
tions. Parental preference for sons (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Dahl and Moretti, 2008) may reduce
investments in women, lowering their educational attainment; by contrast, growing up with a
brother may raise parents’ expectations of women’s achievement (Butcher and Case, 1994). Op-
posite gender children may also influence parenting styles, reinforcing traditional gender roles
(Brenøe, 2018) and reducing women’s competitiveness (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007); however,
the latter may increase when growing up with a brother, as sibling rivalry is exacerbated (McHale
et al., 2012). Given that entrepreneurship is a stereotypically male occupation, requiring human
capital and competitiveness, sibling sex composition may be an important determinant.
So far, empirical results have been inconsistent. Butcher and Case (1994) find that a brother
improves women’s educational achievement, though Kaestner (1997) and Hauser and Kuo (1998)
dispute this. Cyron et al. (2017) find a positive effect of sisters on men’s cognitive ability, Cools
and Patacchini (2019) find lower earnings for women with a brother, while Rao and Chatterjee
(2018) find positive earnings effects for men with a brother. Using twins, Bhai (2016) finds that
having a brother raises women’s high school completion rates and earnings, whereas Peter et al.
(2018) find higher earnings for men with a brother and women with a sister. Finally, women with
a brother are more likely to pursue a science and technology (STEM) education when their father
works in a STEM occupation (Oguzoglu and Ozbeklik, 2016), but may be less likely to work in
STEM themselves (Brenøe, 2018).
One could speculate on the implications of these findings for entrepreneurship. If women with
brothers are more competitive and acquire more education, they may be more likely to become
incorporated; by contrast, if traditional roles are reinforced or women obtain lower education in
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the presence of brothers, they may be more (less) likely to become unincorporated (incorporated)
entrepreneurs. The existence and nature of sibling sex composition effects in entrepreneurship
appear to be an empirical matter and evidence so far is scant. This is surprising in light of the
attention paid to the gender gap in entrepreneurship, its drivers, and potential solutions. One
exception is Mishkin (2017), who finds that women with a brother are less likely to become self-
employed when the father is self-employed. I discuss this mechanism later and now turn to a
formal investigation of pure sibling sex composition effects. While I also analyze men’s outcomes,
the main focus is on women’s entrepreneurship, with the baseline expectation that:
Hypothesis 3. Women growing up with a brother are a) more likely to become unincorporated
entrepreneurs, but b) less likely to become incorporated entrepreneurs.
The literature on sibling gender effects has not converged on either the appropriate theory or
the preferred empirical specification (Butcher and Case, 1994; Hauser and Kuo, 1998; Cools and
Patacchini, 2019). I therefore provide a set of different specifications and sample cuts. These
exercises rely on a large set of controls for family background to alleviate the endogeneity of child
gender preferences. However, they all point towards a limited role of sibling sex composition effects
in entrepreneurship. In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, no clear relationship between number of brothers or
sisters and entrepreneurship entry emerges for men or women: most rates of entrepreneurship in
the raw data are overlapping (separately by gender).
To formally analyze the role of sibling gender, I restrict the sample to complete families with at
least two children in order to get an accurate picture of the number of men and women. Descriptive
statistics for this sample are shown in Appendix Table B.1.15. In Appendix Tables B.1.16 to B.1.18
I use indicators for the presence and number of same or opposite gender sibling, the percent of
sisters in the family, and the presence of younger or older siblings. In these models, I control for
individual and parental birth year, parental education, immigration, and entrepreneurship, family
structure at age 15, and family size. The findings parallel the pattern of mixed results in the
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Figure 3.3: Unincorporated (left) and incorporated (right) entrepreneurship, by number of
brothers and family size, with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.4: Unincorporated (left) and incorporated (right) entrepreneurship, by number of
sisters and family size, with 95% confidence intervals.
literature, although the presence of (younger) brothers and sisters has a somewhat positive effect
on men’s entrepreneurship (of either type) and women’s unincorporated entrepreneurship.
Although I control for a large set of background characteristics, sibling gender may reflect
unobserved parental preferences potentially related to entrepreneurship. For instance, more risk-
averse, less entrepreneurial parents (thus less likely to transmit entrepreneurship to children) may
also prefer to have male and female children to diversify old-age risks. Alternatively, fathers may
wish to impart entrepreneurial skills to a son, to the detriment of a daughter, such that a negative
effect of having a brother on the sister’s entrepreneurship is confounded. To get closer to a causal
interpretation, I therefore focus on first born children, assuming that the second child’s gender is
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quasi-exogenous to the first child conditional on parents’ decision to have another child (Cools and
Patacchini, 2019; Mishkin, 2017; Peter et al., 2018).19
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the effect of growing up with an opposite gender child on the en-
trepreneurship outcomes of first born men and women, respectively, controlling for a wide set of
demographics. For first born men, there is a small positive effect of having a sister in families of two
children, but most of the evidence points towards no significant effect of the next sibling’s gender,
even controlling for birth spacing as a proxy for sibling interaction intensity (Buckles and Munnich,
2012). For first born women, the next sibling’s gender does not affect entry into entrepreneurship,
with the exception of the small subsample of families of four children. Overall, evidence for the
existence of pure sibling sex composition effects is limited, although I later discuss the interaction
of sibling gender and parental entrepreneurship in detail.20
Heterogeneity Intra-household resource allocation may depend on parental traits. For instance,
parents may favor sons in transferring entrepreneurship relevant human capital or the business in
its entirety (Mishkin, 2017). For first born women, Panels A and B of Appendix Table B.1.21
show that having a second born brother reduces women’s likelihood of becoming unincorporated
entrepreneurs when parents are entrepreneurs in all family sizes, though not always significantly.
If parents are not entrepreneurs, the second child’s gender does not matter for first born women.
19 The first born child’s gender may influence parents’ subsequent fertility decisions: under son preference, the
family will continue to have children if the first child is a daughter (Dahl and Moretti, 2008; Jayachandran and
Pande, 2017). While this may generate a selection effect on family size, the gender of the second child should be
orthogonal to the gender of the first child (Peter et al., 2018). Given that all the individuals in the sample are born
before 1970, parental fertility and children’s gender are not substantially affected by the introduction of the birth
control pill (Black et al., 2005) or sex-selective abortions (Lindquist et al., 2015; Peter et al., 2018), which were
introduced only after 1965 and slowly. Appendix Table B.1.19 shows covariate balance for first born children with
same- and opposite- sex next siblings; the small differences become insignificant in multivariate analyses. As family
size does differ between groups, I control for it in the regressions.
20 Another approach is to use dizygotic twins, where the co-twin gender is as good as random; this approach deliv-
ers similar results to using first born children and the next sibling’s gender (Peter et al., 2018). Encouragingly, they
note (footnote 31) the absence of sibling gender effects in self-employment using the latter approach. Unfortunately,
I do not have access to zygosity indicators in order to perform a twin analysis, and disregarding zygosity may bias
the results in unpredictable ways (Peter et al., 2018). I assess the role of sibling gender for all twins (irrespective of
zygosity) in Appendix Table B.1.20: having a brother does not affect unincorporated entrepreneurship, but increases
both men and women’s likelihood of becoming incorporated. These results, however, may be driven by identical
twins, such that they provide inconclusive evidence of sibling gender effects.
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In Panels C and D of Appendix Table B.1.21, I split the sample between women whose mother
earns at least as much as, or less than the father, as an operationalization of gendered roles, i.e. men
are breadwinners and women are homemakers (Bertrand et al., 2015). The presence of a brother
may make women more ‘feminine’ (Brenøe, 2018), thus reducing their entry into entrepreneurship;
this effect may be stronger in families with more stereotypical gender roles, e.g. where the mother
earns less than the father (Cools and Patacchini, 2019). However, I find that parents’ adherence to
gendered roles does not reinforce any potential negative effects of a second born brother’s presence
on first born women’s entrepreneurship. Finally, in Panels E and F, I split the sample by parental
income below/above median, with similarly insignificant differences.
Chen et al. (2017) argue that an opposite gender sibling has i) a direct effect through differential
parental behavior or sibling interactions, and ii) an indirect effect through family size; these effects
may cancel each other out, hiding a significant impact. For example, if a first born female’s next
sibling is male, parents with a preference for sons will have fewer children, thus generating an
indirect effect through lower family size. To assess the direction and magnitude of these effects, I
use IV models interacting the gender of the next sibling and family size, instrumented by multiple
birth at the second birth order and its interaction with the next sibling’s gender (F > 600).
Appendix Table B.1.22 performs this decomposition: both direct and indirect effects are zero and
precisely estimated. Overall, I find little evidence of sibling sex composition effects, consistent
with a lack of adult sibling peer effects (Lindquist et al., 2018).
Sibling Gender and Intergenerational Associations Using U.S. data from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics, Mishkin (2017) argues that sibling sex composition effects arise only under
specific circumstances. She shows that women with a brother are less likely to be self-employed
when their father is self-employed, representing an 80% reduction in the father-daughter association
in self-employment. In her data, this result is weaker and less significant for father-daughter
associations in incorporation. Nonetheless, this effect, as well as the potential for similar effects
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for mothers’ or male children’s entrepreneurship, comes in contrast with my finding of no pure
sibling sex composition effects, including in entrepreneurial families.
To assess the source of this discrepancy, I replicate and extend her research by differentiating
between individual and parental unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship, and examin-
ing men’s outcomes and mothers’ entrepreneurship. Compared to Mishkin (2017), I have a larger
sample and data on more than 20 years of individuals’ careers, allowing me to examine the long-run
entrepreneurial propensity. Column (5) in Panel A of Appendix Table B.1.23 shows a negative
effect of having a brother and an unincorporated father on women’s self-employment. This ef-
fect is reversed for men, for whom a sister amplifies the father-son association in unincorporated
entrepreneurship in column (1). Instead, column (8) suggests that having a brother increases
women’s likelihood of incorporation when the father is incorporated, a result robust to controlling
for parental traits. In Panel B, the effects are directionally similar, but less statistically significant.
However, when the mother is an (unincorporated or incorporated) entrepreneur, having a brother
boosts women’s incorporation.
Endogenous fertility and child gender decisions limit the ability to claim causality when using
all children in families with at least two siblings. I therefore restrict the sample to first born chil-
dren in complete families and assess the role of the next sibling’s gender on the intergenerational
transmission of entrepreneurship. Results in Panels C and D largely confirm the previous findings,
although father’s unincorporated entrepreneurship now increases women’s likelihood of incorpora-
tion in the presence of a brother. In addition, the presence of a brother no longer moderates the
effect of mother’s entrepreneurship.
The channel proposed by Mishkin (2017) appears limited to fathers’ and individuals’ unincor-
porated entrepreneurship and is more muted in Sweden than in the U.S.: 20-30% compared to 80%.
However, maternal entrepreneurship is a stronger influence for women than paternal entrepreneur-
ship (Lindquist et al., 2015), and mothers may even favor daughters when a brother is present,
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such that the father-daughter transmission and its relation to sibling gender fades in importance.
In addition, incorporated fathers may increase daughters’ incorporation when a brother is present,
with potentially large welfare implications (van Praag and Raknerud, 2017). Overall, while the
presence of brothers weakens the father-daughter association in unincorporated self-employment,
it does not hold for incorporation or mother entrepreneurs, with the latter producing potentially
countervailing effects. Indeed, the analysis in Panel A of Table B.1.21 barely picks up the effect
that Mishkin (2017) proposes.21 I conclude that sibling sex composition effects play an overall
minor role for entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, in the next section I attempt to account for them in
a revised measure of the influence of families.
3.6 Sibling Differences and Sibling Correlations
By creating sibling similarities, family and community background can explain 20-30% of variation
in entry into unincorporated entrepreneurship and 40-50% for incorporation, as estimated by
sibling correlations (Lindquist et al., 2018). These correlations compute the share of variation
in a given outcome explained by between-family variation as opposed to within-family variation,
and represent a broad measure of the importance of background (Solon, 1999). Intuitively, sibling
correlations capture all factors shared by siblings, including genetic endowments, family resources
and role models, schools, or neighborhoods. More formally, ρ = σ2a/(σ2a+σ2b ), where σ2a is between-
family variance and σ2b is within-family variance. These are estimated from a random effects
model: E∗if = X′ifβ + af + bif , where E is the entrepreneurship outcome of individual i in family
f , and X ′ includes birth year and gender. The sibling correlation ρ, however, does not capture
sibling differences generated inside the family, through preferential treatment of children or sibling
interactions (Conley, 2004), such that the total effect of background is underestimated and the role
of sibling similarities is overestimated. It is important to revise the sibling correlation to account
for any sibling differences the family may generate.
21 Mishkin (2017) also examines whether this relationship is affected by family size and birth order (potential
confounders). Reassuringly, she finds no effects of these variables on the coefficients of interest.
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Björklund and Jäntti (2012) propose a useful method for recovering the share of individual
variation produced by within-family differences. This technique: 1) estimates the random effects
regression needed for the sibling correlation (ρ); 2) predicts the individual level residuals (i.e.
within-family variation, where shared family characteristics have been parsed out), with variance
σ2b ; 3) regresses these residuals on factors that may generate sibling differences and obtains the
R2; and 4) calculates a revised measure of family influence that adds this explanatory power to
the original correlation: ρ˜ = (σ2a +R2σ2b )/(σ2a + σ2b ).
In this paper, I have shown positive birth order effects for men, some negative family size effects
in large families, and a differential effect of the presence of an opposite gender sibling when the
father is an entrepreneur. I now incorporate these differences in a unified framework, producing a
revised measure of family influence, accounting for the two- and three-way interactions of i) birth
order, gender, and parental entrepreneurship, ii) gender, the presence of opposite sex siblings,
and parental entrepreneurship, and iii) gender, family size, and parental income dummies. In
this exercise birth order, family size, and sibling sex composition remain endogenous; as previous
sections have shown the causal effects of these factors to be limited compared to OLS specifications,
their explanatory power in this exercise is likely an upper bound on their true contribution to the
importance of family background.22
Table 3.7 shows the results of this exercise, performed on the sample of complete families.
Panel A displays sibling correlations for each group and outcome, and Panel B shows the R2 from
the residual regression, used to calculate the revised sibling correlations in Panel C. Columns (1)
and (2) in Panel D show that the revised measures are 4.3-5% larger than the original sibling
correlations. In columns (3)-(6) I analyze men and women separately with similar results, though
differences are smaller for women. I focus on families with both male and female children in
22 Since the residuals have by definition been parsed of shared family factors, the coefficients on shared parental
characteristics (such as income or entrepreneurship) in the residual regressions should be insignificant and precisely
estimated. Reassuringly for the validity of this method, this is indeed the case. In other words, the R2 we obtain
accurately captures differential treatment inside the household.
3.6. SIBLING DIFFERENCES AND SIBLING CORRELATIONS 129
Table 3.7: Sibling Differences and Sibling Correlations
All Males Females Mixed gender
families (all families) (all families) families
Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Sibling correlations
ρ 0.2249 0.3425 0.3001 0.4113 0.2306 0.3637 0.1979 0.3126
(0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0126) (0.0173) (0.0069) (0.0089)
B. Individual variation explained by differential treatment
R2 0.0146 0.0225 0.0197 0.0329 0.0107 0.0183 0.0165 0.0239
C. Revised measure of family influence
ρ˜ 0.2363 0.3573 0.3139 0.4307 0.2388 0.3754 0.2111 0.3290
(0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0091) (0.0101) (0.0125) (0.0170) (0.0068) (0.0087)
D. Percentage increase from ρ to ρ˜
5.047% 4.320% 4.585% 4.710% 3.583% 3.207% 6.688% 5.249%
Nind 277,410 277,410 142,522 142,522 134,888 134,888 142,910 142,910
Nfam 144,939 144,939 103,858 103,858 100,136 100,136 59,055 59,055
All models control for individual birth year and gender. Sample restricted to complete families in order
to correctly define sibling gender (results are similar in the full sample). Columns (1) and (2) include
all children; columns (3) and (4) consider males; columns (5) and (6) consider females (regardless of
siblings’ gender); columns (7) and (8) restrict the sample to children in families that include both males
and females. I account for two- and three-way interactions of i) gender, parental entrepreneurship (i.e.
maternal and paternal unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship), and birth order dummies,
ii) gender, family size dummies, and parental income dummies (percentiles 10, 20, ..., 90, 95, 99), and
iii) gender, the presence of opposite gender siblings, and parental entrepreneurship.
columns (7) and (8), where family-generated differences should be largest due to potential sibling
gender effects. Indeed, there is a stronger role for such differences, as the revised measures are
6.7% larger for unincorporated entrepreneurship and 5.3% larger for incorporation.
Thus, when I account for a broad set of sibling differences with regards to birth order, family
size, and sibling gender (interacted with gender, parental entrepreneurship and parental income),
the latter add at most 7% to the sibling correlation (or 2 percentage points). As sibling differences
are small, sibling correlations do not substantially understate the role of family and community
background in entrepreneurship, and marginally overstate the role of sibling similarities in driving
this explanatory power, as captured by sibling correlations.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the role of three closely related and salient sources of sibling differences
generated inside the family for Swedish individuals’ propensity to become entrepreneurs. Birth
order effects, previously found to increase self-employment (Han and Greene, 2016; Black et al.,
2018), are driven by a higher likelihood of later born men to be unincorporated business owners.
Despite a popular perception that first borns are over-represented in entrepreneurship, I find no
support for this contention. Moreover, the positive birth order effects for men are largely mediated
by education: later born men have lower human capital, but a larger likelihood of unincorporated
business ownership. I conclude that higher entry into unincorporated entrepreneurship for men
is largely explained by poor labor market prospects, pointing towards the necessity aspect of this
type of entrepreneurship (Åstebro et al., 2011; Andersson-Joona and Wadensjö, 2013; Levine and
Rubinstein, 2018), rather than the widely held view that younger children are ‘born to rebel’ or
more disruptive (Sulloway, 1996).
Beyond contributing to our understanding of birth order effects, these findings reinforce the the-
orized dichotomy between unincorporated and incorporated firms as different types of entrepreneur-
ship (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014, 2019; Levine and Rubinstein, 2018), often taken to represent
an (imperfect) approximation of necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship. They also imply that
policy makers should take this distinction seriously, with a view towards fostering growth oriented
ventures and reducing necessity self-employment, notwithstanding heterogeneity within the latter
type of entrepreneurship (Dencker et al., 2019).
While family size is negatively related to entry in OLS regressions, linear and non-linear IV ap-
proaches dealing with endogenous fertility decisions show some evidence of negative causal family
size effects for incorporation in large families (whereas I find no effects for unincorporated busi-
ness ownership). This accords with a view of incorporated entrepreneurship as intensive in both
human and financial capital, where large families exhibit potentially binding resource constraints
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with regards to investments in children’s human capital as well as their businesses. However, as
developed societies transition to lower fertility rates, family size is unlikely to represent a strong
barrier to growth oriented entrepreneurship. For developing countries where large families are still
prevalent, family size may nonetheless hinder the entry and growth of ambitious, innovative new
ventures.
Growing up with siblings of the opposite sex has been shown to affect individuals’ education
and income, but does not seem to affect entrepreneurship entry. This result is robust to addressing
the endogeneity of family preferences for child gender, suggesting an absence of pure sibling sex
composition effects. Nonetheless, sibling gender may affect the transmission of entrepreneurship
from parents to children, as daughters with an unincorporated father are less likely to enter unin-
corporated entrepreneurship when a brother is present. While this effect is smaller in Sweden than
in the U.S. (Mishkin, 2017), it suggests that unincorporated self-employment – reliant on manual
tasks (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017) and concentrated in male-dominated occupations (Lindquist
et al., 2018) – may be characterized by a narrow set of occupation-specific skills that fathers find
easier or more desirable to pass on to sons, rather than daughters. By contrast, incorporated
fathers increase daughters’ entry when a brother is present, as do mothers in some specifications.
This result reinforces the importance of role models in growth oriented, incorporated business
ownership, a necessary element for increasing women’s likelihood of entry in an occupation with
an established gender gap.
Given the results of the three causal exercises, what is the joint quantitative value of these
effects for the total importance of family background? While background explains up to half of the
variation in entrepreneurship outcomes (Lindquist et al., 2018), sibling correlations only account
for factors that siblings share. By overlooking differences generated inside the household, sibling
correlations may understate the true explanatory power of family background (Björklund and
Jäntti, 2012). Once I account for these differences in families with both men and women, where they
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are expected to have the largest impact, sibling correlations rise by only 1.2-2 percentage points
(or 3.2%-6.7%). Therefore, the role of background for entrepreneurship is marginally understated,
confirming the importance of families in generating similarities, rather than differences, between
children in occupational choice. In other words, the sibling correlations in the previous chapter
provide an accurate indication of the total importance of family and community background for
entrepreneurship in Sweden.
The results in this paper are important for completing our picture of the importance of family
background, by examining potential household-level determinants of entrepreneurship that have
not received much attention, as well as the interplay of sibling differences and similarities. While
birth order, family size, and sibling sex composition affect ability, education, earnings, and labor
market outcomes (Black et al., 2005, 2018; Bagger et al., 2018; Peter et al., 2018), they have small
causal effects on one aspect of labor market choices, namely selection into entrepreneurship. More-
over, evidence for other outcomes suggests that the small effects observed for entrepreneurship are
not necessarily specific to Sweden. Nonetheless, sibling interactions may influence entrepreneurship
in more subtle ways than I am able to pick up. Closer investigation of such interactions and the
potential for sibling differences across countries – given substantial variation in primogeniture and
child gender norms (Ejrnæs and Pörtner, 2004; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Bloom and van Reenen,
2007; Dahl and Moretti, 2008) – may yield additional insight into the role of family background
for the different types of entrepreneurship.
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B.1 Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure B.1.1: Unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship, by birth year.
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Figure B.1.2: Years of schooling, by birth order and family size, with 95% confidence intervals.
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Table B.1.1: Descriptive statistics: Birth Order
All 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
born born born born born
Entrepreneur 0.199 0.198 0.201 0.202 0.196 0.192
(0.400) (0.398) (0.401) (0.402) (0.397) (0.394)
Unincorporated 0.146 0.142 0.146 0.151 0.150 0.151
(0.353) (0.349) (0.353) (0.358) (0.357) (0.358)
Incorporated 0.085 0.087 0.087 0.083 0.076 0.069
(0.279) (0.281) (0.282) (0.276) (0.266) (0.254)
Years of schooling 12.318 12.509 12.319 12.136 11.914 11.670
(2.166) (2.180) (2.151) (2.154) (2.109) (2.015)
Male 0.513 0.514 0.513 0.512 0.513 0.504
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Mother age at first birth 22.933 23.005 23.256 22.612 22.054 21.601
(3.996) (4.010) (4.167) (3.755) (3.492) (3.263)
Mother years of schooling 10.135 10.694 10.150 9.577 8.894 8.264
(2.805) (2.742) (2.788) (2.771) (2.568) (2.174)
Father years of schooling 10.072 10.446 10.091 9.719 9.193 8.632
(3.066) (3.041) (3.048) (3.088) (2.958) (2.622)
Unincorporated mother 0.156 0.164 0.156 0.151 0.140 0.119
(0.363) (0.370) (0.363) (0.358) (0.347) (0.324)
Unincorporated father 0.256 0.273 0.253 0.244 0.224 0.192
(0.436) (0.445) (0.435) (0.429) (0.417) (0.394)
Incorporated mother 0.034 0.042 0.034 0.025 0.016 0.010
(0.181) (0.201) (0.181) (0.155) (0.126) (0.098)
Incorporated father 0.067 0.089 0.067 0.044 0.026 0.015
(0.250) (0.285) (0.249) (0.205) (0.159) (0.121)
Parental income (log) 23.828 23.943 23.868 23.706 23.471 23.260
(1.089) (1.044) (1.051) (1.131) (1.224) (1.180)
Family size 2.931 2.624 2.662 3.398 4.238 5.000
(0.919) (0.785) (0.800) (0.620) (0.426) (0.000)
N 603,616 228,062 216,227 106,468 40,460 12,399
Sample restricted to families with at most 5 children and without multiple births (twins, triplets,
quadruplets, quintuplets). The number of observations on parental characteristics varies with data
availability (though only at most 5% of observations are missing).
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Table B.1.6: Birth Order: Order among Same Sex Siblings
Unincorporated entrepreneur Incorporated entrepreneur
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2nd 0.0138** 0.0147 0.0118** 0.0087 -0.0073 -0.0085 0.0058 0.0059
(0.0059) (0.0125) (0.0054) (0.0108) (0.0050) (0.0108) (0.0036) (0.0069)
3rd 0.0209* 0.0211 0.0202** 0.0161 -0.0093 -0.0127 0.0101 0.0100
(0.0109) (0.0202) (0.0097) (0.0174) (0.0092) (0.0173) (0.0065) (0.0113)
4th 0.0299* 0.0350 0.0253* 0.0205 -0.0063 -0.0074 0.0048 0.0070
(0.0173) (0.0279) (0.0149) (0.0240) (0.0144) (0.0236) (0.0099) (0.0153)
5th 0.0370 0.0390 0.0742** 0.0611 0.0274 0.0334 -0.0054 0.0029
(0.0368) (0.0474) (0.0326) (0.0410) (0.0277) (0.0369) (0.0202) (0.0254)
Males:
2nd -0.0011 0.0014
(0.0122) (0.0105)
3rd 0.0012 0.0056
(0.0201) (0.0172)
4th -0.0272 -0.0130
(0.0348) (0.0296)
5th 0.0686 -0.0471
(0.1159) (0.0507)
Females:
2nd 0.0034 -0.0001
(0.0104) (0.0067)
3rd 0.0037 0.0005
(0.0174) (0.0110)
4th 0.0051 -0.0120
(0.0305) (0.0203)
5th 0.0788 -0.0518
(0.0991) (0.0577)
N 114,884 114,884 108,466 108,466 114,884 114,884 108,466 108,466
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the family level. All
models control for birth year dummies and gender (when not split) and include family fixed effects.
I restrict the sample to families completely captured in the data to accurately describe birth order
among same sex siblings.
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Table B.1.11: Family Size, by Gender
A. Unincorporated
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
+ Dem. + Order + Dem. + Order
Family size 0.0075*** 0.0052*** 0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0056***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Family size2 -0.0004** -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002* 0.0001 0.0003**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
2nd born 0.0069*** 0.0058***
(0.0017) (0.0014)
3rd born 0.0111*** 0.0116***
(0.0025) (0.0021)
4th born 0.0087** 0.0142***
(0.0036) (0.0030)
5th born 0.0079 0.0154***
(0.0053) (0.0043)
6th+ born -0.0104 0.0134**
(0.0069) (0.0056)
N 361,556 341,299 341,299 343,706 324,395 324,395
B. Incorporated
Male Female
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
+ Dem. + Order + Dem. + Order
Family size 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0013* -0.0012* -0.0023***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Family size2 -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0003 -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
2nd born 0.0083*** 0.0040***
(0.0014) (0.0010)
3rd born 0.0107*** 0.0042***
(0.0021) (0.0014)
4th born 0.0109*** 0.0041**
(0.0029) (0.0019)
5th born 0.0079* 0.0031
(0.0041) (0.0027)
6th+ born 0.0139** 0.0050
(0.0055) (0.0033)
N 361,556 341,299 341,299 343,706 324,395 324,395
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the family level. All
models control for own and mother’s birth year and gender. Demographic controls include father’s
birth year, mother’s and father’s education level, unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship.
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Table B.1.13: Family Size: Alternative Instruments
Unincorporated entrepreneur Incorporated entrepreneur
(1) OLS (2) IV (3) OLS (4) IV
A. Instrument: same gender siblings
Sample: first two children, family size 2+
Family size 0.0006 -0.0188 -0.0048*** -0.0021
(0.0016) (0.0314) (0.0013) (0.0259)
Second born 0.0076*** 0.0136 0.0031** 0.0023
(0.0020) (0.0099) (0.0016) (0.0081)
N 193,906 193,906 193,906 193,906
B. Instrument: first two males/females
Sample: first two children, family size 2+
Family size -0.0187 -0.0021
(0.0314) (0.0259)
Second born 0.0136 0.0023
(0.0099) (0.0081)
N 193,906 193,906 193,906 193,906
C. Instrument: multiple second birth + sex composition
Sample: first born children, family size 2+
Family size 0.0028 -0.0150 -0.0038** -0.0003
(0.0022) (0.0111) (0.0017) (0.0093)
N 96,518 96,518 96,518 96,518
D. Instrument: multiple third birth + sex composition
Sample: first two children, family size 3+
Family size -0.0007 0.0137 -0.0056* 0.0063
(0.0039) (0.0164) (0.0030) (0.0134)
Second born 0.0032 0.0014 0.0041 0.0027
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0031) (0.0034)
N 52,028 52,028 52,028 52,028
E. Instrument: multiple birth + sex composition
Sample: pooled parity
Family size 0.0026 0.0039 -0.0047*** -0.0044**
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0019)
N 122,699 122,699 122,699 122,699
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, robust in Panel C and clustered
at the family level in Panels A, B, D, and E. All models control for gender, own and parental birth
year, and parental education. The sample is restricted to complete families. Following Angrist
et al. (2010), Panel C includes dummies for first two males/females and multiple second birth as
instruments; Panel D includes three males/females, boy at third birth, and multiple third birth as
instruments, with controls for first two children both male or female; Panel E pools together the
instruments and samples in Panels C and D – these results should be interpreted cautiously, as
consistency requires implausibly stringent assumptions when instruments are missing non-randomly
(Mogstad and Wiswall, 2012). The first stage F -statistics are 261.53, 130.85, 1,990.08, 827.58, and
48,593.70 in Panels A-E; in Panels A, B, D, and E, these are Paap-Kleibergen F -statistics, adjusting
for clustering (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Further controlling for parental entrepreneurship and
income reduces both the magnitude and significance of family size coefficients.
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Table B.1.14: Family Size: Birth Order Index
Unincorporated entrepreneur Incorporated entrepreneur
(1) All (2) Male (3) Female (4) All (5) Male (6) Female
A. All children
Family size 0.0001 0.0013** -0.0011** -0.0005* -0.0000 -0.0009***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Birth order 0.0126*** 0.0131*** 0.0124*** 0.0056*** 0.0076*** 0.0036***
index (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0012)
N 665,679 341,292 324,387 665,679 341,292 324,387
B. Families with no multiple births or adopted children
Family size 0.0003 0.0016*** -0.0011** -0.0006** -0.0003 -0.0010***
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Birth order 0.0133*** 0.0147*** 0.0120*** 0.0051*** 0.0065*** 0.0038***
index (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0013)
N 634,003 325,349 308,654 634,003 325,349 308,654
C. Complete families
Family size -0.0004 0.0018 -0.0027*** 0.0015** 0.0033*** -0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007)
Birth order 0.0145*** 0.0147*** 0.0154*** 0.0042** 0.0046 0.0042*
index (0.0026) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0023)
N 265,682 136,523 129,159 265,682 136,523 129,159
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the family level. All
models control for gender, own, mother’s, and fathers’ birth year, mother’s and father’s education
level, entrepreneurship, and income.
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Table B.1.15: Descriptive statistics: Sibling Sex Composition
All Male Female
Unincorporated 0.145 0.176 0.112
(0.352) (0.381) (0.315)
Incorporated 0.089 0.127 0.049
(0.285) (0.334) (0.216)
Mother age at first birth 23.743 23.750 23.735
(4.245) (4.252) (4.238)
Mother years of schooling 10.467 10.471 10.463
(2.820) (2.820) (2.821)
Father years of schooling 10.317 10.316 10.317
(3.103) (3.104) (3.103)
Unincorporated mother 0.158 0.160 0.157
(0.365) (0.366) (0.363)
Unincorporated father 0.261 0.264 0.259
(0.439) (0.441) (0.438)
Incorporated mother 0.038 0.039 0.036
(0.191) (0.194) (0.187)
Incorporated father 0.075 0.077 0.073
(0.263) (0.266) (0.260)
Immigrant mother 0.106 0.107 0.106
(0.308) (0.309) (0.308)
Immigrant father 0.092 0.091 0.092
(0.288) (0.288) (0.289)
Parental income (log) 23.966 23.961 23.971
(0.994) (0.997) (0.990)
Any sister 0.588 0.600 0.576
(0.492) (0.490) (0.494)
Any brother 0.616 0.603 0.630
(0.486) (0.490) (0.483)
Number of sisters 0.714 0.722 0.706
(0.701) (0.691) (0.712)
Number of brothers 0.757 0.750 0.764
(0.712) (0.726) (0.696)
Younger sisters 0.357 0.359 0.355
(0.577) (0.576) (0.577)
Older sisters 0.357 0.363 0.351
(0.568) (0.566) (0.569)
Younger brothers 0.382 0.377 0.386
(0.595) (0.596) (0.593)
Older brothers 0.375 0.373 0.379
(0.579) (0.596) (0.574)
Family size 2.487 2.489 2.485
(0.579) (0.817) (0.799)
N 234,036 120,342 113,694
Some observations on parental traits are missing (less than 5%). Sample restricted to com-
plete families with at least two children.
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B.2 Non-Linear Family Size Effects
Throughout Section 3.4, all the estimations implicitly assumed linear effects of family size.
However, such specifications can be restrictive if the underlying processes are non-linear (e.g.,
Lochner and Moretti, 2015; Brinch et al., 2017), as would be the case if i) the effect of family size
differs from going from 2 to 3 children, to 4 to 5 children, or ii) family size affects the availability
of parental time and resources differently for different birth orders. Mogstad and Wiswall (2016)
relax the linearity assumption to find substantial marginal family size effects, in contrast to the
absence of such effects in, for instance, Black et al. (2005).
The models I estimate in Section 3.4 may therefore be less suitable for detecting differential
effects of family size, which is the goal in this paper. To address this, I now estimate unrestricted
family size models, using a non-linear instrumental variable strategy. I provide here only a sketch
of the empirical approach, emphasizing the differences from the linear IV method employed pre-
viously; the interested reader is referred to Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) for a detailed description
of the assumptions and mechanics of the model.
The linear IV model uses multiple births at parity t to instrument for family size in analyzing
the outcomes of children born at parities 1, 2, ..., t− 1. The estimate is a local average treatment
effect of family size increasing from t to t+k, where k may be larger than 1 if multiple births shift
fertility preferences at higher parities (for instance, through economies of scale). The estimate is
therefore a weighted average of the underlying marginal effects of going from family size t to t+1,
t+ 1 to t+ 2, and so on (Angrist et al., 2010). Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) argue that it is these
marginal effects that should be the main focus, rather than the total effect, as the latter can be
zero even if the marginal effects are strictly non-zero (but cancel each other out).
Focusing on the analysis of the outcomes of first born children in families with at least two
children (with parallel procedures for second born or third born children), the unrestricted model
is as follows:
Yi = γ2d2i + γ3d3i + γ4d4i + δXi + i, (B.2.1)
where Yi is entrepreneurship, Xi is a set of controls, and dsi are a set of dummies for the number
of siblings being at least s (alternatively, family size being at least s+1), with s ∈ {2, 3, 4}. These
dummies provide the marginal effects of having s rather than s− 1 siblings.1
Multiple birth instruments As opposed to the sole endogenous variable in the linear IV
estimation, there are now three endogenous variables, requiring at least three instruments. Un-
fortunately, one cannot rely directly on the multiple birth instruments as in the linear IV case,
because a multiple birth at birth order t, for instance, is not defined in a family with t−1 children.
Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) then propose adjusting the multiple birth instruments as follows,
where c denotes family size:
Multiple∗ci =
{
0, if ci < c,
Multipleci − Eˆ[Multipleci|Xi, ci ≥ c], if ci ≥ c.
(B.2.2)
Essentially, these adjustments define the instruments as 0 in cases where they are undefined, and
deviations from predicted multiple births at the given parity for families where the multiple birth
instrument is defined. In practice, Eˆ[Multipleci|Xi, ci ≥ c] is obtained as the linear prediction from
1 Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) also include a dummy for having at least 5 siblings; since the incidence of such
family sizes in my sample is small, I do not include this dummy in the main analysis. When I do use the s ≥ 5
dummy, the results are similar, although some of the models are under-identified (i.e. very low first stage F -statistics,
especially for the sample of first born children). Another difference from their original approach is that they use
twin births, rather than multiple births: I use the latter to increase instrument incidence.
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a regression of Multipleci on i) individual gender, ii) individual and parental birth year dummies,
iii) mother’s age at first birth dummies, iv) mother’s and father’s education level dummies, v) the
interaction of mother’s and father’s education with mother’s and father’s age and age squared, and
vi) the interaction of mother’s and father’s ages. This regression approximates a nonparametric
estimation, as it offers flexibility with regards to age profiles (especially for the mother, whose age
is a strong determinant of multiple births), and includes 177 covariates.
Once these instruments are computed, I construct the following first stage specification for the
endogenous variables in equation (B.2.1):
dsi = λs2Multiple2i + λs3Multiple∗3i + λs4Multiple∗4i + ρsXi + ηsi, (B.2.3)
where s ∈ {2, 3, 4}, i.e. for number of siblings being larger or equal to two, three, or four (and family
size larger or equal to three, four, or five). Empirically, I employ the above procedure three times,
for i) first born children in families with at least two children, ii) second born children in families
with at least three children, and iii) third born children in families with at least four children. For
each of these samples, I bootstrap the whole process (with 50 repetitions) to account for the first
stage estimation of the conditional mean function of the imputed multiple birth instruments.
Efficient instruments To ensure that standard error imprecision in instrumental variable mod-
els with multiple endogenous dummy variables is not exacerbated, Mogstad and Wiswall (2016)
propose another refinement, in the form of ‘efficient instruments’. These instruments match the
inherent structure of the data, recognizing that a multiple birth must increase family size by at
least one child and that the endogenous variables are dummies. For instance, in the sample of first
born children, the instrument for moving from one to two siblings is given by:
pˆ2i =
{
1, if Multiple2i = 1,
f2(Xi, θˆ2), if Multiple2i = 0,
(B.2.4)
where θˆ2 represents the estimates of the unknown parameters of function f2. This instrument
recognizes that the probability of having at least two siblings conditional on having a multiple birth
at the second birth order is 1 (by definition). For those without a multiple birth, the instrument
is the predicted probability that the individual has two or more siblings, restricted to the unit
interval. Empirically, I estimate f2(Xi, θˆ2) with a probit, where the covariates are i) individual
and parental age and age square, ii) mother’s age at first birth, iii) the interaction of parental ages,
and iv) parental education level and income dummies. The instruments for going from two to three
and three to four siblings are computed in a similar way, as predicted probabilities from a probit
regression. Specifically, pˆ3i = f3(Xi,Multiple∗3i, θˆ3), and pˆ4i = f4(Xi,Multiple∗4i, θˆ4), therefore
accounting for the multiple birth instruments computed in the previous section and their impact
on family size. With these predicted probabilities in hand, the first stage equations become:
dsi = λs2pˆ2i + λs3pˆ3i + λs4pˆ4i + ρsXi + ηsi, (B.2.5)
where s ∈ {2, 3, 4}. The estimation is performed for the three different samples, and the whole
process of i) computing the imputed multiple birth instruments, ii) computing the efficient instru-
ments, and iii) estimating the instrumental variable model is bootstrapped (with 50 repetitions).
Results Table B.2.1 shows the results of the non-linear instrumental variable estimation, with
the imputed multiple birth instruments in Panel A, and the efficient instruments in Panel B.
The first stage F statistics are above 100 for both types of instruments, and the higher match
between the structure of the data and the efficient instruments is reflected in the slightly smaller
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Table B.2.1: Non-Linear Family Size Effects
First born children, Second born children, Third born children,
family size ≥ 2 family size ≥ 3 family size ≥ 4
Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc. Uninc. Inc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Imputed multiple birth instruments
Family size ≥ 3 -0.0026 0.0007
(0.0184) (0.0128)
Family size ≥ 4 0.0046 0.0461* 0.0233 0.0238*
(0.0276) (0.0258) (0.0176) (0.0136)
Family size ≥ 5 -0.0296 -0.0970*** 0.0355 -0.0703*** 0.0012 -0.0023
(0.0640) (0.0232) (0.0518) (0.0216) (0.0238) (0.0180)
F -statistic 113.40 400.51 7,027.46
N 224,336 108,102 38,880
B. Efficient instruments
Family size ≥ 3 0.0098 0.0049
(0.0180) (0.0133)
Family size ≥ 4 0.0260 0.0404 0.0198 0.0192
(0.0331) (0.0294) (0.0131) (0.0146)
Family size ≥ 5 0.0362 -0.1692*** -0.0328 -0.0976*** -0.0256 -0.0354**
(0.0610) (0.0389) (0.0401) (0.0220) (0.0242) (0.0154)
F -statistic 126.07 566.10 3,984.79
N 224,336 108,102 38,880
Sample mean 0.1428 0.0862 0.1488 0.0847 0.1517 0.0750
(0.3499) (0.2807) (0.3559) (0.2785) (0.3587) (0.2635)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (with 50 repetitions).
All models control for gender, own and parental birth year dummies, mother’s age at first birth,
parental education, entrepreneurship, and income. Kleibergen-Paap F -statistics reported; the first
stage is the same for unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship.
standard errors (though this is not always the case). For unincorporated entrepreneurship, the
marginal effects of family size are economically small and statistically insignificant, regardless of
the instruments used. For incorporation, most marginal effects of family size are not statistically
significant; however, children in families with more than four children are less likely to become
incorporated, and the effects are economically and statistically significant.2 Indeed, this may
explain the significant negative effect for larger families in Panel C, column (6) of Table 3.3 (for
all children) and Panel C, column (4) of Table 3.4 (for men).
While this result does not overturn the absence of family size effects across a wide range of
specifications, it does appear that for very large families, resource constraints bind with regards to
incorporated entrepreneurship. On the one hand, a larger family may limit parental investments in
individuals’ human capital, preventing them from pursuing higher-growth ventures; on the other
hand, individuals’ ability to rely on parents’ financial resources in their entrepreneurial ventures
may be lower when more children are present in the household.
2 As another robustness check of the main results, using these instruments in a linear IV model where I pool
the three different samples produces estimates of -0.0072 (standard error 0.0086, p = 0.402) for unincorporated
entrepreneurship, and -0.0112 (standard error 0.0067, p = 0.095) for incorporated entrepreneurship.
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4.1 Introduction
As hybrid organizations combining commercial and social logics (Austin et al., 2006; Dacin et al.,
2011; Pache and Santos, 2013), social enterprises must allocate scarce employee effort between
commercial and social mission tasks in order to deliver on their dual objectives (Battilana and
Dorado, 2010; Battilana and Lee, 2014; Besharov, 2014).1 In practice, many social enterprise
employees prioritize purpose over profits, creating the risk that insufficient effort is allocated to
promoting economic performance (Battilana et al., 2015; Stevens et al., 2015; Staessens et al.,
2018). An excessive focus on social impact to the detriment of generating revenue – or ‘revenue
drift’ (Ebrahim et al., 2014) – may ultimately threaten social enterprises’ financial sustainability
and survival (Tracey et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013).
In such circumstances, we might expect social enterprises to offer pecuniary rewards to induce
employees to balance their effort between commercial and social tasks. Yet, social enterprises
rarely make use of monetary incentives (Battilana and Lee, 2014). On the one hand, potential
employees may perceive a tight coupling of pay and commercial performance as incompatible with
social enterprise values and resources (Austin et al., 2006; Tracey et al., 2011; Besharov, 2014).
Identity tension is especially likely if employees associate monetary rewards with the competitive
‘bonus culture’ and profit motive traditionally characterizing a commercial logic (Dees, 2012; Ben-
abou and Tirole, 2016; Dimitriadis et al., 2017). On the other hand, social entrepreneurs may be
anxious about the danger of mission drift, where mission-driven organizations emphasize commer-
cial over social imperatives (Ebrahim et al., 2014), thereby choosing to eschew monetary incentives
(Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001).
In this paper, we question whether these concerns are well-founded. As social sector organi-
zations face increasing competition for talent, pressure to professionalize, and market competition
1 Social enterprises occupy a continuum along the trade-off between economic and social goals (Besharov and
Smith, 2014; Shepherd et al., 2019); our focus is on firms where this trade-off is most pronounced, i.e. where multiple
logics are core to organizational functioning and provide contradictory prescriptions for action.
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(Hwang and Powell, 2009; Smith et al., 2013; Battilana and Lee, 2014), many hybrids are turning
their attention to the financial sustainability of their operations and the role of staffing practices
in meeting their dual objectives (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Smith and Besharov, 2019). Thus,
the role of incentives cannot be dismissed outright, especially for social enterprises whose finances
are precarious. Specifically, we ask: can monetary incentives for commercial performance help
social enterprises achieve a more balanced allocation of employee effort between commercial and
social tasks? If so, how sensitive is effort allocation to monetary rewards – in other words, how
‘steep’ do incentives need to be to attain a balanced effort allocation? To answer these questions,
we conceptually theorize about and conduct an experiment to distinguish between two mecha-
nisms that affect the balance of commercial and social tasks. The first mechanism relates to the
attention-directing role of incentives (Ocasio, 1997), which shifts the effort allocations of a given
workforce (an intensive margin effect). The second relates to a changing workforce composition
(an extensive margin effect) (Lazear, 2000), acknowledging that less socially motivated individuals
may self-select into social enterprises that offer high-powered incentives.
We draw on organizational theory and organizational economics (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kaplan
and Henderson, 2005) to analyze these questions conceptually. Given the predominance of socially
motivated employees and a mission emphasis in social enterprises (Miller et al., 2012; Smith et al.,
2013; Besley and Ghatak, 2017), an absence of pay for performance leads to an unbalanced effort
allocation, with employees favoring social impact over revenue generation. In a multitasking frame-
work (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991), workers’ high levels of intrinsic motivation induce adverse
specialization (MacDonald and Marx, 2001), endangering social enterprises’ financial performance.
We argue that modest incentives (i.e. small performance bonuses) can restore the balance of em-
ployee effort between commercial and social tasks, via action on both the intensive and extensive
margins. However, we expect that strong incentives (i.e. large bonuses) lead to mission drift by
distorting effort too far in the direction of commercial imperatives.
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We conduct an incentivized, real-effort, online experiment to test our theoretical predictions.
This approach overcomes the limited availability of data on compensation practices and individual
effort allocation in social enterprises and the endogeneity of pay for performance adoption deci-
sions; moreover, it allows us to unpack the mechanisms relating effort allocation and incentives.
Our experiment uses a labor market framing, where subjects are asked to behave as employees of
companies whose descriptions match typical for-profits, non-profits, and social enterprises. Em-
ployees move a set of sliders (Gill and Prowse, 2012) to allocate effort between a commercial and
a social task, associated respectively with own and ‘good cause’ payoffs. To disentangle the causal
mechanisms underlying our hypothesized effects, we manipulate the strength of commercial per-
formance incentives (i.e. own payoffs) within social enterprises and employees’ ability to choose
their preferred contract, keeping good cause payoffs constant. Our hypotheses are broadly sup-
ported. Monetary incentives elicit a more balanced effort allocation, regardless of their steepness,
whereas we find a small, but significant downward shift in employees’ social motivation when strong
incentives are offered.
The paper makes three main contributions to the organization science literature. First, we
extend the logic of incentive theory to social enterprises and highlight the adverse specialization
problem stemming from an excessive mission emphasis. Pecuniary rewards allow firms to overcome
revenue drift by focusing employee attention on generating the revenue required for delivering
their social mission (Tracey et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013; Stevens et al., 2015). We hope our
conceptualization of the social enterprise as a multitasking setting with motivated workers can aid
future theory building efforts in the area of hybrid organization hiring and socialization practices,
as well as organizational design (Battilana and Lee, 2014).
Second, we implement a novel experimental design which causally isolates the normative role
of incentives (Ocasio, 1997; Kaplan and Henderson, 2005; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009; Wolfolds,
2018) from their effect on workforce composition (Lazear, 2000; Cadsby et al., 2007; Deserranno,
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2019). Contrary to a common belief among social enterprise actors that monetary rewards may
be perceived as unfair, controlling, or incongruent with organizational values (Austin et al., 2006;
Tracey et al., 2011; Dees, 2012), our experimental results show that pay for performance need not
deter socially motivated workers from joining social enterprises. Instead, (modest) incentives work
mainly by directing attention towards commercial tasks.
Third, we trace out the implications of our findings for social entrepreneurs. By embracing
heterogeneity in other-regarding values (Miller et al., 2012; Stevens et al., 2015; Besley and Ghatak,
2017) and considering the mechanisms through which incentives affect effort (Cadsby et al., 2007),
we show that pay for performance does not necessarily crowd-out social motivation by workers
and cause mission drift. This challenges a common view and normative pressure in the social
enterprise community that monetary rewards should be avoided (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001).
Therefore, we tentatively recommend that social entrepreneurs worried about revenue drift and
adverse specialization should consider incorporating modest incentives into their worker compensa-
tion schemes, alongside socialization practices (Battilana and Dorado, 2010) and other governance
mechanisms (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Smith and Besharov, 2019).
4.2 Theoretical Background
Social enterprises are double-bottom line organizations. They aim to deliver a social mission,
as well as the financial performance which enables them to survive and prosper, and so advance
their social mission. In what follows, we study the allocation of social enterprise employees’ effort
between these two objectives. We first characterize the tensions these ‘dual mission’ organizations
often encounter, before clarifying definitions and assumptions about effort, employee motivation,
incentives, and actions within such hybrid organizations. We then discuss effort allocation in the
absence and presence of financial incentives offered by social enterprises.
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4.2.1 Social and commercial tensions in social enterprises
The social enterprise hybrid organizational form tackles social challenges through business means
(Dees, 2001; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009). Despite the diversity of their business
models (Mair et al., 2012), for-profit social enterprises represent a common organizational form,
with clearly stated economic and social goals, or a double bottom line (Austin et al., 2006; Dacin
et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 2015). In ‘integrated’ hybrids, profit and purpose are pursued jointly,
often through direct transactions with beneficiaries (Smith et al., 2013; Besley and Ghatak, 2017;
Eldar, 2017).2 However, profit and purpose represent goals associated with commercial, for-profit
and charitable, non-profit institutional logics, respectively (Pache and Santos, 2010; Battilana and
Lee, 2014; Besharov and Smith, 2014). Thus, they often place conflicting demands on organizations’
attention and resources (Dacin et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 2015).
The trade-off between commercial and social goals is reflected at all levels of the organization, as
employees decide how to allocate their effort. The following examples from social enterprises with
different missions illustrate this trade-off. Loan officers in commercial microfinance organizations
must balance loan size, interest rates, and potential profits on the one hand, with reaching the
underprivileged target population on the other (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos,
2010; Besharov and Smith, 2014; Canales, 2014; Wry and Zhao, 2018). In work integration social
enterprises (WISEs), employees must ensure financial sustainability through business activity, as
well as disadvantaged workers’ skill development (Tracey et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2013;
Battilana et al., 2015). For ‘base of the pyramid’ firms, employees must ensure products are sold
at prices above cost, yet within reach of the target population (Hockerts, 2015; Santos et al., 2015).
Finally, environmental social enterprises must balance generating revenue with costly measures to
protect the environment (Pacheco et al., 2014).
2 By contrast, ‘differentiated hybrid’ social enterprises rely on cross-subsidization, where commercial revenue is
devoted to a social goal (Baron, 2007; Ebrahim et al., 2014). For instance, TOMS Shoes uses its profits to provide
shoes and fund investments in hygiene in developing countries (Marquis and Park, 2014).
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4.2.2 Terminology and assumptions
Before developing our hypotheses, it is helpful to define terms and clarify the setting we analyze.
First, we assume that social enterprise employees must decide how to allocate their effort between
two tasks. One task delivers the commercial objective C, e.g. generating sales; the other delivers
the social mission S, e.g. alleviating poverty. If a fixed and finite amount of effort is available,
one can equivalently analyze the proportion of time a worker devotes to one task rather than the
other. We assume that spending more time on one task necessarily means spending less time on
the other,3 and refer to balanced effort as allocations in which roughly similar amounts of effort
are allocated to each task. In line with standard principal-agent theory, we assume that managers
cannot perfectly measure and direct how employees allocate their effort, which is partly at workers’
discretion (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Henderson and Van den Steen, 2015).
Second, we assume there are two types of employees. The I type is intrinsically motivated by
the social enterprise mission and has a strong desire to do good for others. The E type is primarily
extrinsically motivated (i.e. by money). I types are more predisposed than E types to allocate
effort towards the S task and more willing to join non-profits or social enterprises rather than for-
profit firms. Another standard principal-agent theory assumption is that founders are imperfectly
informed about which type of employee is which; that is, there are ‘hidden types’. This rules
out job separation arrangements within the organization whereby different worker types could be
assigned to work solely on the C or S task.4 All employees are assumed to pursue both tasks, due
to social enterprises’ integrated hybrid nature and typically small scale and staffing constraints
(Smith et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2015; Battilana, 2018). For the social enterprise, commercial and
social tasks are complements (MacDonald and Marx, 2001).
3 We assume a capped level of total effort due to our core focus on effort allocation. While our experiment allows
subjects to also adjust this margin, we find no differences in total effort across treatments.
4 One WISE studied by Battilana et al. (2015) does practice job separation and enforces ‘spaces of negotiation’,
but this approach risks disconnecting different areas of the organization (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009). Another
possibility is non-separability of missions within job assignments, i.e. both missions are necessarily present simulta-
neously; yet workers have discretion over which to emphasize.
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Third, we consider two types of incentives. Incentives are an integral part of firms’ ‘structural
distribution of attention’ (Ocasio, 1997) and perform a normative function, directing employee
effort (Kaplan and Henderson, 2005). Pecuniary rewards can ensure complex organizations reach
their goals even when not all outcomes can be measured accurately (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009).
We distinguish between ‘low-powered’ and ‘high-powered’ incentives. Low-powered incentives con-
sist of a fixed wage unrelated to the allocation of effort to, or performance in, either task (Holm-
ström and Milgrom, 1991). By contrast, high-powered incentives are provided by a combination
of fixed wage and pay-for-performance on a given outcome, occupying a continuum ranging from
‘modest’ incentives (i.e. a small bonus tied weakly to task performance) to ‘strong’ incentives (i.e.
a large bonus tied closely to task performance). In principle, high-powered incentives can be at-
tached to either task (Wolfolds, 2018), but in practice tend to be applied to the C task only, given
the difficulty of measuring social impact – the output of the S-task – in a timely and standardized
manner (Austin et al., 2006; Dacin et al., 2011).
Fourth, incentives affect one or two margins of action, which economists label ‘intensive’ and
‘extensive’. The intensive margin relates to how incentives affect the chosen effort allocation by a
given pool of employees. The extensive margin relates to how incentives affect the composition of
the social enterprise’s pool of employees itself. Along this margin, employees can self-select into
either social enterprises or an alternative organizational form. For example, I types are more likely
to select into social enterprises or non-profit organizations than E types, all else equal; the latter
may select instead into for-profits (Barigozzi et al., 2018).
4.2.3 Low-powered incentives in social enterprises
We propose that social enterprise employees respond to incentives in ways that affect both the
intensive and extensive margins. We first consider the case where low-powered incentives prevail.
This is the predominant case in practice: relatively few social enterprises offer financial bonuses
for commercial performance (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001; Becchetti et al., 2013).
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Most social enterprises are founded by compassionate individuals seeking to maximize the
social return on their investments (Miller et al., 2012; Santos, 2012; Grimes et al., 2013; Bacq
and Alt, 2018). Their emphasis on social mission attracts similarly-minded employees (Besley and
Ghatak, 2017), who prefer to exert high levels of (S task) effort (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Bell
and Haugh, 2014; Gerhards, 2015; Henderson and Van den Steen, 2015; Tonin and Vlassopoulos,
2015; Burbano, 2016; Cassar, 2019).
Moreover, social enterprise founders and employees often have experience working within an
institutional logic where ‘doing good’ trumps ‘doing well’ (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Besharov,
2014; Hockerts, 2017). A social sector background may thus steer their effort allocation decisions, as
‘dangerous idealists’ emphasize the ‘social’ rather than the ‘enterprise’ aspect of the organization
(Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Bacq et al., 2016). In addition, despite often acknowledging the
importance of market mechanisms for financial sustainability, social enterprises rely heavily on
the mission they champion to attract potential customers, investors, and employees (Dees, 2001;
Renko, 2013; Smith et al., 2013; Fosfuri et al., 2016).
Social enterprises may offer low-powered incentives for at least two reasons. First, incentive
theory suggests that high-powered incentives for the C task risk shifting employees’ effort away
from the less measurable S task and towards the more-easily measured and rewarded C task (Kerr,
1975; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). This represents an intensive margin effect. Founders may
be averse to this shift on the grounds of it being perceived as incongruent with organizational
values (Tracey et al., 2011; Hossain and Li, 2014; Andersson et al., 2017). Second, founders may
worry that high-powered incentives attract financially-motivated employees uninterested in the S
task (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001; Austin et al., 2006). This extensive margin outcome risks
causing ‘mission drift’, whereby the enterprise abandons social concerns in favor of profit-seeking
activities (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Founders may object to this outcome if it threatens to change
the composition and hence the long-term purpose of the enterprise.
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What are the implications of eschewing high-powered incentives for social enterprises? Beyond
the motivational effects of missions, organizational economics suggests that I types have a lower
psychic cost of effort for the S task (Murdock, 2002; Schnedler, 2008). In the absence of incentives
to do otherwise, their effort allocation is distorted towards the less costly task, leading to ‘adverse
specialization’ (MacDonald and Marx, 2001). For social enterprises, the risk is that I employees
exert too much effort on the S task and too little on the C task, reducing financial performance
and hence limiting the resources the enterprise needs to survive (Smith et al., 2013). Ebrahim
et al. (2014) refer to this outcome as ‘revenue drift’.
There are numerous examples of revenue drift. Tracey and Jarvis (2006) and Tracey et al.
(2011) discuss how a social enterprise tackling homelessness threatened its own survival by focusing
excessively on beneficiary needs at the expense of required operational investments. Beer et al.
(2017) document how employees of a youth development social enterprise focused on ensuring
disadvantaged individuals had adequate housing, but overlooked the importance of rent collection
for keeping the business going.5 A fair trade social enterprise insufficiently heeding customer
demands and prioritizing producers instead suffered from operational difficulties for several years,
limiting their ability to serve beneficiaries (Davies and Doherty, 2018). In analyzing Belgian
WISEs’ productivity, Staessens et al. (2018) find that these companies predominantly use inputs to
achieve worker reintegration outcomes rather than to generate revenue, results echoed by Battilana
et al. (2015) and Stevens et al. (2015). Overall, social enterprises’ cash flow problems, often listed
as an impediment to growth along with lack of access to finance, appear partly attributable to an
excessive focus on social impact (Smith et al., 2013).
This raises the question of whether high-powered incentives – coupling pay with financial
performance – can be used to avoid the adverse specialization problem, helping social enterprises
5 One housing worker notes: “We need to get support workers on board with the importance of rent collection...
everyone needs to have a common message [with the young people]”. Another housing worker states: “They [support
workers] say ‘Our job is not to collect rent, it is to get them on a course’. They need to understand that money is
what keeps [Youth Futures] going”.
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strike a more balanced allocation of effort across the C and S tasks. And if so, would modest or
strong high-powered incentives work best? We explore these questions next.
4.2.4 High-powered incentives in social enterprises
Can high-powered incentives mitigate the problems caused by excessive attention to the social task
and thus achieve a balanced effort allocation? To answer this question, we turn to incentive theory.
If employees had no preference regarding performing C or S tasks, i.e. there was no heterogeneity
along the I-E dimension, then insights from the classical two-task multitasking problem would
apply. In that case, low-powered incentives would be appropriate, since they would lead workers
to exert effort on both tasks (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). In this setting, moreover, any kind
of high-powered incentive would run the risk of dramatically unbalancing the effort allocation, most
obviously by directing all employee effort towards the easily-measured C task at the expense of
the hard-to-measure S task. This would run counter to social enterprises’ central purpose, which
might explain why they eschew such incentives (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001; Ebrahim et al.,
2014). However, the classical analysis needs to be modified when dealing with the more realistic
case where some employees are I types and some are E types.
A formal analysis of the case where there is a mixture of E and I employees suggests that both
types’ effort is responsive to high-powered incentives (Canton, 2005). Such incentives signal the
importance of the incentivized task (Kaplan and Henderson, 2005) and make it more financially
attractive for employees to perform it (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Canton, 2005). In social
enterprises, this is equivalent to a distortion of effort towards the C task, which may lead to
mission drift. Not only are E types likely to shift their effort to the C task in response to
high-powered incentives, but I types may also be induced the same way. The reason is that strong
financial incentives may ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation by I types. Evidence from psychology and
economics (Deci et al., 1999; Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Gneezy et al., 2011) indicates that strong
incentives may be perceived to have a controlling nature, which generally undermines intrinsic
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motivation for the S task. The outcome on the intensive margin can be for demoralized I types to
respond by allocating too much effort to the C task and too little to the S task.
The core of our argument is that this outcome does not necessarily arise when more modest
high-powered financial incentives are used. These can generate a gentler shift among I types on
the intensive margin, from strong effort concentration on the S task towards a more balanced
allocation between the two tasks. For the I types predominant in social enterprises, monetary
incentives imply a trade-off between the benefit of additional income from commercial activities
and the lower satisfaction from reduced effort dedicated to the social mission. In principle, modest
incentives can locate an intermediate position along the trade-off. Modest incentives are less likely
to be perceived as controlling, and may even be presented as supportive of the social mission by
promoting a balanced C-S perspective towards achieving the organization’s goals.
There is another, subtler way that modest incentives may generate a more balanced effort
allocation along the intensive margin. Brüggen and Moers (2007) show that exposure to a social
norm promoting the social mission can mitigate the ‘distorting’ effect of financial incentives, where
the distortion is associated with under-provision of S task effort. Both E and I types can be affected
by a social norm, reducing their tendency to respond to incentives by making sharp shifts in their
effort allocation away from S towards C, but other-oriented workers provide a more balanced effort
allocation (Nellas and Reggiani, 2015; Benabou and Tirole, 2016). In social enterprises, the S task
effectively elicits social norms, while monetary incentives are associated with a dangerous, agentic
‘bonus culture’, deeply embedded in a commercial logic (Dees, 2012; Benabou and Tirole, 2016).
Hence, modest incentives reduce the risk that employees ‘over-react’ and devote excessive effort to
the C task, compared with strong incentives.
Together, these arguments suggest that social enterprise employees respond to modest high-
powered monetary incentives by shifting part of their effort towards the C task, while continuing
to expend significant effort on the S task; as a result, their effort allocation is more balanced
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between tasks. In contrast, strong high-powered incentives may lead to excessive effort devoted to
the C task at the expense of the S task. Thus:
Hypothesis 1. Relative to low-powered incentives which are associated with excessive effort de-
voted to the S task, modest high-powered incentives generate a more balanced effort allocation
between C and S tasks along the intensive margin.
Hypothesis 2. Relative to modest high-powered incentives which are associated with more balanced
effort between C and S tasks, strong high-powered incentives generate excessive effort devoted to
the C task along the intensive margin.
In addition to directing worker effort choices along the intensive margin, incentives may also
perform a sorting function, whereby more financially-motivated E types are attracted to the organi-
zation (Lazear, 2000; Cadsby et al., 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2016). Incentives may thus operate
along the extensive margin as well. Attracting E types to the social enterprise can be unwelcome
to social entrepreneurs (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001), especially if the perceived incongruence be-
tween incentives and social mission endangers employees’ identification with organizational goals
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Besharov, 2014; Andersson et al., 2017) — or if incentives are per-
ceived as ‘unfair’ (Tracey et al., 2011). Both founders and I -type employees may express concerns
over practices whose origin lies in a commercial logic and which are prevalent in for-profit com-
panies (Lazear and Shaw, 2007; Besharov, 2014; Gerhart and Fang, 2014); and I -type employees
may refrain from joining a social enterprise espousing such profit-oriented practices.
A social enterprise offering strong high-powered incentives may attract E types, by allowing
them to reap personal rewards from performing the C task while exerting a smaller share of S task
effort. But by recruiting more E types through this mechanism, I types may feel that their other-
oriented values are under-appreciated, or even devalued, by the social enterprise, which reduces
their ability to identify with the organization and their intrinsic motivation (Akerlof and Kranton,
2005; Besharov, 2014). Hence, strong high-powered incentives may deter I types from joining a
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social enterprise that uses such practices and encourage those currently working in ones that adopts
such incentives to quit. The overall outcome is to change the composition of the social enterprise
workforce, reducing the proportion of employees focusing more on the S task and increasing the
proportion of employees focusing more on the C task.
By contrast, modest high-powered incentives place a limit on in-selection of E types into the
social enterprise, as well as out-selection of I types. Loosely coupled pay-for-performance may be
only weakly attractive for E types, if they can still do better working in a for-profit, where strong
high-powered incentives are more common. This restricts the number of E types willing to join the
social enterprise, diluting their impact on the organization’s goal focus, and reducing the negative
impact on I type selection (Jones et al., 2018). The overall effect of a small compositional change is
a slight decrease in the proportion of employees focusing more on the S task, and a slight increase
in the proportion of employees focusing more on the C task. We summarize our predictions thus:
Hypothesis 3. Relative to low-powered incentives which are associated with excessive effort de-
voted to the S task, modest high-powered incentives generate a more balanced effort allocation
between C and S tasks along the extensive margin.
Hypothesis 4. Relative to modest high-powered incentives which are associated with more balanced
effort between C and S tasks, strong high-powered incentives generate excessive effort devoted to
the C task along the extensive margin.
This second set of hypotheses works in the same direction as the first. The difference lies in the
mechanism by which effort is affected. Whereas hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to the intensive margin,
hypotheses 3 and 4 relate to the extensive margin. Our experiment is designed to discriminate
between these mechanisms and identify which one is more salient in practice.
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4.3 Experimental Design
Our analysis uses an online, incentivized, real effort experiment with a labor market framing.
Subjects allocate effort between a commercial and a social action as hypothetical employees of
different fictional companies, whose descriptions match those of typical for-profits (FP), non-profits
(NP), or social enterprises (SE). These firms, or ‘contracts’, provide similar services but have
different objectives, corresponding to a realistic labor market choice. For instance, a workforce
integration SE contract is described as follows: “Imagine you are working for a company aimed at
reintegrating long term unemployed people into the workforce by hiring them to provide garbage
collection services that are then sold on the market. It is in the best interest of the organization
that both ensuring the professional development of the long term unemployed and generating
revenue through the sale of services receive attention from employees”. The equivalent FP and
NP company descriptions emphasize revenue generation by providing services (the C task) and,
respectively, the charitable goal of improving disadvantaged groups’ welfare (the S task). Both
commercial and social actions are available to subjects in each contract and are described in relation
to the services the company provides, together with the payoffs they generate.
The experiment consists of four parts, summarized in Table 4.1. In Part 1, subjects choose the
good cause they can earn money for throughout the experiment (i.e. the good cause payoff) and
which provides the context for the fictional firms, ensuring the salience of the social task. In Part
2, all subjects perform the effort allocation task under each of the three different contracts (FP,
NP, SE), displayed randomly to avoid order bias effects. Worker self-selection is not possible in this
setting, allowing us to study intensive margin effects by varying the SE bonus between (randomly
selected) subjects. In Part 3, subjects pick their preferred contract from those encountered in Part
2 and perform the effort allocation task again, allowing us to study the effect of incentives along
the extensive margin. Finally, in Part 4 we collect information about demographics and social
preferences. We describe our design below and provide the instructions in Appendix C.1.
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Table 4.1: Experimental Design
Actions and Own payoff Good cause payoff
measures (C task) (S task)
Part 1 Choose good cause
Practice slider task
Comprehension check
Part 2 FP contract £1 £1
NP contract £0 £1
SE contract £0/£0.25/£0.50/£1 £1
Part 3 Choose preferred contract
FP contract (if selected) £1 £1
NP contract (if selected) £0 £1
SE contract (if selected) £0/£0.25/£0.50/£1 £1
Part 4 Demographics
Social preferences
Compassion: sub-scale of public service motivation scale
Altruism: incentivized £10 dictator (giver)
Inequality aversion: hypothetical £10 ultimatum (receiver)
Hypothetical altruism: hypothetical £1,000 lottery
Willingness to share: without expecting anything in return
Prosocial behavior : observed prosocial behavior
Risk and time preferences
Attention check
Manipulation check
Recruitment: Prolific Academic, a UK-based online platform (link)
Stratification: by gender, for comparison purposes
Target number of subjects: 800 in total, 200 per bonus level, 100 per gender × bonus level
Restrictions: UK resident, ages 18-64, active labor force, prior approval rate > 90%
Participation fee: £3 for 15-20 minutes
Bonuses: 5% or 1 in 20 subjects, up to £80, from slider task and dictator (giver/receiver)
Good causes: The Big Issue Foundation, Fairtrade Foundation, Water Aid
Preregistration: Open Science Framework (link)
We randomize the order in which contracts are displayed in Part 2 and the order in which the options
are presented in Part 3. The choice of good cause determines the charity that the good cause payoffs
will be donated to, but also the organizational mission that the fictional (social) enterprises will pursue,
i.e. workforce reintegration, fair and equitable trade, and water quality and environment. We restrict
subjects’ prior approval rate on the platform to be larger than 90% to ensure high-quality answers.
Note that subjects only see company descriptions, but not the FP, NP, or SE labels.
Task We use a real effort task adapted from the slider task introduced by Gill and Prowse
(2012) to measure effort allocation. This task consists of 15 horizontal sliders that can be moved
to positions equivalent to exerting effort on the commercial or social task. The sliders are labeled
from 0 to 100 and initially positioned at 50. The commercial task, C, requires placing the slider
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at 25 and carries a payoff for the subject, determined by the commercial task incentive level (or
‘bonus’) in a given contract. The social task, S, requires placing the slider at 75 and carries a
payoff for the selected good cause.6 Each slider has a number to its right, showing its current
position. Subjects can move the mouse in any way they like to drag sliders, and can readjust the
position of each slider as many times as they wish.
Most importantly, subjects do not simply state how they would like to allocate effort, but
must drag sliders in a way that reflects their preferences, such that they expend real effort. While
neither action has a monetary cost, both tasks require the subject to physically move a slider. In
addition, the social task entails foregoing the monetary rewards of the commercial task. It is in
this sense that the slider task allows us to capture real effort.
Before each slider task is carried out, we explain how payoffs are calculated. In addition, we
inform subjects that each slider offers a commercial task bonus between £0 and £1 when we
initially describe the task. As the maximum possible bonus per slider is thus known, subjects are
aware when a social enterprise uses strong incentives (£1), allowing us to detect extensive margin
effects. We measure Commercial effort and Social effort as counts of the number of sliders moved
to the C and, respectively, S task. The more similar Commercial effort and Social effort are, the
more balanced the effort allocation.
Treatments The experiment features two different treatments, designed to tackle i) the effect
of incentives on effort allocation, and ii) the contributions of the extensive and intensive margins.
First, beyond the participation fee (equivalent to a fixed wage), we vary the strength of the SE C
task incentive between subjects. At one extreme, the SE contract offers ‘low-powered incentives’
(£0 bonus), in line with current social enterprise practice and identical to the NP contract; at the
6 For example, in the workforce reintegration mission in the £0.50 treatment, the commercial task is described
as follows: ‘By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate revenue for the company through the sale
of services; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff of £0.50’. The equivalent social task is described
as follows: ‘By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can contribute to the professional development of its
employees; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1 to the good cause’.
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other extreme, the SE contract offers the same ‘strong high-powered incentives’ (£1 bonus) as the
FP contract; we refer to intermediate levels as ‘modest high-powered incentives’ (£0.25 or £0.50
bonus). Subjects are randomly assigned to a fixed incentive level, which they face throughout
the experiment. Second, we allow subjects to choose their preferred contract from the previously
encountered FP, NP, and SE contracts. That is, Part 3 incentives and company descriptions are
the same as in Part 2, but we now allow for individual sorting across company types (captured by
the binary variable Sorting). We fix the FP bonus at £1, the NP bonus at £0, and the good cause
payoff in all contracts at £1 per slider throughout the experiment. The £1 FP bonus allows us to
benchmark SE incentive strength (i.e. the SE bonus is 0%, 25%, 50% or 100% of the FP bonus)
across the range of possible incentives. The £1 good cause payoff reflects the high social returns
to S task effort and is kept constant across contracts to ensure that the only difference between
the various contract terms is the extent to which commercial effort is financially rewarded (which
is the main focus of our experiment).
Preferred Mission To ensure S task saliency, we allow subjects to choose their preferred good
cause (Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015; Cassar, 2019). The options available – The Big Issue Foun-
dation, Fairtrade Foundation, and Water Aid – are selected as charities whose goals match repre-
sentative social enterprise missions, namely workforce reintegration, fair and equitable trade, and
environmental protection (Mair et al., 2012; Eldar, 2017). Moreover, these missions have a clear
multitasking component and can be pursued through a for-profit, non-profit, or social enterprise
model, allowing us to construct realistic descriptions of the FP, NP, and SE contracts. Further-
more, the actual charity organizational form allows us to credibly commit to donating the good
cause payoffs generated by subjects in the experiment.
Social Preferences As our theoretical framework suggests that individual social motivation
affects both effort allocation and self-selection, we elicit subjects’ social preferences in various
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ways. Following the social entrepreneurship literature (Miller et al., 2012; Grimes et al., 2013), we
measure Compassion using Perry’s (1996) compassion scale, a sum of eight items on a five-point
scale.7 For example, one item asks subjects how strongly they agree with the following statement:
“I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don’t know personally”. We measure Altruism
in a standard, incentivized dictator game, where subjects decide how to split a £10 endowment
with another randomly paired subject (Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez, 2018). We also use a set
of hypothetical and direct questions. We measure Hypothetical altruism, where subjects make a
hypothetical donation after winning a £1,000 lottery, self-reportedWillingness to share with others
without expecting anything in return on a 0-10 scale (Falk et al., 2016), Inequality aversion as the
recipient’s minimum acceptable amount in hypothetical ultimatum game (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999),
and Prosocial behavior through past social sector experience (Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015).
These measures capture different aspects of motivation, so we aggregate them into a composite
Social motivation measure using principal component analysis. This approach produces a single
factor with eigenvalue larger than 1, explaining more than 80% of variance, and on which Com-
passion, Hypothetical altruism, and Willingness to share load strongly (see Appendix C.5). For
parsimony, we discuss Compassion and Social motivation in our main analysis, and report results
for other measures as robustness checks. We also measure self-reported risk taking (Risk) and
future discounting (Time) preferences on a 0-10 scale (Dohmen et al., 2011; Falk et al., 2016), as
they may impact both individuals’ perception of incentives and their effort allocation.8
Procedure We recruit subjects on Prolific Academic, a UK-based online platform geared to-
wards researchers and startups and designed for surveys and experiments. This platform produces
similar response times and data quality as Amazon Mturk, but gives access to more diverse and
representative respondents (Peer et al., 2017). Social enterprises are an established organizational
7 These items, with Cronbach’s α = 0.75, are available in Appendix C.1.
8 The self-reported answers to the general risk, time, and willingness to share questions are reliable predictors
of behavior and consistent with incentivized elicitations (Dohmen et al., 2011; Falk et al., 2016).
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form in the UK (Tracey et al., 2011) and an online study allows us to reach a broad population
of potential employees (Bitektine et al., 2018). We restrict the subject pool to UK residents aged
18-64 who are students or active in the labor force (i.e. not ‘homemakers’, disabled, or retired).
To achieve gender balance and perform comparisons between men and women, we stratify the
randomization by gender, using the gender variable Prolific previously required subjects to report.
Finally, to ensure high-quality answers, we require participants to have a history of taking Prolific
studies seriously (as evidenced by approved submissions in past studies) and consider eligible only
those participants with prior approval rates higher than 90% on the platform; we also include
attention and manipulation checks.
All subjects receive a flat £3 participation fee (around $4 or e 3.50 at the time of the exper-
iment). In addition, the sliders allow subjects to earn up to an additional £60 (15 sliders × 4
contracts × £1 per slider) and the dictator game produces own payoffs up to £20 (£10 as giver,
£10 as receiver). To be able to use these rather large sums as incentives, we randomly select
40 out of the 796 subjects for bonus payment, with a maximum potential bonus of £80. Thus,
we compensate some participants with larger sums but a smaller likelihood (about 1 in 20), a
procedure equivalent to paying smaller sums with certainty (Charness et al., 2016).9
To arrive at our final sample, we impose several restrictions. First, we require subjects to
have placed at most 10 sliders in an incorrect position, considering sliders placed at 23-27 and
73-77 as indicative of strong intentions to exert commercial or social effort, and therefore correct.
Second, subjects must not have failed both attention and manipulation checks. Third, we require
consistency between our gender variable and the Prolific variable used for stratification; in other
words, a subject must have answered both questions in the same way. Finally, to ensure subjects
paid attention, we require them to have completed the experiment in between 10 and 40 minutes.
9 The expected total payoff is £7 for a duration of around 20 minutes. The maximum own payoff is attained
when subjects exert only commercial effort in the £1 treatment. If subjects exert only social effort, the maximum
good cause payoff is £60. In practice, the average own and good cause payoffs of selected subjects are £29 and,
respectively, £33.
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This leaves us with a sample of 708 subjects (out of 796 responses) for whom data quality is likely
to be very high, distributed roughly evenly across treatments.10
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Out of 708 subjects, 49.9% are female and 16.5% are students. Subjects are fairly well educated,
cover the range of incomes, and tend to be young. The average Compassion score is 29.2 out of a
maximum of 40 and subjects donate on average £4.2 in the dictator game; about 24.4%, 10.5%,
and 16% of subjects have previous experience working in a non-profit, in a social enterprise, or with
a social organization, respectively.11 Compassion is positively correlated with most other social
preference measures and loads strongly on Social motivation, together with Willingness to share,
Hypothetical altruism, and Prosocial behavior. Subjects took on average 18.5 minutes to complete
the study. 25%, 18.6%, and 56.4% of subjects chose the workforce reintegration, fair trade, and,
respectively, environmental good causes, with similar choices across treatments.
4.4.2 Intensive margin: Social enterprise effort allocation
Figure 4.1 plots average social enterprise (SE) Social effort across incentive levels and sorting
conditions, together with 95% confidence intervals. In the absence of pay for performance, the
effort allocation is skewed towards the social task, as subjects exert more than two thirds of
their effort on this task (i.e. more than 10 out of 15 sliders). However, subjects allocate effort
roughly equally between the commercial and social tasks at all levels of pay for performance, with
confidence intervals that include the level of social effort expected for a perfectly balanced effort
allocation, plotted as a dashed line. Similarly, Panel A of Table 4.2 reports average Social effort
10 To ensure transparency and commitment in our analysis, we preregistered our design and hypotheses within
the Open Science Framework (link). Appendix C.2 provides descriptive statistics, social preference correlations, an
analysis of good cause choice, and a randomization check. We find that the good cause chosen is not systematically
related to individual traits and that our randomization procedure was successful. Appendix C.3 details the results
of power calculations performed prior to running the experiment. The sample sizes we obtain allow us to detect
relatively small changes in social effort (around half of a standard deviation) with more than 80% power at the 5%
significance level. Appendix C.4 shows that results are robust to tightening or relaxing the sample restrictions.
11 Social organizations include both non-profits and social enterprises. This variable captures professional work
relationships with such an organization (e.g. as a joint venture with a for-profit).
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Figure 4.1: Social effort in social enterprises by treatment and sorting condition, with 95%
confidence intervals; the dashed line represents a fully balanced effort allocation.
across contracts, together with the number of subjects in each condition. Using t-tests, the first
row of Panel B shows that more balanced SE effort allocations are elicited regardless of incentive
strength or whether self-selection is possible (p < 0.001). The remaining rows of Panel B show that
differences in SE Social effort between the £0.25, £0.50, and £1 treatments are not statistically
significant. These results provide initial evidence for intensive margin effects, equivalent to an
attention-directing role of incentives in social enterprises.
Table 4.2 also allows us to compare behavior in different organizational forms. For profit (FP)
and non-profit (NP) workers exert 30% and, respectively, 90% of their effort on the social task
in each treatment; SE social effort levels are in between and significantly different from FP and
NP levels (p < 0.001 in Panel C). To quantify where SEs lie on the FP/NP continuum, we use
t-tests to compare SE social effort with the average of FP and NP social effort in Panel D, where
a positive difference indicates SE is closer to NP. Indeed, we find a positive difference in the £0
4.4. RESULTS 183
Table 4.2: Social Effort, by Contract and Treatment
No sorting Sorting
£0 £0.25 £0.50 £1 £0 £0.25 £0.50 £1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Social effort levels across contracts
FP 4.918 5.152 5.227 5.640 3.956 4.131 4.100 4.846
(4.506) (4.479) (4.435) (4.613) (3.836) (3.735) (3.672) (4.846)
N 170 178 185 175 90 84 70 26
SE 10.935 7.129 7.108 7.343 10.633 7.534 8.000 7.600
(3.612) (3.727) (3.595) (3.534) (3.408) (3.262) (3.002) (2.527)
N 170 178 185 175 49 73 94 125
NP 13.306 12.719 12.984 12.697 13.355 13.762 13.367 13.458
(2.939) (3.169) (3.303) (3.503) (2.537) (2.364) (3.851) (3.413)
N 170 178 185 175 31 21 21 24
B. SE effort t-tests of equality of means across treatments, p-values
vs £0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
vs £0.25 0.956 0.581 0.340 0.874
vs £0.50 0.533 0.286
C. SE effort t-tests of equality with FP and NP, p-values
vs FP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
vs NP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
D. SE effort t-tests of equality with FP and NP average, sign and p-values
+0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 +0.001 −0.006 −0.118 −0.013
Standard deviations in parentheses. We use matched pair t-tests for the no sorting condition, since
all individuals performed the slider task in all contract types. In the bottom row, we compare SE
social effort with the average of FP and NP social effort to show where the SE lies on the continuum
between FP and NP: ‘+’ means SE is closer to NP than to FP, and ‘−’ means SE is closer to FP than
to NP. All p-values are two-sided.
treatment and a negative one (though not always significant) for steeper incentives. These results
suggest that SEs occupy the middle ground between FPs and NPs with regards to effort allocation
when monetary incentives are in place and highlight the adverse specialization problem that social
enterprises face when they do not use monetary rewards.
Interestingly, company descriptions matter beyond the incentives offered, even when both com-
mercial and social tasks are available in all contracts. For instance, the £0 bonus SE is equivalent
to the NP in the contract terms offered, and the £1 bonus SE is equivalent to the FP. Nonethe-
less, behavior is significantly different in these organizational forms, indicating that the stated
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organizational goal per se triggers shifts in the effort allocation.12
We can further probe the nature of adverse specialization: does imbalance result from a skewed
effort allocation for all workers or only a minority of workers? Figure 4.2 plots the distribution
of SE social effort in each treatment. Between 30% and 40% of subjects in the £0 treatment
exert only social effort, whereas the distribution of social effort is roughly normal and centered
around a fully balanced allocation for other subjects. Thus, adverse specialization only affects
a fraction of workers, rather than shifting the entire distribution of social effort upwards. What
could drive such behavior? Our theoretical framework suggests that subjects with higher other-
regarding preferences are more likely to exert more social effort and, therefore, to exhibit adverse
specialization. In Appendix C.6, we show that individuals in the top Compassion decile are indeed
more likely to be in such a situation, especially if they select into the SE contract. The remaining
panels of Figure 4.2 suggest that incentives, both modest and strong, successfully reduce the
fraction of SE workers exerting only social effort. This results in significantly different distributions,
centered more tightly around a fully balanced effort allocation.
As Hypothesis 1 predicts, modest incentives induce a more balanced effort allocation between
the commercial and social tasks, alleviating the adverse specialization that occurs in the absence
of monetary rewards. Surprisingly, contrary to Hypothesis 2 and a common view in social en-
trepreneurship, the commercial task does not gain prominence with stronger incentives: the effort
allocation remains balanced even when the social enterprise pays as much as a for-profit, mitigating
mission drift concerns. We now turn to analyzing the relationship between monetary rewards and
the other-regarding preferences of workers attracted to the social enterprise and the potential for
self-selection to influence effort allocation.
12 Moreover, with a £0, £0.25, or £0.50 SE bonus, subjects would be better off financially by choosing the
FP contract, as commercial effort is better remunerated in the FP and social effort produces the same good cause
payoff (the social action in an FP could correspond, for instance, to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities,
see, e.g., Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). Subjects would also be better off choosing the FP over the NP: they
could choose to allocate, for example, 13 units of their effort to the social task, while still reaping personal rewards
from 2 units of commercial effort in the FP contract (whereas the NP contract does not reward commercial action).
Nonetheless, individuals choose organizations with a stated social mission over organizations without one, suggesting
that labels matter.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of social effort in social enterprises. The £0 distribution is different from
the £0.25, £0.50, and £1 distributions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p < 0.001, no sorting; p < 0.01,
sorting). The latter distributions are not different from each other (p > 0.1).
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4.4.3 Extensive margin: Worker self-selection
One of the reasons social entrepreneurs are reluctant to use pay for performance relates to their
potential attraction of less socially motivated individuals. To assess the validity of this concern,
Table 4.3 displays the average levels of Compassion and Social motivation across treatments.13 In
Panel A, we find minor and insignificant differences in mean social preferences across treatments
(p > 0.1), suggesting our randomization was successful. Panel B then displays social preferences
separately for subjects selecting into the FP, SE, and NP contracts. SE social preferences are
similar for the £0, £0.25, and £0.50 treatments, but are significantly lower in the £1 treatment,
as the t-tests in Panel C show (p < 0.05 relative to the £0 treatment).14 This shift is consistent with
our prediction that more extrinsically motivated employees are attracted to SEs when incentives
in this organization are stronger. Nonetheless, high-powered incentives do not reduce the size of
the pool of joiners. Instead, more workers join the SE as incentives become stronger: while a £0
SE bonus attracts 28.8% of subjects (i.e. 49 out of 170), the £0.25, £0.50, and £1 bonuses attract
41%, 50.8%, and, respectively, 71.4% of subjects, mainly at the expense of FPs.
We investigate extensive margin effects further by comparing social preferences across Part
3 contract choices in Panel D of Table 4.3. As already visible in Panel B, outside of the £1
treatment, self-selected SE workers’ motivation is higher than that of FP workers (p < 0.05) and
indistinguishable from that of NP workers (p > 0.1), supporting our central contention that the SE
organizational form attracts highly motivated employees. However, SE workers’ Social motivation
in the £1 treatment is lower than that of NP workers (p = 0.014) and similar to that of FP
workers (p > 0.05). As noted above, this is driven by a large shift in subjects choosing SE relative
to FP when SE and FP contract terms are the same. In Panel E we inquire once again whether
13 For ease of interpretation, we standardize Compassion to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
14 F -tests for equality of variances do not indicate a wider dispersion of social preferences across treatments, but
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions suggest a different distribution of Social motivation in the
£1 treatment (p < 0.1). In Appendix C.5, we show that with a £1 bonus, the SE attracts more (fewer) individuals
from the bottom (top) 25% of the Social motivation distribution, shifting the entire distribution downwards.
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Table 4.3: Motivation and Contract Choice
Compassion (standardized) Social motivation (factor)
£0 £0.25 £0.50 £1 £0 £0.25 £0.50 £1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Motivation across contracts, without sorting
All 0.038 -0.025 0.050 -0.065 0.020 -0.036 0.049 -0.035
(0.953) (1.015) (1.086) (0.937) (0.752) (0.768) (0.827) (0.670)
N 170 178 185 175 170 178 185 175
B. Motivation across contracts, with sorting
FP -0.185 -0.255 -0.266 -0.318 -0.237 -0.282 -0.254 -0.293
(0.949) (1.088) (1.159) (0.989) (0.768) (0.745) (0.871) (0.763)
N 90 84 70 26 90 84 70 26
SE 0.272 0.150 0.209 -0.031 0.292 0.196 0.222 -0.046
(0.863) (0.902) (0.970) (0.920) (0.637) (0.705) (0.742) (0.624)
N 49 73 94 125 49 73 94 125
NP 0.311 0.287 0.392 0.036 0.333 0.145 0.284 0.303
(0.965) (0.917) (1.114) (0.960) (0.605) (0.796) (0.763) (0.682)
N 31 21 21 24 31 21 21 24
C. SE motivation t-tests of equality of means across treatments, p-values
vs £0 0.458 0.699 0.047 0.443 0.575 0.002
vs £0.25 0.692 0.177 0.815 0.012
vs £0.50 0.063 0.004
D. SE motivation t-tests of equality with FP and NP, p-values
vs FP 0.006 0.013 0.005 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.080
vs NP 0.854 0.547 0.449 0.745 0.782 0.777 0.736 0.014
E. SE motivation t-tests of equality with NP and FP average,
sign and p-values
+0.147 +0.320 +0.319 −0.506 +0.025 +0.025 +0.068 −0.653
Standard deviations in parentheses. We standardize Compassion to have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. In the bottom row, we compare SE motivation with the average of FP and NP
motivation to show where the SE lies on the continuum between FP and NP: ‘+’ means SE is closer
to NP than FP, and ‘−’ means SE is closer to FP than NP. All p-values are two-sided.
SEs are closer to FPs or NPs in social preferences by comparing the former with the mean of
the latter. While SEs are indistinguishable from this average in terms of Compassion, they are
significantly closer to NPs with regards to Social motivation when the bonus is £0, £0.25, or
£0.50. Thus, the scope for extensive margin effects appears limited, with only strong incentives
leading to a small, but significant decrease in SE employee social motivation. As Figure 4.1 shows,
allowing for employee self-selection does not alter the relationship between monetary incentives
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and Social effort, although self-selection leads to an effort allocation that appears closer to full
balance. To formally test for differences across conditions, columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.4 regress
SE Social effort on dummies for incentive levels, the sorting condition, and their interactions, with
and without demographic and good cause controls. As some participants perform the SE contract
twice, we cluster standard errors at the individual level. If the extensive margin is unimportant,
we would expect the Sorting variable and its interaction with each treatment level to be jointly
insignificant. The p-values for these tests, reported at the bottom of Table 4.4, show that sorting
differentially affects effort allocation only in the £0.50 treatment, where subjects exert higher
Social effort.
Table 4.4 shows the results for two other dependent variables. First, we account for potential
differences in total effort – which may shift social effort downwards in absolute, but not necessarily
relative terms – by computing social effort as a share of total effort. The results in columns (3) and
(4) perfectly match those obtained using units of social effort, suggesting that total effort does not
represent an important margin of adjustment, in line with our assumption in Section 4.2. Second,
since one could be concerned with deviations from balance in the direction of either C or S task
effort, we also consider the absolute value of the difference between social and commercial effort,
where a lower value implies better balance. Columns (5) and (6) provide additional evidence against
self-selection as the main mechanism by which incentives affect effort allocation; however, they
suggest that sorting does contribute to better absolute balance in the £0.50 and £1 treatments.
Our analysis suggests that incentives operate similarly with and without worker self-selection
and that strong incentives have a small negative effect on workers’ social preferences. Thus,
modest incentives have no extensive margin effects, contrary to Hypothesis 3; strong incentives
may engender a loss of employee motivation, but do not skew effort towards the commercial task.
While this result seemingly contradicts Hypothesis 4, our inability to confirm these hypotheses
may relate to the incentive strength we use, an idea we return to when discussing limitations.
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Table 4.4: Intensive and Extensive Margin Effects on SE Effort Allocation
Social effort units Social effort share Absolute balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
£0.25 -3.806*** -3.934*** -0.252*** -0.260*** -2.197*** -2.389***
(0.394) (0.397) (0.026) (0.026) (0.587) (0.587)
£0.50 -3.827*** -3.934*** -0.254*** -0.261*** -2.570*** -2.823***
(0.383) (0.389) (0.026) (0.026) (0.589) (0.591)
£1 -3.592*** -3.670*** -0.237*** -0.241*** -2.717*** -2.885***
(0.385) (0.392) (0.026) (0.026) (0.591) (0.600)
Sorting -0.303 -0.240 -0.020 -0.017 -0.935 -0.856
(0.471) (0.464) (0.031) (0.031) (0.838) (0.822)
Sorting × £0.25 0.708 0.639 0.047 0.043 0.005 0.177
(0.588) (0.586) (0.039) (0.039) (0.972) (0.948)
Sorting × £0.50 1.195** 1.128** 0.081** 0.077** 0.047 0.005
(0.577) (0.572) (0.038) (0.038) (0.930) (0.913)
Sorting × £1 0.560 0.489 0.034 0.030 -0.778 -0.837
(0.537) (0.531) (0.036) (0.035) (0.904) (0.886)
Constant 10.935*** 11.545*** 0.729*** 0.770*** 7.894*** 7.899***
(0.277) (0.631) (0.018) (0.042) (0.467) (0.929)
Tests of joint significance of Sorting + Sorting × treatment, p-values:
£0.25 0.250 0.266 0.251 0.274 0.059 0.153
£0.50 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.027 0.034
£1 0.321 0.344 0.408 0.436 0.000 0.000
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049
R2 0.152 0.177 0.151 0.175 0.066 0.113
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses. The
baseline category is the £0 treatment when sorting is not possible. The dependent variable is Social
effort, i.e. S task effort, in columns (1) and (2), social effort as a share of total effort, i.e. S/(S +C),
in columns (3) and (4), and absolute balance, i.e. |S − C|, in columns (5) and (6). Controls include
age, gender, studentship, education, income, risk and time preferences, and choice of good cause.
In the social enterprise context, monetary rewards work mainly at the intensive, rather than the
extensive margin, directing employee attention towards the remunerated commercial task in a
way that generates a balanced effort allocation in absolute terms, as well as relative to other
organizational forms.
Sensitivity and heterogeneity Our results are robust to a wide set of sensitivity analyses.
These include alternative sampling restrictions (Appendix C.4), social preference measures (Ap-
pendix C.5), effort measures (Appendix C.6), and multiple hypothesis testing adjustments, reflect-
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ing the number of outcomes and treatments we consider (Appendix C.7). As women are often
found to be more other-oriented than men and more likely to engage with social, rather than
commercial activities (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dimitriadis et al., 2017), we stratified our ran-
domization by gender. However, we find no substantial differences between men and women in the
effect of incentives on effort allocation (Appendix C.7). Our results paint a clear picture: modest
incentives induce a balanced effort allocation without a reduction in social motivation.
4.5 Discussion
To achieve their economic and social value creation goals, social enterprises must allocate scarce
employee effort between commercial and social tasks. Owing to their embeddedness in a social
logic espousing an emphasis on social impact, a reluctance to employ practices stemming from
a commercial logic, and high levels of other-regarding preferences among both founders and em-
ployees, social enterprises often pay insufficient attention to revenue generation. As purpose takes
priority over profits, revenue drift hinders social enterprises’ ability to deliver on their social mis-
sion and threatens their survival. Why then do so few social enterprises adopt pay for performance
practices, and why does the scholarly literature pay relatively little attention to incentives in social
enterprises?
We argue theoretically that in the absence of pecuniary rewards, social enterprise employees
allocate most of their effort to social tasks due to their high social motivation and perceived social
mission saliency. We hypothesize that monetary incentives elicit a balanced effort allocation by
directing employee effort to the commercial task and by potentially attracting workers with lower
levels of social motivation who are less prone to adverse specialization. While modest incentives
are mainly expected to operate at the intensive margin by increasing the benefits of exerting
effort on the commercial task, strong incentives may work on the extensive margin by attracting
less motivated employees who could cause mission drift. Our experiment examines the effect of
incentives on effort allocation in social enterprises, identifying the mechanisms through which this
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effect propagates. Both modest and strong incentives are found to produce a balanced effort
allocation, with employee effort split roughly equally between a commercial and a social task.
While modest incentives do not affect the composition of the social enterprise workforce, strong
incentives do lead to a small, but significant downwards shift in the distribution of workers’ social
motivation.
Theoretical implications The tension between social and economic value creation in social
enterprises and its implications for firm performance are core questions in the hybrid organizations
literature (Pache and Santos, 2010; Dacin et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013; Battilana et al., 2015;
Smith and Besharov, 2019). While the risk of mission drift engendered by the pursuit of commercial
goals in social enterprises has received substantial attention (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ramus and
Vaccaro, 2017; Grimes et al., 2018), few studies address revenue drift beyond noting threats to
economic performance when firms put purpose ahead of profits (Tracey et al., 2011; Battilana
et al., 2015; Stevens et al., 2015; Staessens et al., 2018). Moreover, the usual incentive tools
used by commercial ventures to guide employee effort are often viewed as inappropriate for social
enterprises, due to their perceived incongruence with social impact and their potential to attract
less motivated workers (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001; Austin et al., 2006; Tracey et al., 2011;
Smith et al., 2013).
By applying incentive theory to social enterprises, we argue instead that monetary rewards
can stave off revenue drift in this type of hybrid organization. Whereas existing studies show
that firms often use social missions to elicit higher employee effort (Besley and Ghatak, 2005;
Henderson and Van den Steen, 2015; Burbano, 2016; Cassar, 2019), the nature of that effort has
been largely overlooked (Jones et al., 2018). Social enterprises relying solely on social mission
to attract and motivate employees are vulnerable to revenue drift, which may create obstacles to
growth and survival. By contrast, a combination of mission and monetary incentives succeeds in
making workers balance their effort between commercial and social tasks.
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Inasmuch as it engenders a deviation from social enterprises’ core focus on social mission, an
outcome of balance may still be considered a source of mission drift. However, we argue that
balance will afford social enterprises the resources needed for growth, allowing them to achieve
their social impact more reliably. Our results therefore reinforce the need to move away from
viewing mission drift as unequivocally bad and towards appreciating the situations where it may
be necessary (Grimes et al., 2018).
The experimental design developed in this article causally isolates the channels through which
incentives affect effort allocation. On the one hand, monetary rewards signpost to employees what
tasks are valuable for the organization; hence, they perform a normative function (Kaplan and
Henderson, 2005; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009; Wolfolds, 2018) and are integral to firms’ structural
distribution of attention (Ocasio, 1997). On the other hand, incentives also perform a sorting
function, potentially attracting employees with different motivations (Lazear, 2000; Cadsby et al.,
2007); this can help achieve balance if motivation crowd-out is small, but may backfire if self-
selected workers are extrinsically motivated and exert most of their effort on the incentivized
commercial task (Deserranno, 2019). The evidence from our experiment is consistent with an
intensive margin, attention-directing role of monetary rewards, with modest incentives being suf-
ficient to balance the effort allocation without reducing employee social motivation. By conveying
the importance of a given task to all employees, modest incentives act as a coordination device
and are especially valuable either when firms face conflicting goals (Kogut and Zander, 1996),
or when a dominant logic prescribes and legitimates non-optimal practices (Lounsbury, 2007).
In social enterprises, the dominant logic tends to be marked by a deeply entrenched culture of
social impact in a context where there are substantial gains to the joint pursuit of profits and
purpose. This corresponds to a setting where a powerful informal organization must be countered
with an ‘inconsistent’ formal organization in order to achieve multiple, incompatible objectives, a
process Gulati and Puranam (2009) refer to as ‘compensatory fit’. Under the threat of revenue
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drift, social enterprises adopting performance-contingent rewards are indeed able to pursue such a
compensatory fit strategy.
As hybrid organizations tackling social challenges through business means (Dees, 2001; Zahra
et al., 2009), social enterprises need to guide employee effort to tasks that place conflicting demands
on their attention by relying on both mission and monetary incentives. The need to make dual
logic-consistent decisions leads social enterprises to ‘selectively couple’ practices prescribed by both
commercial and social logics (Pache and Santos, 2013). The more consistent their message and
practices, the more likely social enterprises are to achieve their dual goals. Given differences in
social enterprise missions and ability to measure commercial and social outcomes, a multitasking
framework may help us understand the practices social enterprises adopt, as well as the business
models most exposed to a risk of revenue or mission drift.
Makadok and Coff (2009) show how competing actions lead organizations to adopt hybrid gov-
ernance forms combining features of markets and hierarchies. However, they note that some tasks
are actually synergistic for employees, such that levers which increase effort in one dimension have
positive spillovers on effort in other dimensions. Indeed, social enterprise business models cover
both competing and reinforcing social and commercial tasks (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Shepherd
et al., 2019). Scholars may find it useful to adapt the multitasking framework to systematically
study the relations between mission, services offered, the nature of tasks employees must perform,
and the practices – drawn from both commercial and social logics, with elements of markets and
hierarchy – enacted by social enterprises.
Our findings speak to other settings where complex organizations pursue multiple goals and
workers are heterogeneous (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009). Innovative firms must balance explo-
ration and exploitation (March, 1991), and employees vary in their pecuniary and non-pecuniary
motives (Sauermann and Cohen, 2010). Inventors with strong preferences for intellectual chal-
lenge, novelty, or independence may then put exploration ahead of exploitation, with potentially
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adverse consequences for firm performance when gains from ambidexterity are large (He and Wong,
2004). In this case, monetary rewards are expected to shift workers’ attention towards exploitation
(Manso, 2011; Ederer and Manso, 2013; Lee and Meyer-Doyle, 2017), and modest incentives may
prove optimal (see also Baumann and Stieglitz, 2014).
Practical implications Facing growing competitive pressures, social enterprises are increas-
ingly turning their attention to operational sustainability. Monetary rewards offer one way for
social enterprises to overcome an excessive focus on social impact to the detriment of revenue gen-
eration. Modest incentives are particularly appealing, as they expand the potential employee pool
and restore balance with minimal cost. Modest incentives are also unlikely to reduce employee
social motivation and increase risk taking or myopic behavior, and may thus be expected to have
minimal adverse effects on organizational activities outside the scope of our study. Rather than
attracting less motivated workers or over-emphasizing the relevance of commercial tasks, modest
incentives signal the value of certain actions to employees. Consequently, social entrepreneurs
need not worry too much about the pool of potential applicants, but devote attention instead to
internal effort allocations and compensation design. As our results show, a social enterprise that
pays employees larger bonuses can attract more candidates, such that incentives may aid social
enterprises in their search for talent. Moreover, social entrepreneurs who can overcome their aver-
sion to performance-based pay may be able to credibly commit to market-based goods or service
delivery. Redirecting a fraction of employees’ attention towards revenue generation can help social
enterprises become less dependent on outside finance and achieve the scale required for making a
meaningful difference in beneficiaries’ well-being and economic development. Of course, monetary
rewards for commercial performance are but one tool available to social entrepreneurs. Additional
means of guiding employee effort include governance mechanisms (Ebrahim et al., 2014), hiring
and socialization practices (Battilana and Dorado, 2010), and, where quantifiable, rewards for
achieving social impact and operational targets (Wolfolds, 2018). Assessing the complementarity
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of such practices presents an interesting avenue for future research, with potentially important
implications for social enterprise performance.
Limitations As with any experiment, there are several limitations to our study. Because we
are interested in how high-powered incentives affect effort allocation, we study a wide range of
incentive strengths in social enterprises, from as weak monetary incentives as in non-profits, to
as strong monetary incentives as in for profits. Conceptually, we thus cover the entire range of
relevant incentive strengths. Nevertheless, it might be that our choice of experimental parameters
still limits this range. In particular, the good cause payoff is always £1 and the monetary bonus
is at most £1 per slider, as well. The relatively high returns to the social task ensures that this
task is on a level playing field with the commercial task, but one may be legitimately worried that
monetary incentives could be perceived as weak. A wider range of bonus levels, exceeding the good
cause payoff, could potentially lead to different findings for strong incentives and explain why we
do not find evidence for hypotheses 2 and 4. However, this would not affect our main conclusion
that modest incentives help social enterprises rather than hurt them.
To causally isolate if and how monetary incentives affect effort allocation, we purposely simplify
the nature of social enterprises at the expense of their hybrid complexity. First, our experiment
has limited external validity, given the multitude of tasks social enterprise employees may perform,
the number of dimensions on which employees may differ, as well as the nuanced presentation of
different types of firms’ objectives in real life. Nonetheless, we believe our experiment captures the
fundamental tension between commercial and social tasks in social enterprises and employee effort
allocation in a simple and transparent manner. While we attempted to further alleviate external
validity concerns by recruiting participants from a representative pool of potential employees and
giving them realistic choices of company types and missions, field replications represent a nat-
ural and necessary extension of our study. Second, social enterprise effectiveness often depends
on coordinated action and team performance. If so, are team incentives better than individual
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incentives? Does their effectiveness vary with employee heterogeneity? Third, the introduction of
pay for performance is often accompanied by a justification, helping the practice gain legitimacy.
Does the communication of incentives matter for their success? How does goal clarity improve that
communication? How do social enterprises justify and implement an incentive change? Fourth, the
presence of monetary incentives in social enterprises is likely to affect a broad range of institutional
referents, beyond employees. How do investors and communities perceive social enterprises using
monetary rewards: are they more professional or are they courting mission drift? Fourth, financial
incentives may have other, potentially negative effects on aspects of hybrid organizations that our
work has not considered. For instance, do incentives create internal conflicts between employees
with different social preferences? Do monetary rewards generate long run distortions? What are
joiners’ commitment and retention rates? For social enterprises to achieve their promise, answers
to these questions are crucial, in both stylized experimental settings and in the field.
Finally, the nature of the experiment constrains our ability to describe social enterprises in
detail; nonetheless, even when exactly the same available actions and reward structure (for both
own and good cause payoffs) exist in social enterprises as in for-profits or non-profits, behavior dif-
fers markedly across organizational forms. Despite our avoidance of the explicit ‘social enterprise’
label, subjects clearly distinguished this organizational form from the alternatives. This result
prompts the importance of future research on the perception of social enterprises as a potentially
distinct category, whose prescriptions for action employees and wider audiences may ultimately
internalize, thereby providing additional legitimacy for this organizational form (Zuckerman, 1999;
Negro et al., 2010; Pontikes, 2012).
Conclusion We have argued theoretically and provided experimental evidence that social enter-
prises can address revenue drift, an excessive focus on social impact at the expense of generating
revenue, by deploying monetary rewards. Modest incentives redirect employee attention to com-
mercial tasks and reinforce social enterprises’ commitment to achieving their social mission via
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market-based mechanisms, without attracting less socially employees. Our findings question a
common view in social entrepreneurship that incentives are incongruent with social impact and/or
attract the wrong kind of employee. This study contributes to a growing literature on hybrid
organizations’ challenges of managing competing logics, and opens up a whole vista of interesting
questions regarding social enterprises’ compensation practices and organizational design.
Appendix C
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C.1 Instructions
Welcome Thank you for taking part in this study designed to learn about how people make
decisions.1 The choices we ask you to make are based on methods and techniques from economics,
business administration, and psychology. The experiment is expected to take around 20 minutes.
At the top of your screen, you will be able to see what percentage of the questionnaire you have
already completed.
Personal data will be kept confidential. Your answers will only be used for this research. The
published results will not refer to a person by name and will not describe individual choices. We
will not disclose information to third parties. Aside from the participation fee, this experiment
allows you to earn additional money. Out of all respondents who completed the questionnaire,
we will randomly select 40 respondents for payment; as we expect around 800 participants in this
experiment, the chance of being chosen for payment is about 1/20. Depending on the choices
made, those chosen for payment can earn up to £80. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.
The task This experiment will consist of four parts. In Parts 2 and 3, you will perform a slider
task. This consists of a screen with 15 horizontal sliders, labeled from 0 to 100. As shown below,
each slider is initially positioned at 50 and can be moved towards 0 or 100. These labels carry no
inherent value, and only provide an axis for the slider. Each slider has a number to the right of
it showing its current position. You can use your mouse in any way you like to move each slider.
You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. You will have a chance to
practice moving sliders shortly.
The task involves making a choice between placing the slider at 25 or 75, each corresponding
to an action and a payoff that will be made clear at the beginning of each slider round. Placing
the slider at 25 will always generate a payoff to you. Placing the slider at 75 will always generate
a payoff to a good cause (which you will select below). Each slider will carry a payoff between
£0 and £1, stated explicitly whenever you perform the task. Note that a slider will be taken into
consideration for your payoff only if positioned at exactly 25 or 75, as accuracy is valued.
Figure C.1.1: Slider example.
Payment You will receive a fixed fee of £3 for completing this experiment. In addition, you can
earn money in each of the rounds where you will perform the slider task, with the exception of the
practice round. Finally, you can earn money in some of the questions asked towards the end of the
experiment. It will always be clearly indicated if and how (much) money can be earned. When
the experiment has concluded, a number of participants will be randomly selected as winners
and will receive payment. We expect around 800 participants, and only 40 will be selected for
payment: we therefore expect around 1 in 20 participants to be selected for payment. Throughout
the experiment, you will also have the chance to earn money for both yourself and a good cause.
You will have a chance to select a good cause below. If you are selected for payment, any payoff
you have generated for the good cause will be transferred to that particular good cause.
1 A preview can be accessed here. Each subject is randomly allocated a social enterprise incentive level (£0,
£0.25, £0.50, or £1) as they enter the experiment, and is exposed to only one of these levels throughout. In addition,
subjects never see the labels used below (FP, SE, NP), and only infer the type of company.
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Part 1 – Good cause and practice
This part of the experiment allows you to choose your preferred good cause and become familiar
with the task. Please proceed to the next screen.2
Please choose one of the three organizations below corresponding to your preferred good cause:
• Workforce reintegration: The Big Issue Foundation seeks to promote the social and
financial inclusion of its vendors by identifying and motivating individuals to engage with
the services that will help them move forward and deal with their homelessness and health
issues and achieve their own goals.
• Fair and equitable trade: Fairtrade Foundation seeks to connect disadvantaged producers
and consumers, promote fairer trading conditions through standardization and certification
and empower producers to combat poverty, strengthen their position, and take more control
over their lives.
• Water quality and environment: Water Aid seeks to deliver clear water, improved sani-
tation, and proper hygiene to developing countries through a combination of technical solu-
tions and hygiene education. They aim to ensure the effectiveness of their projects by using
carbon-neutral, sustainable methods that preserve the environment.
You now have a chance to practice moving sliders. Please remember that a slider is considered
correctly placed only if placed at exactly 25 or exactly 75. The numbers only represent positions
that correspond to actions providing an own payoff and a payoff to the previously selected good
cause. These 2 sliders are given for you to become familiar with the task. You will not be paid
for this practice round. Please keep in mind that in the actual task you will position sets of 15
sliders. When you are sufficiently familiar with this task, please proceed to the next screen.
Comprehension check Before proceeding to the actual task, please answer the following ques-
tions.
If each slider placed at 25 produces an own payoff of 5 points, and each slider placed at 75 produces
a good cause payoff of 20 points, what is the good cause payoff when 5 sliders are placed at 75?
• 100
• 25
• 40
If each slider placed at 25 produces an own payoff of 10 points, and each slider placed at 75
produces a good cause payoff of 20 points, what is the good cause payoff when 2 sliders are placed
at 75?
• 100
• 25
• 40
If each slider placed at 25 produces an own payoff of 5 points, and each slider placed at 75 produces
a good cause payoff of 20 points, what is your payoff when 5 sliders are placed at 25?
• 100
• 25
• 40
This is the end of Part 1. Please proceed to the next screen.
2 Randomization is employed with regards to the order of: i) good causes, ii) attention check questions (and
options), iii) contracts in Part 2, and iv) contracts in the choice question in Part 3.
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Part 2 – All contracts
You will now be performing the slider task under a set of different contracts. Throughout the
experiment you will behave as an employee of a set of companies. These companies provide similar
services, but have different objectives, as explained at the beginning of each scenario. Please
read the company descriptions carefully. Moving the slider will allow you to make choices
as an employee of those companies. The actions described within each contract will correspond to
potential actions of employees of such companies, and generate either a payoff to you or the good
cause you selected earlier. The text will explain clearly how the payoffs are generated. Please
proceed to the next screen.
Workforce reintegration (if selected)
For profit Imagine you are working for a company providing garbage collection services on the
market. The company only cares about generating revenue through the sale of services.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate revenue for the company through
the sale of goods and services; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff of £1.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can contribute to the professional development
of its employees; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1 to the good cause.3
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
Non profit Imagine you are working for a company aimed at reintegrating long term unemployed
people into the workforce by hiring them to provide garbage collection services. The company
only cares about workforce reintegration through the professional development of the
long term unemployed.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate revenue for the company through
the sale of services; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff of £0.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can contribute to the professional development
of its employees; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1 to the good cause.
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
Social enterprise Imagine you are working for a company aimed at reintegrating long term
unemployed people into the workforce by hiring them to provide garbage collection services that
are then sold on the market. It is in the best interest of the organization that both
ensuring the professional development of the long term unemployed and generating
revenue through the sale of services receive attention from employees.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate revenue for the company through
the sale of services; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff of £0/£0.25/£0.50/
£1.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can contribute to the professional development
of its employees; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1 to the good cause.
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
3 The availability of the social task in FP contracts approximates the possibility of CSR activities.
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Fair and equitable trade (if selected)
For profit Imagine you are working for a company investing in new businesses. The company
only cares about generating returns for its investors by selecting the most promising
ventures.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate returns for the company by
investing in the most promising ventures; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff
of £1.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can make finance accessible to fair trade
businesses in developing countries; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1 to
the good cause.
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
Non profit Imagine you are working for a company dedicated to investing in new businesses.
The company only cares about alleviating poverty by supporting fair trade businesses
in developing countries.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate returns for the company by
investing in the most promising ventures; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff
of £0.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can make finance accessible to fair trade
businesses in developing countries; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1 to
the good cause.
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
Social enterprise Imagine you are working for a company investing in new businesses. It is
in the best interests of the organization that both offering fair trade businesses in
developing countries access to loans and credit facilities and ensuring a positive rate
of return on investments receive attention.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate returns for the company by
investing in the most promising ventures; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff
of £0/£0.25/£0.50/£1.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can make finance accessible to fair trade
businesses; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1 to the good cause.
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
Water quality and environment (if selected)
For profit Imagine you are working for a company providing water services to a variety of
other organizations on the market. The company only cares about generating revenue by
expanding market access.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate revenue for the company by
expanding market access; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff of £1.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can reduce the carbon emissions resulting
from product packaging and delivery; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1
to the good cause.
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
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Non profit Imagine you are working for a company providing environmentally sustainable water
services to a variety of other organizations. The company only cares about having an
environmentally friendly product, with minimal carbon emissions and fully recyclable
packaging.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate revenue for the company by
expanding market access; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff of £0.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can reduce the carbon emissions resulting
from product packaging and delivery; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1
to the good cause.
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
Social enterprise Imagine you are working for a company providing environmentally sustainable
water services to a variety of other organizations on the market. It is in the best interests of the
organization that both ensuring that production and delivery are done with minimal
environmental impact and increasing revenues by expanding market access receive
attention.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 25 you can generate revenue for the company by
expanding market access; each slider you position at 25 will give you a payoff of £0/£0.25/
£0.50/£1.
• By placing the slider exactly at position 75 you can reduce the carbon emissions resulting
from product packaging and delivery; each slider you position at 75 will give a payoff of £1
to the good cause.
Please place the 15 sliders below as you see fit.
This is the end of Part 2. Please proceed to the next screen.
Part 3 – Preferred contract
You will now perform the slider task once more. However, this time you can choose your preferred
contract from the ones in Part 2. Please proceed to the next screen.
Workforce reintegration (if selected)
Which contract would you like to perform the slider task in?
• The company provides garbage collection services on the market and cares only about gen-
erating revenue. Placing the slider at exactly 25 produces an own payoff of £1. Placing the
slider at exactly 75 produces a payoff of £1 for the good cause.
• The company reintegrates the unemployed into the workforce by hiring them to provide
garbage collection services and cares only about the professional development of its employ-
ees. Placing the slider at exactly 25 produces an own payoff of £0. Placing the slider at
exactly 75 produces a payoff of £1 for the good cause.
• The company reintegrates unemployed people into the workforce by hiring them to provide
garbage collection services that are sold on the market. It is in the best interests of the
organization that both generating revenue and aiding the professional development of its
employees receive attention. Placing the slider at exactly 25 produces an own payoff of
£0/£0.25/£0.50/£1. Placing the slider at exactly 75 produces a payoff of £1 for the good
cause.
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Fair and equitable trade (if selected)
Which contract would you like to perform the slider task in?
• The company invests in the most promising new businesses and cares only about generating
returns for investors. Placing the slider at exactly 25 produces an own payoff of £1. Placing
the slider at exactly 75 produces a payoff of £1 for the good cause.
• The company provides access to finance for fair trade businesses in developing countries and
cares only about poverty alleviation. Placing the slider at exactly 25 produces an own payoff
of £0. Placing the slider at exactly 75 produces a payoff of £1 for the good cause.
• The company provides access to finance for fair trade businesses in developing countries with
a positive rate of return on investments. It is in the best interests of the company that both
generating positive returns and poverty alleviation receive attention. Placing the slider at
exactly 25 produces an own payoff of £0/£0.25/£0.50/£1. Placing the slider at exactly 75
produces a payoff of £1 for the good cause.
Water quality and environment (if selected)
Which contract would you like to perform the slider task in?
• The company provides water services to other organizations on the market and cares only
about generating revenue. Placing the slider at exactly 25 produces an own payoff of £1.
Placing the slider at exactly 75 produces a payoff of £1 for the good cause.
• The company provides water services to other organizations and cares only about environ-
mental sustainability. Placing the slider at exactly 25 produces an own payoff of £0. Placing
the slider at exactly 75 produces a payoff of £1 for the good cause.
• The company provides water services to other organizations on the market. It is in the best
interest of the organization that both generating revenue and environmental sustainability re-
ceive attention. Placing the slider at exactly 25 produces an own payoff of £0/£0.25/£0.50/
£1. Placing the slider at exactly 75 produces a payoff of £1 for the good cause.
[Subjects then perform slider task in chosen contract.]
This is the end of Part 3. Please proceed to the next screen.
Part 4 – Questionnaire
Before you complete the experiment, please answer the following questions.
What is your gender?
• Male
• Female
What is your age?
• Under 25
• 25-34
• 35-44
• 45-54
• 55 or older
What is the highest level of schooling you have completed?
• High school diploma
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• Bachelor degree
• Master degree
• Other
Are you currently as student?
• Yes
• No
What is your educational background?
• Economics and business
• Arts, architecture, and design
• Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
• Law, social sciences, and humanities
• Medicine, health, and care
• Other
What was your gross income (across all sources of income) in 2018? We understand this information
is sensitive. Therefore, if you want, you can keep it private. However, this information may help
us understand differences in economic decision-making.
• Less than £10,000
• Between £10,000 and £25,000
• Between £25,000 and £50,000
• Between £50,000 and £75,000
• More than £75,000
• I prefer not to answer this question
For this question, you will be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant. This
question allows you to earn some money. You are endowed with £10 and have to decide
how much of the £10 you would like to share with the other participant. Please enter the amount
you would like to give to the other participant below (you will keep the remainder of the £10 for
yourself). Values between 0 and 10 are allowed, up to two decimals (e.g. 9.99 or 0.01). If selected
for payment, you will receive the amount you chose to keep and the randomly selected
participant will receive the amount you chose to give. At the same time, you will also
be randomly paired with another participant deciding how to share £10 with you. If
selected for payment, you will also receive this amount. Note that the person you
give to and the person that gives to you will not be the same person. [Altruism]
• ...
Imagine a similar situation to the one just described (i.e. sharing £10), with three differences.
First, in this case, you are the recipient. Second, you can choose to refuse the amount received if
you consider it inappropriate. However, if you refuse the amount, neither you or the other person
would receive any payoff. Note that this question will not earn you money. What would
be the minimum amount offered that you would accept? Values between 0 and 10 are allowed, up
to two decimals (e.g. 9.99 or 0.01). [Inequality aversion]
• ...
For each of the statements below, please select the option that best describes you. The options
are: strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, and strongly
agree. [Compassion]
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• I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. (reverse coded)
• Most social programs are too vital to do without.
• It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress.
• To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others.
• I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don’t know personally. (reverse coded)
• I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another.
• There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support. (reverse coded)
• I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help
themselves. (reverse coded)
• Please click on ‘Somewhat disagree’ [attention check]
Imagine you won £1,000 in a lottery. Considering your current situation, how much would you
donate to a good cause? Values between 0 and 1,000 are allowed, up to two decimals (e.g. 999.99
or 0.01). [Hypothetical altruism]
• ...
How do you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return when
it comes to a good cause? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely
unwilling to share” and 10 means you are “very willing to share”. You can use values in between
to indicate where you fall on the scale. [Willingness to share]
• ...
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely unwilling to take risks” and
10 means you are “fully prepared to take risks”. You can use values in between to indicate where
you fall on the scale. [Risk preferences]
• ...
How willing are you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more
from that in the future? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely
unwilling to give up something today” and 10 means you are “fully prepared to give up something
today”. You can use values in between to indicate where you fall on the scale.[Time preferences]
• ...
How would you label an organization with both economic and social value creation goals?
• ...
How would you perceive a social enterprise that introduces performance bonuses?
• ...
What was the own payoff per slider offered by the social enterprise contract?
• £0/£0.25/£0.50/£1 [manipulation check]
In the past, have you:
• Been employed by a non-profit? Yes/no
• Been employed by a social enterprise? Yes/no
How often do you:
• Volunteer? Rarely/often
• Donate to social organizations? Rarely/often
• Work professionally with social organizations? Rarely/often [Prosocial behavior ]
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C.2 Experimental Checks
Sample and summary statistics This appendix presents a set of basic checks on the data
generated through our experiment, whose design we summarize in Table 4.1. We impose several
restrictions on our main sample in order to ensure the highest quality of data. First, we consider
sliders placed at 23-27 and 73-77 as correct, indicating a clear intention to exert commercial or
social effort; we then require that subjects have placed at most 10 of the 60 sliders they perform
overall outside of these ranges. Second, we require subjects to pass at least one of the attention
and manipulation checks. Third, we require our gender variables and the one offered by Prolific
to be in agreement. Fourth, we require subjects not to complete the experiment in less than 10
minutes or more than 40 minutes (potential signals of lack of attention). These criteria leave us
with a sample of 708 subjects, although Appendix Table C.4.1 shows our findings are robust to
tightening or relaxing these restrictions. Table C.2.1 provides summary statistics for our sample.
Half of the participants are women, 16.5% are students, 40% have a bachelor degree, and 13% have
a master degree. Respondents span the income and age ranges, although a large share are below
age 44 and below £50,000 annual income. Average Compassion is 29 out of 40 and subjects share
on average £4.2 in the dictator game (with a large fraction sharing exactly £5). Subjects report
being willing to share without expecting anything in return (mean 6.4 on a 0-10 scale), and 24.4%
and 10.5% report previous non-profit or social enterprise employment. Table C.2.2 also shows that
most social preference measures are positively correlated. Subjects are moderately willing to take
risks (mean 5.1 on a 0-10 scale), but are willing to give something up today in order to benefit in
the future (mean 6.5 on a 0-10 scale). Finally, subjects completed the experiment in around 18.5
minutes on average, although substantial variation exists.
Good cause (mission) choice To ensure the saliency of the social task, we allowed subjects
to choose their preferred good cause from the options: workforce reintegration, fair and equitable
trade, and water quality and environment. This choice of good cause informs the company de-
scriptions (mission) that subjects face. Subjects’ choices are shown in Table C.2.3, by treatment.
Table C.2.4 performs a multinomial logit estimation of the choice of mission on demographics,
social preferences, and dummies for the treatment subjects were allocated to (i.e., £0.25, £0.50,
and £1 incentive levels, against a £0 baseline). The results suggest that social preferences and
demographics are largely uncorrelated with the choice of good cause. Subjects in the £0.25 and
£0.50 treatments were less likely to select a workforce reintegration or fair trade mission, preferring
an environmental mission instead, and the treatment dummies are jointly significant (p = 0.023).
However, a χ2 test cannot reject the independence of mission and treatment (p = 0.111). The lat-
ter is consistent with the structure of the experiment, as subjects were not aware of the treatment
they were randomly allocated to (i.e., the SE bonus) when they chose the good cause. To alle-
viate any concerns regarding the endogenous nature of the mission choice, our robustness checks
using regression analyses include mission choice dummies, essentially comparing within groups of
individuals choosing the same good cause. Furthermore, our results are similar across these three
mission choices, see Appendix C.7.
Randomization check We assess whether our randomization procedure has been successful
by estimating a set of regressions of various demographics and social preferences on treatment
dummies in Table C.2.5. The £0.25 treatment has a slightly larger share of individuals with
income between £25,000 and £50,000, and subjects took longer to practice the slider task in the
£0.50 and £1 treatments. These significant coefficients are within the bounds of the number of
significant effects appearing by chance, and become insignificant with multiple hypothesis testing
adjustments (Romano and Wolf, 2005; List et al., 2018). For other demographics and social
preferences the dummies are jointly insignificant (all p > 0.25), and produce a poor fit of the data
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(all R2 < 0.01). This is true not only for the main analysis sample (N = 708), but also for all
available observations (N = 796). Overall, our randomization has been successful.
Table C.2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. dev. N Min Max
A. Demographics
Female 0.499 (0.500) 708 0 1
Student 0.165 (0.372) 708 0 1
Education: High school 0.359
Bachelor degree 0.398
Master degree 0.127
Income: < £10,000 0.215
£10,000 – £25,000 0.329
£25,000 – £50,000 0.307
£50,000 – £75,000 0.077
> £75,000 0.025
Age: 18 – 24 0.216
25 – 34 0.356
35 – 44 0.226
45 – 54 0.140
55 – 64 0.062
B. Social preferences
Compassion 29.195 (4.969) 708 12 40
Altruism 4.207 (2.181) 708 0 10
Inequality aversion 2.698 (2.275) 708 0 10
Hypothetical altruism 134.859 (159.739) 708 0 1,000
Willingness to share 6.404 (2.354) 708 0 10
Non-profit employment 0.244 (0.430) 708 0 1
Social enterprise employment 0.105 (0.306) 708 0 1
Volunteer 0.226 (0.419) 708 0 1
Donate 0.520 (0.500) 708 0 1
Work with social organization 0.160 (0.366) 708 0 1
Prosocial behavior 1.254 (1.159) 708 0 5
Social motivation (factor) 0.000 (0.757) 708 -2.450 2.307
Compassion (standardized) 0.000 (1.000) 708 -3.460 2.174
Risk taking 5.130 (2.474) 708 0 10
Time discounting 6.532 (2.193) 708 0 10
C. Experimental parameters
Practice time 40.049 (31.011) 708 0.000 608.147
Comprehension check time 67.419 (37.004) 708 18.617 300.324
Questions time 28.359 (23.547) 708 8.341 280.372
Experiment time 1,111 (351.909) 708 600 2,399
Own payoff (£) 28.894 (12.342) 40 3 60
Good cause payoff (£) 33.025 (12.305) 40 6 60
Times given in seconds. Education and income coded as ‘other’ for 11.58% and 4.66% of subjects.
C.2. EXPERIMENTAL CHECKS 209
Ta
bl
e
C
.2
.2
:
C
or
re
la
ti
on
Ta
bl
e:
So
ci
al
P
re
fe
re
nc
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(1
)
C
om
pa
ss
io
n
1.
00
00
(2
)
A
ltr
ui
sm
0.
13
62
1.
00
00
(3
)
In
eq
ua
lit
y
av
er
sio
n
-0
.1
35
3
0.
07
46
1.
00
00
(4
)
H
yp
ot
he
tic
al
al
tr
ui
sm
0.
20
20
0.
26
50
0.
03
12
1.
00
00
(5
)
W
ill
in
gn
es
s
to
sh
ar
e
0.
39
94
0.
17
29
0.
00
50
0.
34
15
1.
00
00
(6
)
Pr
os
oc
ia
lb
eh
av
io
r
0.
23
37
0.
14
13
-0
.0
02
1
0.
25
70
0.
30
49
1.
00
00
(7
)
R
isk
ta
ki
ng
0.
02
15
0.
05
15
0.
03
28
0.
08
80
0.
14
84
0.
11
08
1.
00
00
(8
)
T
im
e
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s
0.
11
90
0.
05
19
-0
.0
86
7
0.
15
30
0.
32
15
0.
14
03
0.
18
33
1.
00
00
Pa
irw
ise
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
be
tw
ee
n
so
ci
al
pr
ef
er
en
ce
m
ea
su
re
s.
C
om
pa
ss
io
n
is
m
ea
su
re
d
th
ro
ug
h
th
e
co
m
pa
ss
io
n
su
bs
ca
le
of
th
e
pu
bl
ic
se
rv
ic
e
m
ot
iv
at
io
n
sc
al
e,
al
tr
ui
sm
is
m
ea
su
re
d
th
ro
ug
h
a
di
ct
at
or
ga
m
e,
in
eq
ua
lit
y
av
er
sio
n
is
m
ea
su
re
d
th
ro
ug
h
an
ul
tim
at
um
ga
m
e,
hy
po
th
et
ic
al
al
tr
ui
sm
is
m
ea
su
re
d
as
th
e
do
na
tio
n
in
a
hy
po
th
et
ic
al
lo
tt
er
y,
w
ill
in
gn
es
s
to
sh
ar
e
is
m
ea
su
re
d
as
su
bj
ec
ts
’w
ill
in
gn
es
s
to
sh
ar
e
w
ith
ot
he
r
w
ith
ou
t
ex
pe
ct
in
g
an
yt
hi
ng
in
re
tu
rn
,a
nd
pr
os
oc
ia
l
be
ha
vi
or
is
m
ea
su
re
d
by
co
m
bi
ni
ng
qu
es
tio
ns
on
i)
pa
st
no
n-
pr
ofi
te
m
pl
oy
m
en
t,
ii)
pa
st
so
ci
al
en
te
rp
ris
e
em
pl
oy
m
en
t,
iii
)v
ol
un
te
er
in
g,
iv
)d
on
at
io
ns
,o
rv
)p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
lr
el
at
io
ns
w
ith
so
ci
al
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
.R
isk
ta
ki
ng
an
d
tim
e
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s
ar
e
as
se
ss
ed
w
ith
se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n
qu
es
tio
ns
on
w
ill
in
gn
es
s
to
ta
ke
ris
ks
an
d
w
ill
in
gn
es
s
to
gi
ve
so
m
et
hi
ng
up
to
da
y
fo
r
a
re
wa
rd
to
m
or
ro
w
.
A
ll
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
la
rg
er
th
an
0.
07
(in
ab
so
lu
te
te
rm
s)
ar
e
sig
ni
fic
an
t
at
5%
.
Ta
bl
e
C
.2
.3
:
C
ho
ic
e
of
G
oo
d
C
au
se
W
or
kf
or
ce
Fa
ir
an
d
W
at
er
qu
al
ity
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
re
in
te
gr
at
io
n
eq
ui
ta
bl
e
tr
ad
e
an
d
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
N
£
0
50
36
84
17
0
£
0.
25
41
24
11
3
17
8
£
0.
50
39
36
11
0
18
5
£
1
47
36
92
17
5
To
ta
l
17
7
13
2
39
9
70
8
N
um
be
r
of
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
in
ea
ch
tr
ea
tm
en
t
th
at
se
le
ct
ed
th
e
gi
ve
n
go
od
ca
us
e.
210 APPENDIX C.
Table C.2.4: Choice of Good Cause: Multinomial Logit
Workforce reintegration Fair and equitable trade
Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.)
Compassion *0.053* (0.023) 0.040 (0.024)
Altruism -0.037 (0.047) -0.046 (0.050)
Inequality aversion -0.010 (0.044) **0.102** (0.046)
Hypothetical altruism 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Willingness to share -0.056 (0.053) -0.036 (0.054)
Prosocial behavior 0.071 (0.089) 0.054 (0.099)
Risk taking 0.029 (0.040) 0.034 (0.044)
Time preferences 0.027 (0.047) 0.073 (0.052)
Treatment = £0.25 **-0.628** (0.269) ***-0.830*** (0.315)
Treatment = £0.50 **-0.627** (0.274) -0.391 (0.292)
Treatment = £1 -0.180 (0.268) -0.110 (0.295)
Female 0.311 (0.206) -0.031 (0.227)
Student **-0.843** (0.363) -0.220 (0.340)
High school diploma 0.249 (0.322) -0.004 (0.348)
Bachelor degree -0.494 (0.329) -0.426 (0.356)
Master degree -0.243 (0.396) -0.238 (0.439)
< £10,000 *1.108* (0.566) 0.847 (0.566)
£10,000 – £25,000 0.956 (0.543) 0.725 (0.546)
£25,000 – £50,000 0.930 (0.551) 0.579 (0.560)
£50,000 – £75,000 0.907 (0.617) -0.043 (0.695)
> £75,000 0.740 (0.773) -0.226 (0.947)
Age 25-34 -0.302 (0.323) **-0.771** (0.340)
Age 35-44 -0.114 (0.350) -0.129 (0.359)
Age 45-54 0.413 (0.376) 0.067 (0.404)
Age > 55 -0.094 (0.465) *-1.015* (0.595)
Constant ***-2.523*** (1.035) ***-2.599*** (1.003)
N 708
LR χ2 (p-value) 85.25 (0.018)
Pseudo-R2 0.061
Social preferences: χ2 (p-value) 17.18 (0.374)
Treatment levels: χ2 (p-value) 11.34 (0.023)
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. The baseline mission
is the water quality and environment mission. For categorical variables the baselines are
high school education, income < £10,000, age 18-25, and the £0 treatment. We do not
report dummies for field of education for brevity, though none are significant. Although
the mission was chosen in advance of subjects being aware of the bonus offered by the
social enterprise contract (the treatment), a simple χ2 test rejects the independence of
mission and treatment with p = 0.111.
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Table C.2.5: Randomization Check
Treatment
Characteristic (1) £0.25 (2) £0.50 (3) £1 (4) p-value (5) N (6) R2
Compassion -0.309 0.061 -0.508 0.663 708 0.002
(0.524) (0.538) (0.506)
Altruism 0.027 -0.102 -0.007 0.946 708 0.001
(0.248) (0.241) (0.237)
Inequality aversion 0.007 0.000 -0.155 0.861 708 0.001
(0.251) (0.254) (0.236)
Hypothetical altruism 18.673 24.416 17.190 0.496 708 0.003
(17.460) (16.812) (15.998)
Willingness to share -0.243 0.033 -0.272 0.476 708 0.003
(0.262) (0.257) (0.247)
Prosocial behavior -0.155 0.033 -0.066 0.587 708 0.002
(0.124) (0.136) (0.126)
Social motivation -0.055 0.029 -0.055 0.658 708 0.002
(factor) (0.082) (0.084) (0.077)
Risk taking 0.158 -0.009 -0.077 0.815 708 0.001
(0.265) (0.275) (0.267)
Time preferences 0.378 0.226 0.127 0.427 708 0.004
(0.234) (0.233) (0.225)
Age 0.073 -0.008 -0.163 0.269 708 0.005
(0.124) (0.123) (0.124)
Female -0.011 -0.008 0.014 0.965 708 0.000
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
Student -0.007 0.003 0.030 0.818 708 0.001
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041)
Bachelor degree -0.052 -0.001 -0.023 0.717 708 0.002
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053)
Master degree 0.028 0.007 0.002 0.862 708 0.001
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Low income -0.048 -0.030 -0.028 0.843 708 0.001
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Medium income 0.084* 0.077 0.050 0.291 708 0.005
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
High income 0.030 0.020 0.032 0.726 708 0.002
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Practice time 2.677 5.863*** 6.629* 0.028 708 0.007
(2.408) (2.097) (3.881)
Comprehension time -4.894 -1.919 -5.440 0.499 708 0.004
(4.136) (4.293) (4.110)
Questions time 2.530 -0.294 1.246 0.675 708 0.002
(2.767) (2.041) (2.532)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each row presents results
from a separate model, regressing the given trait on treatment dummies, with joint significance test
p-values. The omitted education categories are high school and ‘other’; the omitted income category
comprises those who prefer not to answer. Estimating a series of seemingly unrelated regressions
produces similar results. Multiple hypothesis testing adjustments eliminate the significant coefficients.
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C.3 Power Calculations
To ensure we are able to detect meaningful changes in social task effort, we performed a series of ex
ante power calculations. In other words, given the sample sizes we target, the expected means and
standard deviations, and the required significance level, what is the statistical power to detect a
given effect? Conversely, what is the smallest effect we can detect while still maintaining statistical
power above the conventional 80%? The purpose of this section, therefore, is to ensure that our
experiment is able to maximize power and minimize the effect sizes it can detect.
Following List et al. (2011), for independent groups with means µa and µb, standard deviations
σa = σb = σ, sample sizes Na and Nb, significance level α, and detectable effect size δ, statistical
power 1− β for a two-sided test is calculated to satisfy:
δ = (tα/2 + tβ)
√
σ2a
Na
+ σ
2
b
Nb
(C.3.1)
Equation C.3.1 shows that the effect size δ we can detect increases with the required significance
level (i.e. we can detect larger effects at 5% than at 1% significance) and the standard deviations of
the outcomes (i.e. the less noisy our estimates, the smaller the effect we can detect), but decreases
with sample size (i.e. the more observations, the smaller the effect we can detect). The formula
also shows that δ and tβ (and, as a result, 1−β) are positively correlated, which implies that small
effect sizes can only be detected when there is more statistical power. While statistical power rises
with sample size, budget constraints limit this avenue, highlighting the trade-off between power
and effect size. The results below provide a set of assumptions regarding sample sizes, means,
standard deviations, and significance, in order to assess the relationship between effect size and
power in our experiment.
In Panel A of Table C.3.1, we consider comparisons of SE social effort across treatments, with
sample size 200 per group, fixing one sample mean to 7.5 as our expectation of a fully balanced
effort allocation, and varying the other to achieve various δ levels and standardized effect sizes
0.2 < δ/σ < 1.4 Based on a pilot experiment, we set σ ∈ {1, 1.5, 2, 2.5}. Results in column (8)
suggest that we have substantial power (below the conventional 80% only in the most conservative
settings) to detect small effect sizes in two-sided tests. For similar comparisons across treatments
when sorting is permitted, we expect social enterprise sample sizes around 120-150, such that
power is close to that in Panel A.
In Panels B and C, we consider comparisons between the largest group (SE) and smallest group
(FP/NP) within the £0.50 and £1 treatments, as suggested by the pilot experiment.5 The larger
sample size we expect for the social enterprise group is in line with the higher expected variance in
this group (List et al., 2011), although the ratio of variances is perhaps smaller. Small variations
in sample size or variance (between groups) do not affect the main conclusions, namely that unless
standard deviations are very large (σ > 1.5), our tests significantly detect a 1-unit change in effort
allocation with power 1− β > 80%.
For completeness, in column (10) we show the minimum effect size δmin for a given standard
deviation in two-sided tests with 80% power. In these two-sided tests, we are virtually always
able to detect changes of δ/σ ≥ 0.6. Note that so far we have used two-sided tests in our power
calculations in order to be conservative. As our hypotheses are mostly one-sided, we calculate
power for such tests in column (9): as expected, these tests are even more powerful.
4 There is no ex ante reason to expect different variance in social enterprise social effort across treatments when
sorting is not allowed; therefore, we opted for equal samples across treatments (List et al., 2011). F -tests of equal
variance based on the means and standard deviations of social effort reported in Table 4.2 show that, ex post, the
assumption of equal variance is valid (p > 0.1 in all comparisons).
5 The FP and NP groups are smaller, but their mean difference is expected to be large, so power is retained.
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Figure C.3.1: Power levels for two-sided mean comparisons between- and within-individuals
(α = 0.05, σa = σb = σ = 2, δ = 1 or 0.5, δ/σ = 0.5 or 0.25, H0: µa = µb, Ha: µa 6= µb).
Some of the comparisons we perform (for example, between SE and NP without sorting) rep-
resent dependent samples; in the case of such within-subject comparisons, power is expected to
be at least as high (List et al., 2011). We confirm this result in Figure C.3.1, where we calculate
the power achieved for between- and within- comparisons for σ = 2 and δ = 1 (i.e, δ/σ = 0.5)
and, even more conservatively, δ = 0.5 (i.e, δ/σ = 0.25), following the simulation-based approach
proposed by Bellemare et al. (2016). While we fail to achieve enough power to detect δ/σ = 0.25,
we obtain 1− β > 80% for δ/σ = 0.5 whenever our groups have at least 80 subjects each.
Figure C.3.2 confirms the power calculations in Table C.3.1, showing the required sample size
for detecting a given effect size δ with 80% power, when σ ∈ {1, 1.5, 2, 2.5}. Only in the most
conservative settings (with high variance and small effect sizes) do we require samples larger than
the ones we obtain; we are almost always able to detect 1-unit changes in effort.
Finally, since we are interested in testing a number of hypotheses, we must adjust ex ante for
multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2018). As a conservative approach, we use a Bonferroni
correction, requiring α = 0.05/k, where k is the number of hypotheses. For instance, assuming
k = 5, then the necessary significance level becomes α = 0.01. In this case, the minimum effect
sizes relative to the standard deviation, δmin/σ, we are able to detect with 80% power are 0.342,
0.639, and 0.751 in panels A, B, and, respectively, C. Figure C.3.3 shows the required sample sizes
for 80% power two-sided tests with significance α = 0.01: our sample sizes are once again able to
detect 1-unit changes in effort under all but the most conservative settings.
The conclusion of this section is that across a range of assumptions regarding sample sizes,
means, standard deviation, and significance, our experiment is able to detect small changes in
social effort – i.e. of at least half a standard deviations – even under the most conservative
specifications. Ex post, it is important to note that while the standard errors resulting from our
experiment were higher than the ones we used for power calculations, the materialized differences
were also larger, such that power was maintained throughout.6
6 List et al. (2011) warn against performing power calculations with the actual data from the experiment, which
is why we emphasize the ex ante calculations.
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Figure C.3.2: Required sample size for detecting effect size δ with 80% power in two-sided mean
comparison (1− β = 0.8, α = 0.05, σa = σb = σ,H0: µa = µb, Ha: µa 6= µb).
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Figure C.3.3: Required sample size for detecting effect size δ with 80% power in two-sided mean
comparison (1− β = 0.8, α = 0.01, σa = σb = σ,H0: µa = µb, Ha: µa 6= µb).
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Table C.3.1: Power Calculations
2-sided 1-sided
Na Nb µa µb σ δ/σ α 1− β 1− β δ80%min
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A. 200 200 7.5 8 2.5 0.20 0.05 0.514 0.638 0.700
Without 200 200 7.5 8.5 2.5 0.40 0.05 0.979 0.991
sorting 200 200 7.5 9 2.5 0.60 0.05 1.000 1.000
200 200 7.5 8 2 0.25 0.05 0.703 0.803 0.560
200 200 7.5 8.5 2 0.50 0.05 0.999 1.000
200 200 7.5 9 2 0.75 0.05 1.000 1.000
200 200 7.5 8 1.5 0.33 0.05 0.914 0.954 0.420
200 200 7.5 8.5 1.5 0.66 0.05 1.000 1.000
200 200 7.5 9 1.5 1.00 0.05 1.000 1.000
200 200 7.5 7.75 1 0.25 0.05 0.703 0.803 0.280
200 200 7.5 8 1 0.50 0.05 0.999 1.000
200 200 7.5 8.5 1 1.00 0.05 1.000 1.000
B. 100 40 7.5 8 2.5 0.20 0.05 0.186 0.281 1.310
With 100 40 7.5 8.5 2.5 0.40 0.05 0.565 0.685
sorting 100 40 7.5 9 2.5 0.60 0.05 0.890 0.939
(£0.50) 100 40 7.5 8 2 0.25 0.05 0.264 0.376 1.048
100 40 7.5 8.5 2 0.50 0.05 0.756 0.845
100 40 7.5 9 2 0.75 0.05 0.978 0.991
100 40 7.5 8 1.5 0.33 0.05 0.425 0.551 0.786
100 40 7.5 8.5 1.5 0.66 0.05 0.943 0.971
100 40 7.5 9 1.5 1.00 0.05 0.999 1.000
100 40 7.5 7.75 1 0.25 0.05 0.264 0.376 0.524
100 40 7.5 8 1 0.50 0.05 0.756 0.845
100 40 7.5 8.5 1 1.00 0.05 0.999 1.000
C. 120 25 7.5 8 2.5 0.20 0.05 0.148 0.230 1.540
With 120 25 7.5 8.5 2.5 0.40 0.05 0.439 0.566
sorting 120 25 7.5 9 2.5 0.60 0.05 0.774 0.858
(£1) 120 25 7.5 8 2 0.25 0.05 0.204 0.304 1.232
120 25 7.5 8.5 2 0.50 0.05 0.618 0.732
120 25 7.5 9 2 0.75 0.05 0.923 0.960
120 25 7.5 8 1.5 0.33 0.05 0.325 0.446 0.924
120 25 7.5 8.5 1.5 0.66 0.05 0.854 0.915
120 25 7.5 9 1.5 1.00 0.05 0.995 0.998
120 25 7.5 7.75 1 0.25 0.05 0.204 0.304 0.616
120 25 7.5 8 1 0.50 0.05 0.618 0.732
120 25 7.5 8.5 1 1.00 0.05 0.995 0.998
Power calculations for mean comparisons. In panel A, the comparison is for any pair of treat-
ments, with equal variance and sample size; in panels B and C, we consider comparisons between
the expected largest and smallest groups within each treatment. With 80% power, the equiva-
lent standardized minimum effect sizes δ/σ in column (10) are 0.280, 0.524, and 0.616 in panels
A, B, and, respectively, C.
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C.4 Robustness Check: Different Samples
Attention and manipulation checks To examine the extent to which subjects pay attention
to the experiment, we included an attention check in our compassion subscale, asking subjects
to select a particular item (i.e., ‘Somewhat disagree’). In addition, we included a manipulation
check, asking subjects to recall the bonus offered by the social enterprise contract. 95.35% of
the 796 subjects passed the attention check by clicking on the required option, but only 55.90%
passed the manipulation check, correctly recalling the SE bonus. Rather than being due to poor
understanding, the latter may be due to subjects not correctly assigning the social enterprise
nomenclature to a particular contract, as the contracts subjects encountered in Parts 2 and 3 only
included the company description and not a particular label. In other words, while the SE was
described as a company for which both commercial and social tasks are important, the ‘social
enterprise’ label was never used. The unfortunate choice of wording in the manipulation check
may have thus created confusion and led to wrong answers. This question was also among the last
asked, such that fatigue could have set in. Passing or failing the attention check is independent
of treatment, such that attrition for this reason is random (and generally, those who pass either
check are not different from those who fail on meaningful dimensions). Nonetheless, we exclude
the 2.01% of subjects who failed both of these checks, although we have verified that including
these subjects in our analyses does not affect our results. Table C.4.1 shows SE social effort for
different samples, relaxing and tightening restrictions around i) slider placement, ii) attention and
manipulation checks, iii) gender, and iv) time taken to complete the experiment.7 Results are very
similar across panels, including those where we require subjects to pass the attention check (Panels
C and D), to pass at least one of the two checks (Panels A and E), and where we do not impose a
restriction around attention and manipulation checks (Panels B, F, and G).
Definition of gender To stratify our randomization by gender, we used the pre-screening feature
on the Prolific platform. This feature uses questions the platform previously asked its participants
with regards to gender, allowing us to target our experiment at different subgroups. More specifi-
cally, we ran two identical experiments, restricting potential subjects to men in one and women in
the other. To ensure subjects are not aware of this aspect of our experimental design and as a data
quality check, we also ask subjects for their gender in Part 4. The pre-existing platform variable
is consistent with the questionnaire answer, with an agreement rate of 99.26%. Throughout the
analysis, we restrict the sample to observations where the two gender variables agree. Our results
are robust to relaxing this restriction, as can be seen in Table C.4.1 by comparing Panels A, C,
and E on the one hand, and Panels B, D, F, and G on the other.
Slider task placement In the experiment, we required subjects to position sliders exactly at
25 and 75 in order to produce a unit of real effort.8 Indeed, 95.04% of the total 47,760 sliders were
7 χ2-tests cannot reject that subjects are uniformly distributed across treatments (p > 0.75 in all samples).
8 The original task in Gill and Prowse (2012) is designed to measure total effort and consists of 48 sliders to be
placed at exactly 50 in the space of two minutes. We use 15 slider per contract to reduce the likelihood of subjects
becoming bored with the task. In addition, our use of positions 25 and 75 as focal points is purely a matter of
labeling, which we make clear to our subjects. A pilot experiment confirmed that these labels did not affect the
decisions made by subjects and that the task is neither trivial, as it is not immediately obvious where precisely
positions 25 and 75 are found, nor prohibitively difficult. As the effort required to move the slider in each direction is
identical, differences in individuals’ cost of taking the commercial or social action are only driven by social motivation
differences. Alternatively, subjects could have moved the slider to their preferred distribution between commercial
and social effort on a 0-100 scale; however, this effort allocation measure is similar to the dictator game we employ to
measure altruism. We believe that allowing individuals to allocate effort in a binary manner across 15 sliders carries
less risk of introducing a purely mechanical relationship between social preferences and effort allocations, avoiding
common method bias. Furthermore, we use 15 sliders – rather than the 10 we used in the pilot experiment – in
order to limit any scale similarity between the slider task and the dictator game.
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positioned correctly, and this does not differ by company type. However, despite an intention to
exert commercial or social effort, there may be minor errors in positioning the slider. For instance,
the slider could be positioned at 23, 24, 26, 27, 73, 74, 75, or 76, and these represent 0.86% of
sliders. In our main results, we count minor deviations as units of effort under the assumption
that they closely match an intention to place the slider precisely, but our results are unchanged
when we only use precisely placed sliders, as Panels A and B of Table C.4.1 show. The remaining
4.1% of sliders are placed at other numbers, and in some observations more than half the sliders
are inadequately placed. These subjects moved sliders more or less randomly and we drop them
from the analysis; their inclusion attenuates our results only slightly, see Panels E, F, and G in
Table C.4.1. Finally, a small number of participants placed sliders exclusively at 0 or 100, which
indicate the direction of effort intended, but are clear deviations, such that they are not included
in our main sample; recoding these observations (as 25 and 75) to count as units of effort leaves
our results virtually identical.
Duration outliers There were several outliers with regards to the duration of the experiment,
i.e. 2.1% of subjects took less than 10 minutes and 1.5% of subjects took more than 40 minutes. For
the former, a short completion time may signal low attention paid to the task, reducing the quality
of the data we obtain. The most likely reasons for the latter are that the session was left running
while the subject was away temporarily or that a connection timed-out temporarily; either way,
subjects may have paid less attention to the study. Our main sample excludes these observations,
but the results are robust to including them, as can be seen in Table C.4.1 by comparing Panels
A, C, and E on the one hand, and Panels B, D, F, and G on the other.
Answer consistency In the sorting condition, subjects choose their preferred contract and
perform the slider task again. Consequently, subjects perform one contract (either FP, NP, or SE)
twice, raising concerns about answer consistency. Reassuringly, the correlations between social
effort levels with and without sorting are 0.681, 0.456, and 0.703 for individuals choosing the FP,
NP, and respectively, SE contract. In addition, consistency in repeated contracts does not vary
with treatment level (χ2 = 0.634, p > 0.5). Figure C.4.1 shows a scatter plot of social effort with
and without sorting for individuals choosing the SE contract, weighted by number of observations.
Most data points lie along the diagonal, suggesting no or minor deviations in repeated contracts.
Overall, concerns about consistency do not threaten the validity of our results.
Pilot experiment Prior to completing the experiment we analyze in this paper, we conducted
a pilot with 183 subjects, designed to guide our experimental design and power calculations. The
main difference between the two lies in the SE contract description. Whereas we now write that “It
is in the best interests of the company that both tasks receive attention”, the pilot informed subjects
that “The company cares equally about both tasks”. We deemed this phrasing to provide too strong
an anchor on a balanced effort allocation (a 50/50 split) and unrealistic to a certain extent. We
preferred to give a more ambiguous description instead, allowing subjects to allocate their effort
according to their perception of company needs. In the pilot, subjects were only required to move
10 sliders per contract, which we changed to 15 sliders per contract in order to remove any perceived
similarity to the £10 dictator game. Moreover, the pilot did not include a £0.25 treatment and
was not stratified by gender. Nonetheless, the pilot results – summarized in Figure C.4.2 – display
a similar pattern as the results we present in Figure 4.1: adverse specialization on the social task
arises in the absence of pay for performance, while bonuses induce a more balanced effort allocation
without reducing social motivation levels, regardless of the incentive steepness (although there is
an elevated risk of mission drift in the £1 treatment).
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Figure C.4.1: Answer consistency across SE contracts with and without sorting, for subjects who
performed the SE contract twice.
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Figure C.4.2: Pilot data social effort in social enterprises by treatment, with 95% confidence
intervals; the dashed line represents a fully balanced effort allocation.
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Table C.4.1: Social Enterprise Social Effort: Other Samples
No sorting Sorting
(1) £0 (2) £0.25 (3) £0.50 (4) £1 (5) £0 (6) £0.25 (7) £0.50 (8) £1
A. NS = 0, F = Fp, 10 ≤ t ≤ 40, pass either check (N = 594, NSE = 291)
Units 11.000 7.099 7.088 7.338 10.350 7.390 7.951 7.504
(3.599) (3.672) (3.762) (3.741) (3.416) (3.140) (3.054) (2.572)
Share 0.733 0.473 0.472 0.489 0.690 0.492 0.530 0.500
(0.239) (0.244) (0.250) (0.249) (0.227) (0.209) (0.203) (0.171)
B. NS = 0 (N = 623, NSE = 307)
Units 10.913 7.238 7.141 7.463 10.302 7.405 7.940 7.459
(3.676) (3.703) (3.776) (3.774) (3.447) (3.025) (3.019) (2.620)
Share 0.727 0.482 0.476 0.497 0.686 0.493 0.529 0.497
(0.245) (0.246) (0.251) (0.251) (0.229) (0.201) (0.201) (0.174)
C. NS ≤ 10, F = Fp, 10 ≤ t ≤ 40, pass attention check (N = 686, NSE = 332)
Units 10.928 7.088 7.165 7.323 10.687 7.362 8.000 7.590
(3.612) (3.760) (3.587) (3.526) (3.421) (3.180) (3.018) (2.557)
Share 0.728 0.474 0.478 0.490 0.712 0.491 0.535 0.506
(0.240) (0.249) (0.239) (0.234) (0.228) (0.210) (0.200) (0.170)
D. IS ≤ 10, pass attention check (N = 717, NSE = 346)
Units 10.948 7.173 7.215 7.325 10.775 7.378 7.989 7.500
(3.649) (3.757) (3.592) (3.633) (3.441) (3.073) (2.987) (2.682)
Share 0.729 0.479 0.481 0.491 0.718 0.492 0.534 0.500
(0.243) (0.249) (0.239) (0.242) (0.229) (0.203) (0.198) (0.178)
E. IS ≤ 30, F = Fp, 10 ≤ t ≤ 40, pass either check (N = 722, NSE = 349)
Units 10.794 7.088 7.112 7.222 10.274 7.426 7.978 7.500
(3.714) (3.743) (3.659) (3.599) (3.800) (3.333) (2.992) (2.632)
Share 0.727 0.480 0.474 0.484 0.706 0.496 0.539 0.503
(0.239) (0.250) (0.243) (0.239) (0.225) (0.222) (0.204) (0.170)
F. IS ≤ 30 (N = 767, NSE = 372)
Units 10.700 7.149 7.158 7.272 10.321 7.566 7.959 7.407
(3.827) (3.775) (3.635) (3.664) (3.785) (3.298) (2.949) (2.735)
Share 0.724 0.488 0.478 0.487 0.709 0.505 0.538 0.497
(0.242) (0.254) (0.242) (0.244) (0.226) (0.219) (0.201) (0.177)
G. Full sample (N = 796, NSE = 388)
Units 10.239 6.984 6.901 7.040 9.419 7.388 7.774 7.208
(4.296) (3.868) (3.790) (3.802) (4.550) (3.457) (3.101) (2.935)
Share 0.717 0.493 0.479 0.489 0.717 0.505 0.547 0.500
(0.252) (0.258) (0.246) (0.245) (0.247) (0.247) (0.209) (0.182)
These sampling criteria, though not comprehensive, cover choices regarding slider placement, duration,
gender, and attention checks. We display social effort as units and shares due to the larger number
of imprecisely placed sliders not counted towards the total in some panels. Standard deviations in
parentheses. N and NSE = total and SE choice sample size, respectively. NS = incorrect sliders,
including imprecise sliders (e.g. 23 is incorrect); IS = incorrect sliders, excluding imprecise sliders (e.g.
23 is correct); F , Fp = gender variables from experiment and Prolific, respectively; t = experiment time.
220 APPENDIX C.
C.5 Robustness Check: Social Preferences
Composite social motivation measure Since social motivation may entail different aspects –
altruism, compassion, reciprocity, etc. –, none of the individual measures of social preferences may
perfectly capture this complex concept. To extract the maximum information from the various
measures we collect, we perform a principal component analysis. We find that our six social
preference variables load onto a single factor with Eigenvalue larger than 1 accounting for 80.78%
of variance, which we label Social motivation (see Table C.5.1). Inequality aversion loads negatively
on this factor and Altruism has a smaller loading than our other measures, suggesting that this
game-theoretic measurement may be an imperfect proxy for social motivation (see also Figure C.5.1
for variable loadings on the first two factors). Due to its broader nature, we use Social motivation
throughout the experiment, together with Compassion. Note that including Risk preferences and
Time preferences, potentially correlated with social preferences, in the principal factor analysis
produce similar results, as does using the individuals variables underlying Prosocial behavior.
Revealed preference social motivation Social task effort in the FP contract without sorting
may also provide a measure of social motivation, because individuals renounce personal pay-offs in
order to exert social task effort. This revealed preference measure is positively correlated with our
other social preference measures, loads positively on the Social motivation factor, and produces
similar results as the other measures (available upon request). However, due to the random order
of Part 2 contracts, the SE bonus is revealed to some subjects before they perform the FP contract;
it could thus be contaminated by the treatment in a way that is correlated with subsequent choices,
such that Compassion and Social motivation provide cleaner measures.
Changes in social motivation In Table 4.3, we provide a series of tests for equality of means,
variances, and distributions in Compassion and Social motivation (plotted in Figure C.5.2). We
also estimate linear regressions of these social preference measures for individuals who select into
social enterprises on the treatment dummies. The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table C.5.2
show some motivation crowd-out in the £1 treatment. To examine distributional changes, we
create dummies for whether individuals are in the bottom or top 25% of individuals in a given
measure, and estimate linear probability models for their presence in social enterprises. In the
£1 treatment, we find an increase (decrease) in the number of individuals at the bottom (top)
of the distribution of Social Motivation. Our measure of compassion registers no distributional
shifts across treatments. Moreover, only the selection of low Social motivation individuals into
social enterprises in the £1 treatment survives multiple hypotheses test adjustments (p = 0.011,
without controls) (List et al., 2018). Another way to analyze such shifts is to perform quantile
regressions of social preference variables on treatment dummies. Table C.5.3 suggests that the
Social motivation of individuals who select into the SE contract is reduced across the distribution
in the £1 treatment, although this is only weakly significant; Compassion is unaffected.
Alternative social motivation measures While incentivized measures are preferable to hy-
pothetical ones, it is important to show how sensitive our results are to using different constructs.
In addition, social preference games in the lab (e.g., dictator) may not accurately capture social
motivation in the field (Levitt and List, 2007; Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez, 2018). We comple-
ment such measures with psychological scales and hypothetical questions to alleviate this external
validity concern (and the main analysis focuses on Compassion and a composite Social motivation
factor). The results using these alternative measures are shown in columns (1)-(5) of Table C.5.4.
Increasing incentives are correlated with lower levels of social preferences in the SE contract, in
particular altruism and willingness to share when the bonus is £1. However, the List et al. (2018)
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Figure C.5.1: Social preference loadings on the first two factors.
multiple hypothesis testing adjustment renders all coefficients statistically insignificant at conven-
tional levels (p > 0.1), suggesting that strong incentives do not attract significantly less motivated
workers. Interestingly, column (2) suggests that incentives’ potential to widen the distribution of
individual payoffs does not deter inequality-averse individuals; workers do not seem to perceive
incentives as ‘unfair’ from a redistribution perspective, or at least do not anticipate this conse-
quence. As columns (6) and (7) suggest, higher SE incentive levels do not attract individuals with
a higher risk propensity or more myopic individuals.9
Social preferences by contract choice One argument for why adverse specialization occurs in
social enterprises relates to the highly socially motivated individuals who join this organizational
form. Regardless of the SE bonus, we expect that other-regarding preferences are lowest for self-
selected FP workers and highest for self-selected NP workers; SE workers are in between, with some
differences across treatments. To see this, Table C.5.5 presents a regression analysis counterpart
to the comparisons in Table 4.3, considering subjects make a single choice between the three
contracts: SE motivation is different from FP motivation but not NP motivation outside of the
£1 treatment. To examine this possibility, we regress our social preference measures on dummies
for Part 3 contract choices, controlling for treatment and choice of good cause (i.e. mission fixed
effects). Table C.5.6 shows that our expectation is met for SE and FP worker comparisons, with
the exception of Inequality aversion, Risk preferences, and Time preferences. It does not appear
that more inequality averse or less risk tolerant individuals join SEs, although SE workers put more
weight on the future relative to FP workers. While FP and NP workers are highly different in their
social preferences, SE and NP workers are remarkably similar, with a statistical difference observed
only for Hypothetical altruism (otherwise p > 0.1). This supports our argument that individuals
selecting into SEs are highly socially motivated, which may result in adverse specialization when
pay for performance is not used.
9 We have also checked that stronger incentives do not attract individuals with higher education, or with higher
or lower income levels. They appear to attract individuals who took longer to complete the comprehension check,
but multiple hypothesis testing adjustments eliminate the significant coefficients.
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Figure C.5.2: Distribution of Compassion and Social motivation, by treatment and contract
choice.
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Table C.5.1: Composite Social Preferences: Factor Loadings
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
Compassion 0.5407 -0.0814 0.7010
Altruism 0.2691 0.2881 0.8446
Inequality aversion -0.0960 0.2748 0.9153
Hypothetical altruism 0.4501 0.2778 0.7203
Willingness to share 0.6016 0.1061 0.6268
Prosocial behavior 0.4358 0.1217 0.7953
Eigenvalue 1.1953 0.2015
Variance explained 80.78% 19.22%
Label Social motivation
Factor loadings for principal component analysis with an orthogonal varimax rotation;
results are similar with oblique (non-orthogonal) rotations. As a social context may
interact with risk and time preferences, we have also checked that including these
variables in our measure of motivation does not impact the results. Reassuringly, the
results are qualitatively similar. Risk and time preferences load more on Factor 2, so
the Factor 1 has a slightly smaller, yet still dominant, explanatory power. Results are
also similar when we include the revealed social preferences from the FP contract or
use the 5 items that comprise Prosocial behavior individually.
Table C.5.2: Social Preferences, Conditional on Social Enterprise Sorting
Mean Bottom 25% Top 25%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Compassion
£0.25 -0.122 -0.074 0.022 -0.005 -0.005 0.007
(0.162) (0.170) (0.067) (0.068) (0.082) (0.085)
£0.50 -0.064 0.030 0.027 0.001 0.064 0.106
(0.158) (0.153) (0.064) (0.062) (0.080) (0.080)
£1 -0.304** -0.184 0.113* 0.087 -0.001 0.044
(0.148) (0.155) (0.064) (0.065) (0.075) (0.078)
R2 0.016 0.143 0.013 0.112 0.004 0.110
B. Social motivation
£0.25 -0.097 -0.073 0.144** 0.138** -0.059 -0.039
(0.123) (0.123) (0.059) (0.062) (0.089) (0.089)
£0.50 -0.070 -0.025 0.098* 0.095* -0.047 -0.012
(0.119) (0.117) (0.051) (0.054) (0.086) (0.085)
£1 -0.339*** -0.274*** 0.187*** 0.177*** -0.204*** -0.170**
(0.107) (0.112) (0.052) (0.058) (0.078) (0.081)
R2 0.039 0.137 0.026 0.100 0.032 0.134
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. N = 341. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns
present regressions of Compassion (standardized) and Social motivation (factor) on treatment dum-
mies; the baseline category is the £0 treatment. Controls include age, gender, studentship, education,
income, risk and time preferences, and choice of good cause.
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Table C.5.3: Social Preferences in Social Enterprises: Quantile Regressions
(1) 10th pct. (2) 25th pct. (3) 50th pct. (4) 75th pct. (5) 90th pct.
A. Compassion
£0.25 0.295 -0.006 -0.256 0.080 0.115
(0.347) (0.261) (0.226) (0.252) (0.420)
£0.50 0.201 0.179 0.039 0.181 -0.101
(0.302) (0.232) (0.212) (0.222) (0.323)
£1 -0.115 0.030 -0.260 -0.121 -0.374
(0.301) (0.226) (0.229) (0.190) (0.318)
B. Social motivation
£0.25 -0.106 -0.151 -0.060 -0.051 -0.045
(0.205) (0.181) (0.156) (0.172) (0.242)
£0.50 -0.239 -0.067 0.036 0.043 -0.003
(0.207) (0.182) (0.161) (0.182) (0.205)
£1 -0.317* -0.297* -0.260 -0.259 -0.359*
(0.186) (0.177) (0.163) (0.176) (0.209)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. N = 341. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
(1000 replications). Columns present quantile regressions of Compassion (standardized)
and Social motivation (factor) on treatment dummies for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th
quantiles; the baseline category is the £0 treatment. Controls include age, gender, income,
studentship, education, risk and time preferences, and choice of good cause.
Table C.5.4: Social Preferences by Treatment, Conditional on Social Enterprise Sorting
Inequality Hypothetical Willing Prosocial
Altruism aversion Altruism to share behavior Risk Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
£0.25 -0.389 -0.316 14.214 -0.150 -0.291 -0.136 -0.076
(0.308) (0.384) (29.871) (0.375) (0.208) (0.437) (0.378)
£0.50 -0.497* -0.149 2.896 -0.039 -0.189 0.167 -0.109
(0.294) (0.366) (28.500) (0.358) (0.198) (0.417) (0.361)
£1 -0.762*** -0.199 -43.925 -0.810** -0.295 -0.043 -0.555
(0.281) (0.350) (0.262) (0.343) (0.189) (0.399) (0.345)
Test of joint significance p-value:
0.051 0.870 0.051 0.014 0.426 0.862 0.217
R2 0.023 0.002 0.023 0.031 0.008 0.002 0.013
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. N = 341. Standard errors in parentheses. Results from
regressions of social preference measures on treatment dummies. The baseline category comprises the
£0 treatment. Controlling for age, gender, income, studentship, education, risk and time preferences,
and choice of good cause does not alter the qualitative picture. Multiple hypothesis testing adjustments
render all coefficients statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p > 0.1).
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C.6 Robustness Check: Effort Measures
Share of social effort Our main analysis focuses on sliders moved to the position equivalent to
social effort, but our sampling restrictions include some observations where not all 15 sliders in a
contract were placed correctly. This may create problems in interpreting results using social effort
if total effort is not adjusted accordingly. For example, for one individual 6 units of social effort
out of 15 correctly placed sliders result in 40% social effort, while for another 6 units of social
effort out of 10 correctly placed sliders result in 60% social effort.10 To address this, we assess the
effects of treatment on the share of effort exerted in the social task, i.e. social effort as a fraction
of total effort. The results for this dependent variable in Table C.6.1 completely mirror those in
Table 4.2 for social effort units. Throughout this section, we show results for both dependent
variables in order to ensure robustness (and our multiple hypothesis testing adjustments take this
into account). Considering the different sampling restrictions with regards to slider placement in
Table C.4.1, using units of social effort becomes more problematic when including subjects with
more incorrectly placed sliders, which may attenuate our adverse specialization results for the £0
bonus SE. Compare, for instance, column (1) in Table C.4.1, where we progressively relax slider
placement restrictions. The units of social effort go down from 11 in Panel A, where we restrict
the sample to subjects who only placed sliders at 25 and 75, to 10.24 in Panel G, where all subjects
are included, and sliders placed at 23-27 and 73-77 are considered correct. While units of social
effort decrease, the share of social effort only varies between 0.733 and 0.717, suggesting that this
measure captures effort allocation well regardless of slider placement restrictions. That results
across both variables are very similar is encouraging, and we focus our analysis on units of social
effort due to its higher transparency.
Fixed effects models Without sorting, all subjects perform the FP, NP, and SE contracts.
Comparisons across contracts must then adjust for the paired nature of the test. More specifically,
the results in Table 4.2 suggest the SE contract is always different from the NP and FP contracts
in simple and paired t-tests. An alternative way to account for non-independence is to estimate
individual fixed effects models. We regress social effort (as units or shares) on dummies for SE
and NP contracts, using Part 2 observations only and the FP contract as a baseline. The results
in Table C.6.2 confirm our results: social effort is higher in the SE and NP contracts relative to
the FP contract; the former are different from each other, with p < 0.0001, although the gap is
much smaller in the £0 treatment.
Adverse specialization The top panel of Figure 4.2 shows that 30%-40% of social enterprise
workers in the £0 treatment only exert social effort. This bimodal distribution stands in contrast
to a distribution centered around the SE social effort average, suggesting adverse specialization is
driven by a subgroup of workers, rather than by higher social effort across the board. What drives
this behavior? Our theoretical framework implies that a high level of social motivation should
increase the likelihood that workers exert only social effort. To examine this, we regress a dummy
for maximum social effort on Compassion and Social motivation in Table C.6.3. With or without
sorting, there does not appear to a linear association between Social motivation and maximum
social effort.11 More compassionate workers are more likely to exert maximum effort, especially in
the top decile of the distribution; the direction is the same for Social motivation, although these
results are not significant (potentially due to small sample size). However, these individuals have
10 Note that we do not find differences in SE total effort across treatments, regardless of the sample we use.
11 Although the negative effects of Social motivation on adverse specialization in Panel B are not statistically
significant, the quadratic results suggest that both the least and the most motivated individuals exert maximum
social effort. The former may do so as a response to performing a contract they would not otherwise have chosen
and may feel compelled to exert substantial social effort (see also Lazear et al., 2012).
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self-selected into the SE contract and are more motivated than those who self-selected into the FP
contract, as per Table C.5.5. Figure C.6.1 displays a scatter plot of SE Social effort in the £0
treatment and Social motivation. Those who self-select into the SE (the gray dots) are more likely
to have higher motivation, as there are visibly fewer observations with Social motivation < 0. They
are also more likely to exert maximum social effort, as the concentration of gray dots in the upper
right-hand side suggests. Overall, adverse specialization in the absence of monetary incentives
appears to be driven especially by individuals with very high levels of compassion. In additional
checks, we verified that these individuals experience the largest changes in effort allocation once
incentives are introduced (available upon request).
Measures of imbalance In our main analysis, we focus on units of Social effort as the most
straightforward measure of effort allocation, and compare SE social effort with a fully balanced
effort allocation (i.e., 7.5 units) and with FP and NP social effort (and their average). Moreover,
results are similar when we perform comparisons using the share of social effort, with a fully
balanced effort allocation as a reference (i.e., a 50% share). Because our theory is centered on the
notion of balance, we can also capture effort allocation with more direct measures of (im)balance.
These measures have a straightforward reference point (i.e., full balance implies a value of zero)
and account for incorrectly placed sliders. The difference between social and commercial effort
(S − C) provides a metric of how dominant the social task is relative to the commercial task,
although this variable can become negative if commercial effort dominates; this variable allows
for deviations from full balance to cancel each other out and can be considered a flexible measure
of overall imbalance. Conversely, deviations from full balance can be considered as distortions
regardless of their direction; thus, total imbalance can be conceptualized as the absolute value of
the difference between social and commercial effort (|S−C|). Table C.6.4 presents the results from
using both of these variables, for which a fully balanced effort allocation produces a value of zero.
The £0 treatment shows a significant level of imbalance, while all other treatments are associated
with significantly more balanced effort allocations (similar across incentive levels). In addition, as
Panel C shows, subjects in the top decile of Compassion have higher levels of imbalance, consistent
with a relationship between social preferences and adverse specialization.
Tobit models Table 4.4 shows the results of linear regressions of the different measures of social
effort and balance on treatment dummies, a dummy for the sorting condition, and their interaction.
While this represents the simplest and most transparent estimation method, all three dependent
variables exhibit a certain degree of censoring. Social effort can only range between 0 and 15, as
can the measure of absolute balance, while the share of social effort ranges from 0% to 100%, with
around 16% of observations being censored in each case. Therefore, Tobit regressions are a more
appropriate estimation technique. The Tobit results we show in Table C.6.5 are fully parallel to
the ones obtained with linear regression, suggesting censoring in the dependent variables is not an
important concern.
Absence and presence of bonus As our results suggest, SE social effort does not differ signifi-
cantly between the £0.25, £0.50, and £1 treatments. To examine their joint impact in an analysis
of extensive versus intensive margin effects, we aggregate these three treatments into a single Bonus
dummy, whereas the £0 treatment corresponds to an SE that uses no bonus. Table C.6.6 repli-
cates the analysis in Table 4.4 with this simple dummy for the presence or absence of incentives.
Confirming our previous findings, allowing for sorting does not matter for the relationship between
incentives and effort allocation.
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Figure C.6.1: Social effort in the SE contract, £0 treatment.
Table C.6.1: Social Effort Share, by Contract and Treatment
No sorting Sorting
£0 £0.25 £0.50 £1 £0 £0.25 £0.50 £1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FP 0.328 0.344 0.349 0.376 0.266 0.276 0.273 0.325
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.062)
SE 0.729 0.477 0.475 0.492 0.709 0.504 0.535 0.507
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.025) (0.021) (0.015)
NP 0.887 0.854 0.869 0.854 0.890 0.917 0.911 0.897
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.034) (0.056) (0.046)
SE effort t-tests of equality p-values:
vs £0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
vs £0.25 0.922 0.553 0.340 0.925
vs £0.50 0.479 0.256
SE effort t-tests of equality with NP and FP average, t-statistics and p-values:
+0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 +0.001 −0.006 −0.128 −0.012
Standard errors in parentheses. Within each column the FP, NP, and SE social effort levels are
different from each other (p < 0.0001). We employ matched pair t-tests for the no sorting condition,
acknowledging that all individuals performed the slider task in all contract types. In the bottom row,
‘+’ means SE is closer to NP than FP, and ‘−’ means SE is closer to FP than NP.
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Table C.6.2: Social Effort without Sorting: Fixed Effects Models
(1) £0 (2) £0.25 (3) £0.50 (4) £1
A. Units of social effort
SE 6.018*** 1.978*** 1.881*** 1.703***
(0.426) (0.331) (0.319) (0.336)
NP 8.388*** 7.567*** 7.757*** 7.057***
(0.455) (0.433) (0.425) (0.443)
B. Share of social effort
SE 0.401*** 0.133*** 0.126*** 0.116***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
NP 0.559*** 0.510*** 0.521*** 0.478***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 510 534 555 525
Subjects 170 178 185 175
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
baseline category consists of social effort in the FP contract. Social effort is different
in the SE and NP contracts across all treatments, with p < 0.0001.
Table C.6.3: Adverse Specialization and Motivation
No sorting Sorting
DV: Maximum social effort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Compassion
Compassion 0.027 0.037 0.235** 0.114*
(0.047) (0.040) (0.085) (0.080)
Compassion2 0.095*** 0.150***
(0.025) (0.050)
Compassion ≥ 90th pct. 0.363*** 0.946***
(0.134) (0.148)
R2 0.093 0.154 0.136 0.579 0.657 0.740
N 170 170 170 49 49 49
B. Social motivation
Social motivation -0.186 -0.076 0.241 0.145
(0.057) (0.056) (0.176) (0.183)
Social motivation2 0.085* 0.146
(0.047) (0.163)
Social motivation ≥ 90th pct. -0.021 0.573
(0.139) (0.372)
R2 0.106 0.122 0.091 0.531 0.546 0.566
N 170 170 170 49 49 49
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Results from linear regressions of
dummies for exerting only social effort in the SE contract with a £0 bonus on subjects’ Compassion
or Social Motivation (and their square terms, or a dummy for the top decile of the distribution).
Controls include age, gender, income, studentship, education, risk and time preferences, and choice
of good cause. Results are also qualitatively similar for the other social preference measures.
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Table C.6.4: Measures of imbalance
Absolute imbalance |S − C| Absolute imbalance S − C
No sorting Sorting No sorting Sorting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Differences in balance across treatments
£0 (benchmark) 7.894 6.959 6.871 6.265
(0.349) (0.623) (0.553) (0.844)
£0.25 -2.197*** -2.192*** -7.522*** -6.128***
(0.551) (0.805) (0.774) (1.091)
£0.50 -2.570*** -2.523*** -7.632*** -5.212***
(0.546) (0.768) (0.767) (1.040)
£1 -2.717*** -3.495*** -7.111*** -6.065***
(0.553) (0.735) (0.777) (0.995)
R2 0.043 0.064 0.163 0.111
N 708 341 708 341
B. t-tests of equality p-values
£0.25 vs £0.50 0.490 0.627 0.884 0.321
£0.25 vs £1 0.343 0.043 0.592 0.942
£0.50 vs £1 0.786 0.103 0.493 0.291
C. Compassion
≥ 90th pct. 4.590*** 9.210*** 5.805*** 10.885***
(1.449) (1.986) (1.710) (2.432)
R2 0.153 0.701 0.175 0.677
N 170 49 170 49
D. Social motivation
≥ 90th pct. -0.202 5.293 -0.461 6.849
(1.706) (3.885) (2.007) (4.522)
R2 0.107 0.597 0.123 0.569
N 170 49 170 49
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Results from linear regressions of
balance measures on treatment dummies (Panel A) and social preference measures (Panels C and D).
The significant difference between the £0.25 and £1 treatments under the |S − C| balance measure
is eliminated when adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table C.6.5: Tobit models: Intensive and Extensive Margin Effects
Social effort units Social effort share Absolute balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
£0.25 -4.683*** -4.822*** -0.310*** -0.319*** -3.074*** -3.284***
(0.509) (0.509) (0.034) (0.034) (0.749) (0.742)
£0.50 -4.825*** -4.936*** -0.321*** -0.328*** -3.395*** -3.672***
(0.508) (0.511) (0.034) (0.034) (0.750) (0.745)
£1 -4.519*** -4.594*** -0.298*** -0.303*** -3.627*** -3.803***
(0.504) (0.508) (0.034) (0.034) (0.748) (0.752)
Sorting -0.491 -0.412 -0.033 -0.028 -1.210 -1.096
(0.645) (0.631) (0.043) (0.042) (1.069) (1.039)
Sorting × £0.25 0.962 0.876 0.064 0.059 0.169 0.346
(0.757) (0.748) (0.050) (0.050) (1.207) (1.171)
Sorting × £0.50 1.572** 1.485** 0.106** 0.100** 0.102 0.023
(0.750) (0.736) (0.050) (0.049) (1.165) (1.134)
Sorting × £1 0.791 0.704 0.050 0.045 -0.652 -0.734
(0.709) (0.695) (0.047) (0.046) (1.136) (1.103)
Constant 11.832*** 12.434*** 0.789*** 0.829*** 9.074*** 9.156***
(0.402) (0.760) (0.027) (0.051) (0.640) (1.130)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049
Left-censored 46 (4.38%) 46 (4.38%) 3 (0.03%)
Right-censored 128 (12.20%) 128 (12.20%) 174 (16.59%)
Pseudo-R2 0.034 0.039 0.240 0.277 0.013 0.022
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.
The baseline category is the £0 treatment when sorting is not possible. See Table 4.4 for details.
Table C.6.6: Aggregating Treatments: Intensive and Extensive Margin Effects
Social effort units Social effort share Absolute balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bonus -3.744*** -3.850*** -0.248*** -0.255*** -2.494*** -2.694***
(0.318) (0.322) (0.021) (0.021) (0.510) (0.513)
Sorting -0.303 -0.238 -0.020 -0.016 -0.935 -0.875
(0.470) (0.463) (0.031) (0.031) (0.837) (0.822)
Sorting × Bonus 0.824 0.756 0.054 0.050 -0.362 -0.333
(0.501) (0.495) (0.033) (0.033) (0.868) (0.851)
Constant 10.935*** 11.544*** 0.729*** 0.769*** 7.894*** 7.860***
(0.277) (0.630) (0.018) (0.042) (0.466) (0.923)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049
R2 0.151 0.175 0.150 0.173 0.062 0.108
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses. The
baseline category is the £0 treatment when sorting is not possible (i.e. no bonus); Bonus captures all
other treatments with a positive incentive. See Table 4.4 for details.
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C.7 Multiple Hypothesis Testing and Heterogeneity
Multiple hypothesis testing Throughout the analysis we compare social effort across several
treatments and outcomes, thus increasing the rate of false positive discoveries (Romano and Wolf,
2005). To alleviate this concern, we follow the procedure described by List et al. (2018) to account
for multiple hypothesis testing in conducting pair-wise comparisons between the four treatments
(£0, £0.25, £0.05, £1) and two outcomes (social enterprise social effort as units and shares).
Table C.7.1 shows unadjusted p-values, List et al. (2018) multiplicity-adjusted p-values, and p-
values from the application of conservative Bonferroni and Holm corrections. We perform the
tests separately for the conditions with and without sorting. In comparing the no bonus group
(£0) with the bonus groups (£0.25, £0.05, £1), significance is not affected: even with the strongest
penalties for multiple hypothesis testing, the effort allocation is more balanced when a bonus is
present. These results hold for multiple hypothesis testing adjustments accounting for comparisons
by gender: with or without worker sorting, the effort allocation is more balanced when the bonus
is positive.
Gender differences Women are often found to have stronger other-regarding preferences and
to be more likely to engage with social, rather than commercial ventures (Croson and Gneezy,
2009; Dimitriadis et al., 2017). In our data women exhibit higher compassion, higher previous
prosocial behavior, lower risk tolerance, and higher Social motivation, which survive multiple
hypothesis testing adjustments (Romano and Wolf, 2005). This may imply that i) women exert
more social effort and potentially exhibit stronger adverse specialization, and ii) the introduction
and strength of social enterprise monetary incentives may lead to different sorting patterns and
effort allocation for men and women. For these reasons, our randomization was stratified by
gender, allowing us to perform comparisons across groups without loss of precision.12 When we
regress social effort on treatment dummies, gender, and their interactions in Table C.7.2, women’s
social effort is less crowded out by incentives, and significantly so in the £0.50 treatment; however,
the differences in the share of effort devoted to the social task are not significant when sorting is
allowed. Furthermore, multiple hypothesis testing adjustments suggest that gender differences in
the effects of treatment on social effort are not significantly different for men and women, as also
seen by plotting Social effort for the two groups in Figure C.7.1. In Table C.7.3 we regress our
motivation measures on gender, treatment dummies, and their interaction. Women’s motivation
is crowded out to a smaller extent (as evidenced by the positive interaction coefficients), but not
significantly so.
Previous social organization experience Individuals with previous social sector experience
– working for or with non-profits or social enterprises – may differ from other individuals in two
ways. Their work may have rendered them more socially motivated (Hockerts, 2017) or may have
accustomed them to an institutional logic where revenue generation and commercial practices are
the exception rather than the norm (Pache and Santos, 2010), so incentives may elicit different
reactions from this subgroup. We create a dummy variable for individuals who have worked i)
in a non-profit, ii) in a social enterprise, or iii) with a social organization and compare results
across groups with and without such experience (results are similar if we also include volunteering
and donations). Results for the subsamples of individuals with and without previous experience
in the social sector are similar in both the sorting and non-sorting conditions. Individuals with a
social sector background exert slightly less social effort, such that their effort allocation in the £0
12 Bruhn and Mckenzie (2009) recommend controlling for strata dummies when assessing treatment effects in
regression analyses. Our regressions with and without controls show that controlling for gender – our stratifying
variable – does not affect our overall results.
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treatment is slightly more balanced, although adverse specialization is still present. One speculative
interpretation may be that, in contrast to the above expectation, over time social sector employees
become attuned to organizations’ financial issues and exert more effort on the commercial task to
compensate for this perceived deficiency. Nonetheless, the differences between those with a social
sector background and those without remain small.
Mission heterogeneity Because social preferences may be weakly correlated with good cause
choice (Appendix Table C.2.4), we use good cause choice dummies in our regression analyses,
effectively performing within-mission analyses. However, this approach does not necessarily imply
that the effects do not differ by mission, another potentially important source of heterogeneity.
For this reason, we analyze social enterprise Social effort separately for each mission, summarizing
the results in Figure C.7.2. Despite the small samples in the sorting condition, the results are
very similar to our pooled sample, with evidence of adverse specialization in the £0 treatment and
effective balanced in the £0.25, £0.50, and £1 treatments, especially when individuals are allowed
to select their preferred contract. Differences across chosen good causes are therefore limited and
do not add much insight beyond our main conclusions. The uniform effects of monetary incentives
across on social effort across these three representative social enterprise missions (which comprise
more than 60% of issues tackled by SEs, Mair et al., 2012), also hints at the validity of our results
for other types of missions.
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Figure C.7.1: Social effort in social enterprises by treatment for women (top) and men (bottom),
with 95% confidence intervals; the dashed line represents a fully balanced effort allocation.
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Figure C.7.2: Social effort in social enterprises by treatment and mission, with 95% confidence
intervals; the dashed line represents a fully balanced effort allocation.
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Table C.7.1: Multiple Hypothesis Testing Adjustments
Comparison p-value
Group 1 Group 2 Difference Unadjusted Adjusted Bonferroni Holm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A1. Units of SE social effort, no sorting
£0.xx £0.25 3.806 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0040
£0.xx £0.50 3.827 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0033
£0.xx £1.xx 3.592 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0027
£0.25 £0.50 0.021 0.9553 0.9553 1.0000 0.9553
£0.25 £1.xx 0.213 0.5843 0.8233 1.0000 1.0000
£0.50 £1.xx 0.234 0.5503 0.8367 1.0000 1.0000
A2. Share of SE social effort, no sorting
£0.xx £0.25 0.251 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0037
£0.xx £0.50 0.254 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0030
£0.xx £1.xx 0.236 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0023
£0.25 £0.50 0.002 0.9210 0.9340 1.0000 1.0000
£0.25 £1.xx 0.015 0.5590 0.8037 1.0000 1.0000
£0.50 £1.xx 0.017 0.4933 0.7920 1.0000 1.0000
B1. Units of SE social effort, sorting
£0.xx £0.25 3.098 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0040
£0.xx £0.50 2.632 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0030
£0.xx £1.xx 3.032 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0023
£0.25 £0.50 0.465 0.3390 0.5513 1.0000 1.0000
£0.25 £1.xx 0.065 0.8733 0.8873 1.0000 1.0000
£0.50 £1.xx 0.400 0.3087 0.5563 1.0000 1.0000
B2. Share of SE social effort, sorting
£0.xx £0.25 0.204 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0027
£0.xx £0.50 0.173 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0037
£0.xx £1.xx 0.202 0.0003 0.0003 0.0040 0.0030
£0.25 £0.50 0.031 0.3400 0.5100 1.0000 1.0000
£0.25 £1.xx 0.003 0.9210 0.9210 1.0000 0.9210
£0.50 £1.xx 0.028 0.2833 0.5887 1.0000 1.0000
Results from pairwise comparisons of treatment groups using the multiple hypothesis testing
p-value adjustments proposed by List et al. (2018), performed separately for the conditions
with or without sorting. Each test considers two outcomes (social effort as units and share)
and four treatments (£0, £0.25, £0.05, £1), and produces an estimate for the unadjusted
p-value, the List et al. (2018) multiplicity-adjusted p-value, and p-values from the application
of conservative Bonferroni and Holm corrections.
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Table C.7.3: Gender Differences in Social Preferences
Compassion (standardized) Social Motivation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
£0.25 -0.334 -0.256 -0.189 -0.108
(0.255) (0.247) (0.198) (0.200)
£0.50 -0.276 -0.208 -0.134 -0.107
(0.253) (0.232) (0.194) (0.188)
£1 -0.549** -0.423* -0.464*** -0.383**
(0.236) (0.226) (0.170) (0.171)
Female -0.064 -0.080 -0.035 -0.015
(0.251) (0.245) (0.185) (0.184)
Female × £0.25 0.365 0.327 0.159 0.066
(0.329) (0.328) (0.252) (0.252)
Female × £0.50 0.403 0.436 0.121 0.151
(0.321) (0.304) (0.242) (0.236)
Female × £1 0.444 0.433 0.226 0.199
(0.301) (0.293) (0.217) (0.214)
Controls No Yes No Yes
R2 0.047 0.149 0.049 0.140
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. N = 341. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
baseline category is the £0 treatment for men.
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